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Summary
The European 3G mobile phone spectrum administrations, which took place between 
1999 and 2002, used a variety o f different methods for allocating licences. The total 
value o f licence fees raised by auctions tended to be significantly higher than those 
achieved in countries which adopted a ‘beauty contest’ approach for assessing 
bidders. Post-administration, many o f the licence-winning firms experienced 
financial distress. There were suggestions at the time that the firms that won licences 
through auction procedures had suffered a ‘w inner’s curse’. There was a certain 
amount o f support for this proposition; licence winners across Europe delayed the 
roll-out o f  3G network infrastructure and, in a number o f  cases, handed back their 
licences or had them revoked. By pooling data across European spectrum 
administrations, this thesis presents an empirical analysis o f  how much was paid for 
licences and who won them. The analysis provides evidence for the proposition that 
administrators raised considerably higher revenues with auctions than was the case 
with beauty contests. In addition to this, the analysis also finds that a number o f key 
revenue-raising factors were out o f the control o f the administering authorities. The 
second part o f this thesis seeks to identify a w inner’s curse through a comparative 
event study o f the German auction and the Swedish beauty contest. This analysis 
provides clear support to the proposition that some firms that won licences through 
auction procedures suffered a w inner’s curse. The final part o f the thesis examines 
the role o f regulation and regulatory bargaining in the mobile telecommunications 
industry. Through the application o f real option theory, it can be shown that a high 
licence fee can cause delay in network infrastructure investment. A simple two stage 
Nash bargaining model can then be used to show how this m ay affect regulatory 
behaviour.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1: The Beginnings of 3G
At the end o f 1999, European Union (EU) countries began the process o f administering 
licences to run the Third Generation (3G) of mobile telecommunication technology. This 
was in accordance with Decision No. 128/1999/EC o f the European Parliament (1999), 
which laid down January 1st 2000 as the deadline by which European Union countries 
must have decided on the method o f their licence administration and January 1st 2002 as 
the deadline for commercial services to be in place. At the time the 3G technology was 
considered to be a considerable improvement over its predecessors, first generation (an 
analogue service) and the then current second generation (2G), which in Europe was run 
on the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM).
The technology that was adopted in Europe to run 3G services is also known as the 
Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS), which was one o f the standards 
recommended by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as part o f the IMT- 
2000 initiative. Due to the increased speeds offered by the new technology, mobile 
communication moved away from simply offering calls and basic data transfer to 
offering a variety o f multimedia services and on demand internet access. In order to run 
these new services an additional portion o f radio frequency was required to be assigned 
to operators. Due to the considerable growth in mobile subscription and the sizable 
profits that had been made by 2G operators, the spectrum that was to be used for 3G was 
seen as a scarce resource of considerable value. However, at the same time it was 
recognised by some countries that the speedy development o f 3G services were in their 
national interest. In attempting to account for these two concerns, and depending on the 
priorities of the administrating authority, a range o f different types o f administrations 
were used across Europe.
The types o f administration used can be broadly split into auctions and beauty contests. 
Both these types o f administration varied in how successful they were both in terms of 
attracting entry, raising funds and administering all their licences. Two procedures that
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were particularly successful were the German and UK auctions raising €50.8 billion and 
€37.5 billion respectively Indeed the success of these auctions were acclaimed as a great 
success for the application o f auction theory. Klemperer (2002) in particular gave credit 
to good auction design for those auctions that raised large sums and blamed bad auction 
design for the failure o f some administrations. The assumption was that the licences had 
been administered to the bidders that valued them the most and would use them most 
efficiently. Despite the size o f some o f the licence fees it was assumed that licence fees 
would not impact on the post-administration mobile telecommunication market. This 
was accordance with standard economic theory that a one off lump sum fee will have no 
impact on the firm ’s behaviour. However with such high prices being paid headlines 
began to emerge questioning whether licence winners had paid too much. Headlines 
such as “2 bad for 3G” (Economist, 2003) and “Pass the Painkillers” (Economist, 2001) 
led to Klemperer defending his position in the media [Klemperer, 2002c, 2002d and 
2002e].
Despite the initial optimism surrounding the 3G technology as licence winners debts 
began to rise, concerns emerged over the viability o f firms in the industry. The level of 
fees that were being charged began to be blamed directly for the downgrading of some 
firms credit ratings (Del Monte, 2003). As the remaining licences were administered 
further concerns were raised as some licences went unadministered and others were sold 
for very low fees. These concerns continued into the post-administration market as 
licence winners failed to meet network roll-out targets that had been set in their licensing 
conditions. In a number of cases this led the regulating authority to reduce the coverage 
commitment or increase the amount of time that firms had to meet their commitments. 
As time went on it became clear that in a number o f cases these relaxations were not 
sufficient and licence winners began to either hand back their licences or have them 
revoked. Those firms that did establish networks used the levels o f debt they had 
incurred as a reason to request relaxations in the regulatory framework that they faced.
1.2: Thesis Structure
It is the method, consequences and response to the 3G licence administration that this 
thesis is interested in exploring. The particular questions that the thesis wishes to answer
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are; what factors determined how much was paid for licences and who won them? Is 
there evidence that too much was paid for the licences? Why was their delay in the roll­
out of 3G networks and what evidence is there that the regulators responded to licence 
winning firms’ financial distress through regulatory easing?
In addressing these questions, this thesis can be broadly split into three sections. The 
first part will focus on what happened in the auctions to run 3G licences. In particular, 
the development o f different methods to administered spectrum and the results o f the 
administration procedures. The second part considers in more detail whether winners of 
3G licences paid too much for the licences that they won through auction procedures. 
The third section examines the regulation o f telecommunications with a focus on mobile 
telecommunications and then goes on to examine whether there is any evidence that the 
administration o f 3G licences impacted on the post-administration industry development 
and regulation.
1.1.2: Part 1. Who, Why and How Much?
Part 1 consists o f Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 2 discusses the use o f different methods 
to administer spectrum. It outlines the advantages and disadvantages o f first-come-first- 
served, lotteries, beauty contests and actions as methods for administering spectrum. The 
chapter will give particular focus to the development o f the use o f auctions to administer 
spectrum. This description will trace the early auctions in Australia and New Zealand 
and the relatively successful FCC auctions in the USA. It was the success o f these 
auctions that contributed to auctions being used to administer some o f the licences to run 
3G services in Europe.
Chapter 3 gives a more detailed examination o f the administration o f 3G licences in 
those European countries that administered their licences before 2004. This chapter will 
describe in detail the method used in each countries administration as well as the 
difficulties experienced in some administrations. These descriptions will also include 
some technical detail of each licence procedure. In addition to the detail o f what 
occurred in each administration there will also be a discussion o f some o f the key post­
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administration events for each country in particular the circumstances around the hand 
back of some licences and the ability of firms to meet roll-out conditions. This will 
include a discussion o f the current state o f 3G development and network competition in 
each country. The chapter will attempt to consider those factors that have been 
suggested as causing some o f the difference in licence fees. The chapter will end with a 
review of some o f the reasons that have been put suggested to explain the post­
administration behaviour. One element that this chapter will give particular focus to is 
the way in which both beauty contest and auction countries faced post-administration 
difficulties and how different countries dealt with them. Indeed, countries that used 
beauty contest faced a very similar number o f licences being handed back as countries 
that used auction administrations.
Chapter 4 takes the analysis o f the licence fees further by presenting an empirical 
analysis o f how much was paid and who won, by pooling data across European spectrum 
administrations. This analysis tests those factors, whether they are country specific, 
administration specific or bidder specific variables that affected the size o f each bidders 
observed bid. The chapter is particularly interested in the reasons for the difference in 
licence fees across countries. There will also be an analysis o f those factors that 
determined which bidders won licences. The administration procedures will be 
examined as a whole data set with auctions and beauty contests together and before both 
types of administration are analysed separately. Some key findings from this first section 
are that some o f the most important factors that impacted o f the size o f the observed bid 
were out o f the control o f the administering authority. Although, as expected, the type of 
administration procedure had a major impact on the bids that were placed within the 
administrations one of the key factors that affected the size o f bids was the timing o f the 
administration. In addition to this, and despite the desire o f a number of countries to try 
and attract entry, being an incumbent was the most important factor in determining 
which bidders won licences.
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1.1.2. Part 2. Was a Winner’s Curse Present?
The second part consists of Chapters 5, 6 and 7. These chapters make a closer 
examination o f two particular administrations and whether evidence from stock market 
reactions can provide support for or against a winner’s curse in some 3G 
administrations. Chapter 5 will focus on the concept o f a winner’s curse. In particular it 
will highlight where and how the winner’s curse has traditionally been identified. It will 
discuss why a winner’s curse may have existed in some 3G auctions and the evidence 
that has been discovered thus far that supports or refutes the idea that there was a 
winner’s curse in the 3G auctions. There will be a section that problematises the 
traditional method o f searching for a winner’s curse by examining the ex post returns of 
a licence winner. Chapter 5 will also begin the discussion o f the method that this thesis 
will use to search for a winner’s curse the event study.
Chapter 6 will provide an in depth discussion of the development and method behind the 
event study and the justification for the core assumption that underlies the use of event 
study. This assumption is that equity markets will price new information correctly and 
are thus, at least, semi-strong efficient. The reaction of the equity markets can then be 
used place a value on 3G licences. Attention will be given to the issues that arise with 
using an event study such as appropriate selection of estimation model and the problems 
with different types of estimation techniques. Much o f this chapter will also focus on the 
particular problems associated with carrying out an event study on an event such as a 
licence administration procedure. The chapter will discuss how all these issues will be 
dealt with in the context o f this study.
Chapter 7 reports the results of a comparative event study between two different 
administration procedures. The German auction and Swedish beauty contest are used for 
comparison due to their relative value in terms of regional strategic importance and the 
fact that they used very different methods of administration and raised very different 
levels o f revenue. One important attribute of these two administrations was that both 
attracted a larger number or participants meaning the final outcomes o f the 
administrations were uncertain. This is particularly important for the results o f the event
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study to be interpreted correctly. The chapter will then also outline some o f the 
particular technical difficulties with carrying out an event study on the German and 
Swedish procedures. The event study for Sweden and Germany are reported with three 
different estimation techniques to account for problems that can occur with estimation 
using ordinary least squares with market data. These results for Germany and Sweden 
will also be compared to an earlier event study on the UK auction. The broad finding of 
this comparative event study is that there is certain evidence o f a winner’s curse in some 
European administration procedures.
1.1.2: Part 3. Regulation and the Post-administration Environment
After Part 1 has dealt with the determination of licence fees and who won the licences
and Part 2 has considered the evidence o f overpayment for 3G licences in auction 
procedures; the next step is to consider the impact that the 3G licensing procedure has 
had on the post-administration market. Section 3 will move into the area o f regulation 
and post-administration behaviour. The purpose of this section is to try and understand 
some o f the complex relationships that occur between regulator and firm and explain 
some o f the behaviour that was observed in the post-administration market. In order to 
give some context to the discussion o f post-administration regulation Chapter 8 will 
begin with a discussion o f the motivations and broad methods for regulation in the 
telecommunication and, in particular the mobile telecommunication sector. The chapter 
will then go onto lay down the regulatory framework that has been established at both a 
European and a national level, there will also be an examination o f documentary 
evidence that there was regulatory easing at both the European and national level as a 
result o f the 3G licensing procedure.
Chapter 9 will then seek to explain some o f the behaviour that was seen in some markets 
post-administration. In particular it will seek to examine how inefficiencies in credit 
markets or firms undertaking irrational investment behaviour could bring about delay in 
infrastructure investment and abandonment o f licences. The key finding here is that high 
licence fees can increase the value o f delay to the firm. The consequence o f this will be 
demonstrated through its effect on Rubinstein bargaining weights. The chapter will
6
finish with a discussion of how these financial concepts could be used to explain the 
post-administration behaviour of regulators, in terms o f regulatory easing, through a 
Nash bargaining mechanism. Chapter 10 will conclude this thesis with a discussion of 
the main findings of the research. In particular how there can be a conflict between the 
administrator social goals and revenue raising ability.
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Part 1
Chapter 2: Allocating Spectrum Licences
The following three chapters that make up Part 1 examine the development and 
implementation of different methods o f administering the European 3G licences. This 
chapter outlines the historical context for the development o f different method of 
spectrum licence administration and the decisions that led to a range o f methods being 
used in the administration across Europe. It will begin with a discussion o f the 
theoretical arguments that were developed around spectrum allocation in the early 
Antipodean administrations and American FCC administrations. It then goes on to 
address the decisions that led to a number o f different type of procedures being used in 
the European assignments. Finally, the chapter will begin to consider the different 
factors that determined the size of administered licences. Chapter 3 will go into the 
details o f  each administration procedure under consideration and some detail o f the post­
administration environment. Chapter 4 will examine those factors that affected the size 
o f the licence fees and the probability o f each bidding unit winning a licence.
2.1: Methods of Administering Spectrum
Historically, there was little focus on the best way to allocate spectrum to different uses. 
Demand was limited due to the small number o f technologies that required spectrum. 
This led to spectrum being administered on a first-come-first-served basis. In many 
cases, particularly within the telecommunication sector, a single monopoly operator was 
designated by the government. However, with the considerable advances in wireless 
communication and transmission technologies, spectrum began to be considered a 
resource o f great value. In order to avoid spectrum congestion, and the inevitable 
interference that would occur, and to ensure efficient and equitable use o f the limited 
spectrum that was available, new methods o f spectrum administration were needed. In 
addition to this, by pricing the spectrum the administering authorities were able to 
transfer part o f the profit that the spectrum holder would earn, to the public purse. The 
need for a  more efficient spectrum allocation method was identified as far back as Coase 
(1959). With the potential economic benefit o f high speed wireless telecommunication 
it became critical to ensure a fast and efficient distribution of spectrum.
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When allocating licences a number o f key policy objectives can be identified. The 
primary aim o f these procedures was to administer spectrum quickly and in a way that 
facilitates the conditions for market competition. After certain criteria have been 
fulfilled, the administering authority would aim to assign licences to those companies 
that put the highest value on them and which will use them most efficiently. A further 
aim, that is not usually explicitly stated, although as will be seen has often been a 
driving factor, is to raise revenue. Early administrations used differing forms of 
comparative selection or lottery to allocate spectrum. A breakdown o f these 
administration types can be found in Hazlett (1998).
2.1.1\ Lotteries
Lottery systems o f administering spectrum are potentially the simplest method available. 
Those wishing to obtain a licence apply to the administering authority and the licence 
winner is then selected at random. It is possible that there are some qualification criteria 
that a bidder must meet to enter the competition but these will not be used to assess the 
bidders once they have qualified. The main advantage that lotteries have over other 
forms o f administration is their speed and ease o f use. With lotteries, very little time 
needs to be spent designing and assessing the procedure or the criteria used to assign the 
licences. Although the lottery system allocates licences quickly and cheaply, they are not 
necessarily the most efficient method o f administration. There is little control over who 
will win a licence or what plans they have for the licences. It also presents the possibility 
that some firms will apply for licences not to win them, but to sell them on and acquire 
the revenue that could have gone to the licensing authority.
2.1.2: Beauty Contests
An alternative to the use o f lotteries are comparative selection procedures also known as 
‘beauty contests’.1 The use o f beauty contests allows much greater control over who 
receives the licence and how it is used. The bidders that wish to obtain a licence submit 
a proposal to the administering authority. The licensing authority lays down certain
1 An analysis o f the benefits and costs of using beauty contests when compared to auctions can be found in 
OECD (2001).
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conditions for the use of the licences and will select the winner on their proposal to fulfil 
these conditions. Although lottery winners could also have legal obligations placed on 
them, the beauty contest forces bidders to show how they will fulfil these conditions. 
The conditions usually include guarantees on the timeframe for the start o f service 
provision, the level o f geographical coverage, quality o f service commitments and future 
financial viability through a business plan. The administering authority may or may not 
make the judgement criteria available before the proposals are judged. Even if  the 
criteria are made available before proposals are submitted, the exact weightings o f each 
criterion may not be.
In addition to these proposals, the administering authority may also charge a fee. This 
may be a small fee that just covers the costs of running the administration procedure or 
may be a much larger fee if they wish to extract some surplus from the firms. Depending 
on the size o f this fee, there may also be a predefined payment schedule. Ideally, the 
beauty contest enables the licensing authority to achieve certain policy goals and ensure 
that the licenses will be used by the winner.
Although this strict command and control system has clear advantages over the use of 
lotteries it can be criticised from a number o f perspectives. Clearly, judging the bidders’ 
proposals is problematic and enforcing those claims made in them equally difficult. The 
licensing authority relies on the firm providing accurate information on their business 
plan and ability to meet quality commitments. If  the bidders believe that the 
administering authority will take their claims at face value then a beauty contest could 
be considered to be a form o f first price sealed bid auction. Instead o f bidders making 
monetary bids, they bid through the commitments made in the bidders’ proposal. 
Depending on the exact nature o f these criteria there may be considerable difficulties in 
monitoring compliance. The question o f regulatory action in the case o f non-compliance 
may also be problematic. This will be particularly true if  information on non-compliance 
action has not been explicitly laid down in the licence conditions. Even if  non- 
compliance is identifiable once a licence has been administered it is possible that no 
action will be taken. Charging a fee also poses a problem in beauty contests. The
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administering authority will only have a general idea o f how much the licences are 
worth. If  the administrator charges too much then no firms will enter the contest, charge 
too little and they are depriving the public purse in favour o f operating companies. Some 
administering authorities seek to avert the problem of mis-valuing the licences by 
charging a fee ex post. This option was usually conducted by charging a proportion of 
revenue or growth of traffic. However, this has the possibility o f an impact on pricing 
and firm behaviour in the post-administration market that will not be present with a 
lump sum ex ante charge. A further draw back with beauty contests, particularly when 
compared to lotteries, is that organisation, submission and evaluation o f a beauty contest 
can be quite a long, drawn out, and expensive procedure. The licensing authority would 
need time to analyse and grade submissions. It may also mean that the licensing 
authority will have to make decisions on technology that is still developing or risk 
delaying the introduction of technologies that were ready for service. If the administrator 
does not reveal ex ante the exact way in which submissions will be judged there is a 
danger that the process lacks transparency. This may be a particular problem when an 
industry engages in considerable lobbying and there is a suspicion o f regulatory capture.
2.1.3 : Auctions
Auctioning spectrum licences has advantages over both comparative selection and 
lottery administrations. At a superficial level, simple auctions are quicker and easier to 
organise than beauty contests. In practice however, this is not always the case. As shall 
be discussed, a failure to anticipate the effect o f certain auction design decisions can 
have a considerable impact on the outcome o f an auction. Auctions are also not 
necessarily administratively light. Some spectrum auctions started with a form o f beauty 
contest before bidders were able to enter the auction phase. Even if there was not an 
explicit beauty contest phase there was always some qualifying criteria, although these 
are often relatively simple. Even with these added complications, the FCC still estimated 
that using an auction can be up to six times cheaper than a beauty contest procedure 
(McMillan, 1995). Depending on the particular procedure, an auction should have a 
greater level o f transparency. The winner o f the administration should be easily
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identified as it will be the bidder which paid the most. This may be less true where 
sealed bid auctions are used and the bids that were placed are not made public.
Auctions, when carefully designed, are preferred to both lotteries and beauty contests on 
efficiency grounds (OECD, 2002). An auction should administer the licence to the 
bidder that values it most highly and, in turn, cause the bidder to reveal their willingness 
to pay for a licence. This will be the case as long as we are happy to assume that the 
bidder knows better than the administering authority how valuable the licence is to them. 
Those bidders who were best placed to deploy a network quickly and most profitably 
would value licences more highly and therefore enjoy a high probability o f bidding 
successfully. As long as there is sufficient entry, and collusion is prevented, the 
administering authority should be able to maximise the revenue that they receive for the 
licences. However, if  there is collusion present or entry has been deterred, and no 
reserve price has been set, the licences may sell for considerably less than their potential 
When bidders place bids they reveal information to the administering authority. This is 
an improvement on the administering authority having to request and trust the 
information that they are given. However, if  by using an auction there is overpayment 
for licences and this has consequences for the post-administration industry then we may 
question the claim that auctions are more efficient. This will be particularly the case if 
this leads to post-administration regulatory easing.
2.1.3.1: A Brief Description of Auction Characteristics
Within the auction literature and throughout this and the next chapter a number of 
different types o f auction will be referred to. This section will give a non-technical 
overview o f the most common types which were used in spectrum administration. For a 
thorough review o f types o f auctions see Klemperer (1999, 2002a). There are three 
broad classifications that we can use for auctions; open or closed, ascending or 
descending and first price or second price. For instance, a second-price open ascending 
auction would involve the seller starting with a price and bidders bidding ever higher 
prices until the point at which there are no bidders left. At this point, the winning bidder
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will pay a price that is equivalent to the valuation o f the second highest bidder. This is a 
well known type o f auction refereed to as an English auction. It is referred to as a second 
price auction as it is equivalent to a closed (sealed bid) auction where the winner pays 
the price bid by the second highest bidder. The other commonly used auction type is the 
Dutch auction. The Dutch auction is a first-price open descending auction. This involves 
the seller starting with a price then gradually reducing this price until a bidder declares 
that they wish to buy. This is referred to as a first price auction as it is equivalent to a 
sealed bid auction where the winner pays their bid (Vickrey 1962, 1976). This will be an 
incremental price above the value o f the second highest bidder’s willingness to pay. 
Under the revenue equivalence theorem, these two prices will be equivalent as they will 
depend on the expectation o f the second highest private valuation. The revenue 
equivalence theorem refers to auctions for goods with private values, not those with 
common values. Spectrum licences will clearly contain a private value portion but will 
also have a common value element. Due to this common value element revenue 
equivalence no-longer holds due to the potential for a winner’s curse. Assuming that the 
bidders are aware o f the winner’s curse they will bid more cautiously for fear o f paying 
too much. In this case those types o f auction that reveal the most information about other 
bidders’ valuations will raise the most revenue as they will reduce the risk to bidders of 
suffering a winner’s curse. The winner’s curse comes about in a common value auction 
where the value o f the asset that is being auctioned has an uncertain value. As long as 
each bidder’s estimate is conditionally independent and identically distributed then the 
mean o f the estimates will be the true value. However, the bidder that wins the auction 
will not be the bidder with the mean estimate but rather the one with the highest. This 
will mean that the winning bidder will have overpaid for the asset. The threat o f a 
winner’s curse encourages the administrator to use open ascending auctions. A more in 
depth discussion o f the existence and consequences o f a winner’s curse is provided in 
Chapter 5.
In addition to the standard auction types, another important characteristic which was 
used by all the 3G licence auctions is simultaneous multi-unit administration. A 
simultaneous multi-unit auction involves selling all the licences at the same time. One
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other specific detail is what was actually being auctioned. It most cases the licences were 
predefined not only in terms o f size but also where on the frequency table they were 
located. However in two cases, Austria and Germany, the auction was set up in such a 
way that the bidders would be able to determine the number and size o f these licences. 
The firms are able to decrease the number o f operators in the post-administration 
industry by paying more for the licences. The bidding firms will know better than the 
licensing authority how much they value one less operator in the market and can bid 
accordingly. One peculiarity o f this type o f administration is that bidders were not given 
an indication, nor were able to influence, the position on the frequency band that they 
were actually buying. More detail on these two auctions is given in Chapter 3.
2.2: Developm ent of Spectrum  Auctions.
Although auction literature had been around for some time, with early works by Vickrey 
(1961) and Wilson (1969) paving the way for future development, and even the idea o f 
using auctions to distribute spectrum licences in Coase (1959), the practical use of 
auctions in spectrum allocation is a relatively recent phenomenon. The earliest spectrum 
auctions were carried out in New Zealand and Australia in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The use o f spectrum auctions really came o f age when the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) began to use auctions in 1994. Before the 
development o f these auctions different forms o f beauty contests and lotteries had been 
used. McMillan (1994), who was involved in the FCC design process, gives an overview 
o f the decisions that were taken in order to develop what was to become a framework for 
many o f the later spectrum auctions including the 3G auction.
McMillan recounts how the first stage was to learn from the early spectrum auctions in 
New Zealand and Australia. The New Zealand spectrum auction, for various cellular and 
television licences, used a second price sealed bid auction. As was reported by Mueller 
(1993), where there were small numbers o f bidders with one valuing the licence 
particularly highly, the undesirable situation arose where the winning bidder paid 
considerably less than they bid and they were willing to pay. The situation was
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exacerbated by no reserve price being set in the auction. This meant that when there 
were only a few bidders, as was often the case in New Zealand, the revenue was far 
lower than expected. In an attempt to overcome these problems the Australian 
Government used a first price sealed bid auction. When the auction ended the winners 
refused to pay their bid. The Australian NRA had not insisted on a penalty for 
withdrawal or any restriction on submitting multiple bids. This led to the winners 
placing multiple bids which incrementally decreased and then reneged on all but the 
lowest bid. Winning bidders then paid considerable less than their highest bids. These 
two experiences were carefully considered when forming the FCC rules.
2.2.1: The FCC Auctions
A primary decision for the FCC was whether to use a sealed bid as with the Australian 
and New Zealand auction, or an open auction. The sealed bid auction has several 
advantages over open auctions. Riley and Samuelson (1981) showed that when bidders 
are risk averse the sealed bid auction will raise greater revenues and Milgrom (1987) 
found that bidder collusion would be considerable reduces if sealed bids are used. The 
major advantage that the open auction has is that it reduced the chance o f the winner’s 
curse, as first suggested by Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971). If  the winner’s curse is 
present and the bidders are unaware o f this then they may overpay and the industry is 
unstable. If bidders are aware of the winner’s curse then they will adjust their bids 
downwards. A full discussion on the winner’s curse and its particular importance in the 
3G administration will be discussed in Chapter 5. To avoid this, the auctioneer must 
provide as much information about the asset being sold and the auctioning process. As 
such, an auction that is open and provides information about bidders and bids will 
minimise the chance o f a winner’s curse and the probability that winners will be overly 
cautious in downgrading their bids. McMillan reveals that the FCC felt that the risk o f a 
winner’s curse was greater than that o f collusion, so they decided on an open auction.
After the decision to use an open auction the next issue faced by the FCC was whether to 
use a simultaneous or a sequential auction. From an administrative point o f view it is 
easier to use a sequential auction to sell multiple assets. A simultaneous auction allows
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bidders to use information gathered during the bidding process to value the licences and 
change the combinations o f licences they bid on as each bidding strategies became 
evident. As Pitchik and Schotter (1988) discuss, using a simultaneous auction will 
reduce the chance o f predatory behaviour, with firms forcing the price up in early 
auctions so that the winners cannot afford to take part in later ones.
A further area o f contention was whether to allow combinational bids. Clearly, as was 
discussed by Cassady (1967), the only reason to have combinational bids is if  there are 
synergies associated with owning multiple licences. This is certainly the case for 
spectrum licences. Being able to operate regionally or nationally will bring clear 
economies o f scale and having neighbouring licences will bring technical benefits. The 
use o f combinational bids brings problems o f their own. Palfrey (1983) and later 
Bykowsky, et al. (2000), Milgrom (2000) consider the possibility that combinational 
bids would lead to assets not going to the individual that valued them the most. They 
were particularly concerned with the threshold problem, which is a variant of the free­
rider problem. Let us suppose we have two assets and three bidders. The first bidder 
only puts a value on the two items together. The other two bidders place a value on 
either individual asset and their combined value is greater than the value o f the first 
bidder. The two bidders may place bids below their maximum, which is then topped by 
the package bid. Each bidder may then wait, hoping the other will increase their bid in 
order beat the package bid. If  neither does then the first bidder will win. A further issue 
is the uncertainty about the correct level of combination bid. If all possible combinations 
are allowed, then a large auction would become extremely complicated. Rothkopf, et al. 
(1998), suggested ways o f limiting the number o f combinations but it is almost 
impossible to know what the efficient combinations would be. Due to these concerns, 
the FCC decided not to use combinational bids in their original auctions.
Several other implementation decisions that the FCC made are outlined by Cramton 
(2001). These included introducing a spectrum cap limiting the amount o f spectrum an 
individual firm could hold in order to promote competition, the introduction o f a deposit 
that was proportional to the size o f the licence and the population that it covered, and
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allowing special terms for ‘designated entities’ such as discounts and relaxed instalment 
payment terms; minimum bids and activity rules to keep the auction rounds going; and 
finally, a withdrawal charge to avoid the Australian experience. This meant that if  a 
winning bidder withdrew they would be liable for the difference between the final 
selling price and their bid. There would be an extra charge o f 3 percent o f the final sale 
price if they withdrew after the end o f the auction.
Although the FCC auctions were generally considered a success, Scanlan (2001) gives 
an overview o f some o f the widely reported problems and how they were overcome. A 
major criticism came when an instalment process was introduced in the C block 
spectrum auction. Using instalment payments presented two problems; some of the risk 
o f market information correction was shifted onto the seller, and the property rights 
surrounding the licences were less clear. It many ways winning a licence could instead 
be considered an option to buy a licence rather than a licence itself. To avoid the risk of 
winners not taking up their licences, the payment level at the end o f the auction needed 
to be large enough to avoid the desire to treat the licence as an option. Also, the amount 
of time that was allowed to elapse between instalments needed to be kept to a minimum. 
The C block auction only required a 5 percent down payment on the licence price. After 
the C block auction, there was a substantial fall in the stock prices and credit ratings o f 
winning companies. This led to some winning bidders not being able to raise the 
required level of capital to pay the balance on their licences. These licences then had to 
be revoked and readministered. Although the readministration raised lower fees than the 
original administration, it may not be correct to say they were underpriced as the original 
auction bids were inflated by the nature o f the instalment process.
The exact nature o f licence property rights became an issue when certain firms declared 
bankruptcy. Under US bankruptcy law, the ownership o f the licences passed to the 
courts. This led to a long delay in readministration and network rollout as ownership was 
disputed. If  instalments had not been used then it would have removed this part o f the 
option element. There would have still been an option in the licence, but this would have 
been an option to develop the services rather than buy a licence. The more important
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issue was to make sure the ownership o f property rights was made clear. In the end the 
FCC offered a number of debt forgiveness and return o f licence options.
2.3: On to the 3G administration
The year 1999 saw the beginning of the process o f administering the sale o f additional 
radio spectrum for the purpose o f developing third generation (3G) mobile phone 
services. In accordance with directive No 128/1999/EC o f the European Parliament, 
within the European Union the date of 1st January 2000 was set as the point by which 
governments in member states should have chosen the process through which licences 
would be administered. The directive required that the process o f licence administration 
would be completed by 1st January 2002. So between 1999 and 2002, Europe witnessed 
a rapid succession o f licence administration processes across individual nation states.
Despite the success o f the FCC auctions, the advice from the European Commission 
seemed to favour using at least some level o f beauty contest procedure; “licences should 
be granted on the basis o f objective, non-discriminatory, detailed and proportionate 
criteria, regardless o f whether or not individual applicants for licences are existing 
operators o f other systems” [Decision No 128/1999/EC (11)] and seemed to be cautious 
over licence pricing: “ ...any spectrum pricing method should not adversely impact on 
the competitive structure o f the market, and respect the public interest, while ensuring 
efficient use o f the spectrum as a valuable resource”[Decision No 128/1999/EC(18)]. 
Strong arguments were voiced at the time in favour of the use o f “beauty contests”. It 
was considered undesirable for regulators or governments to lose their discretion in the 
administration process. In an earlier Green Paper the European Commission (1994) 
expressed concern that high licence prices would affect the size o f tariffs charged to 
consumers. This view is surprising since it ignores the prediction that a profit- 
maximising firm will price on the basis o f its marginal cost, which would be unaffected 
by the sunk costs o f a licence fee. There was concern that high licence fees would delay 
network roll-out. Because o f the existence o f significant wider network externalities, the 
full aggregate economic value o f a well developed 3G infrastructure would be reduced. 
This again seems a strange logic. If it is profitable for a firm to create a network, this
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would be the case whether they were charged a fee or not. However, network investment 
would be affected by high licence fees if  capital market frictions reduced the ability o f 
more heavily indebted telecoms operators to borrow further for network investment. 
However the European Commission’s views were only advisory and the final choice of 
licence administration method was left to the discretion o f  the individual member-states. 
However the final decision surrounding the exact nature o f the design of the 
administration process was left in the hands o f the national governments.
Clearly there was an incentive for countries to use an auction both to raise revenue but, 
even after having seen the success of the FCC auctions, a number countries still 
preferred to use comparative selection processes. The first EU member to allocate 3G 
spectrum was Finland, who followed European Commission advice by using a 
comparative selection process. The subsequent success o f the UK authorities in raising 
€38bn through the auction o f five 3G licences in April 2000 resulted in a shift in opinion 
towards the use o f auctions. The UK adopted a simultaneous multi-unit ascending 
auction design. Bidders were able to bid for all five licenses at the same time.
However, the design o f subsequent auctions varied considerably. Possibly the most 
complex design was that used by Germany and Austria. They auctioned undefined 
blocks o f spectrum rather than licences. Blocks could be assembled to create licences to 
use spectrum segments of varying width. The consequence o f this was that the bidding 
process could determine the final number o f licence holders, within the range 4 to 6. All 
auctions except that in Denmark used an ascending format. Denmark used a fourth price 
sealed bid auction to allocate four individual licences. Even where auction methods were 
similar, final outcomes revealed considerable variation in the range o f licence fees per 
capita o f population paid.
2.3.1: Differences between licences.
Klemperer (2002a) gives an overview o f the main European 3G licence auctions and the 
next chapter will give a thorough overview o f all procedures. At the time these auctions 
began it was widely believed that the licences should have a similar per capita value.
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However, the final results saw a large variation in the revenue raised. The design o f the 
3G auctions relied heavily upon the experiences learnt in the FCC auctions. Although 
these auctions were inspired by the FCC auctions there were some quite significant 
variations across different countries in terms o f the number, type, and way licences were 
auctions.
The most successful of the auctions, in terms o f funds raised, were in the German and 
UK cases raising €50.8 billion and €38 billion respectively. Among the worst performers 
were Denmark and Switzerland €510 million and €132 million respectively. Klemperer 
put the success o f the auctions down to two factors, the ability to attract entry by 
competing firms and to prevent collusion between them, with the countries that raised 
the highest revenue achieving both o f these goals . Consequently the auctions that did 
achieve these goals led to the most efficient outcomes.
Despite the fact that Germany and the UK raised very similar sums, their auction designs 
were quite different. These auction designs are outlined in detail by Binmore and 
Klemperer (2002) for the UK auction and Grimm, Riedel and Wolfsetter (2001) for the 
German auction, with both sets o f authors being involved in their own country’s 
auctions process. Due to the authors’ involvement in the design o f the administrations 
they do give somewhat tendentious commentaries with little effort to identify 
weaknesses in their own design.
The UK auction was a relatively simple ascending auction whereas the Germans went 
for a more complex auction, with an uncertain number o f  licences between 4 and 6 
depending on the conclusion o f the ascending auction. Despite there being some 
disagreement over the best design for the auction both sets o f authors prefer an auction 
over a beauty contest which they see as an inferior alternative. Binmore and Klemperer’s 
paper gives a clear explanation o f the merits o f the UK ascending auction over a beauty
2 Although in the German case Klemperer seemed to be suggesting this was achieved through luck rather 
than good auction design.
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contest and the subsequent efficient outcomes. A complete discussion o f how these 
administrations were carried out can be found in chapter 3.
2.4: The Size and Distribution of Revenues
With such high prices being paid in some o f the auctions and the subsequent decrease in 
stock prices, claims in the press began to suggest that due to the nature of the auctions 
too high a price was paid for the licenses with headlines such as “2 bad for 3G”3 and “A 
reason to celebrate may be hard to find”4 leading Klemperer to publicly defend his 
position in the media (Klemperer, 2002d, 2002e, 2002f). Criticisms came from other 
academics, with John Ure o f The Telecommunications Project being highly critical of 
the assumptions made by the UK and German auction designers, see Ure (2002, 2003a). 
Particular criticism o f the German design came from Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2002) 
who identified the flexible design as potentially damaging to the consumer by allowing 
incumbents to fight entrants directly. By bidding more aggressively, bidders could 
reduce the number o f licences from 6 to 4. Bidders did bid aggressively, although the 
final outcome saw the auction ended with 6 licences. If  the bidders had not bid so 
aggressively and had stopped bidding when the final bidder dropped out they could have 
effectively paid €20 bn less for the licences.
The suggestion then, is that those companies that won the auction were in fact made 
worse off by winning the auction. This idea was reinforced when reports began to 
emerge that Standard & Poor, as well as other credit ratings agencies, had launched 
reviews o f some o f the winning firms’ credit ratings.5 There was a danger at the time 
that the European 3G auctions might become somewhat o f a scapegoat for the woes o f 
the telecommunication industry. This led to exaggerated claims such as in Ure (2003a) 
who, when referring to restructuring debt brought about by 3G, quotes an article in the 
Financial Times6 as the true loss to the world wide economy being $1000 bn. Although 
this article did include the 3G licensing process, other major considerations such as over 
investment in fibre optics were also a major contributing factor. Yet the very idea that
3 Economist (2003).
4 Financial Times (2000).
5 In fact four days after the end of the German auction S&P downgraded BT to an A rating.
6 Roberts (2001).
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the bidding companies paid too much is curious. As Binmore (2001) put it “nobody but 
a fool bids more in an auction than he thinks the licence is worth”. However, it is the 
very fact that the bidder pays what he “thinks” the licence is worth when the licence 
value is uncertain that means the winner’s curse can be brought about. The issue o f a 
winner’s curse will be one to which we return in Chapter 5.
As has been discussed, although a large amount o f revenue was raised in the 3G 
administrations, this revenue was not equally distributed. This is especially problematic 
with the integrated European telecoms market. As telecoms operators attempted to build 
pan-European or regional European networks, the possibility has arisen that some 
countries have extracted large rents from winning bidders at the expense o f other 
countries’ regulatory stance and 3G network development. It then becomes important to 
determine those factors that influenced the size of the licence fees.
2.4.1: Theoretically important factors
A major factor in determining the size o f the licence fees is likely to have been the 
method of licence administration. In general auctions fared considerable better in raising 
revenue than comparative selection processes. Mean per capita cost o f an auctioned 
licence was almost four times greater than the mean o f those paid by winners o f beauty 
contest procedures (Table 3.1). Indeed when France attempted to charge comparable 
prices to those achieved in the UK and German auctions, this led to failure, with only 
two out o f the four available licences receiving bids. However, even within the auction 
and beauty contest groups large variation is apparent.
Those factors that an administering authority may consider when they determine the fee 
for a licence in a comparative selection process may be different from those which 
would determine the willingness to pay o f a bidder in an auction. There are certain 
factors that we may expect to cause differences in licence fees. For instance the size o f 
the potential market may be expected to influence the size o f the licence fee. This in turn 
may be related to income levels (GDP per capita) in the economy in question or current
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preference for mobile telephony as captured by existing mobile market penetration. 
However, within the western European countries under present consideration the 
variation across countries in these market specific factors is not particularly large. 
Section 2.2 highlights many o f the past experiences and decisions that were taken in 
order to try and maximise the revenue received through an auction, however Klemperer 
(2002b, 2002c) states that, within those countries that used auctions, the most important 
factors in setting licence fees were the prevention of collusion, the encouragement of 
entry and the deterrence o f predatory behaviour. Klemperer also suggests that other than 
providing insights on how to meet these requirements, the literature on auction theory 
was o f little use for informing practical auction design.
Ascending auctions are also particularly susceptible to the problem o f entry deterrence. 
This will be a particular problem in the 3G auctions where there are a number 
incumbents operating. It is not unreasonable to expect that incumbents might place a 
higher value on a licence than entrants. Other bidders will be aware o f this and, if there 
are any associated costs of bidding, will have no incentive to enter the bidding process. 
Related to this problem is the issue o f the winner’s curse. Because these licences are 
only partial common value auctions, weaker bidders will be especially nervous. If they 
did win a licence then they would have done so by considerably overestimating the 
value of the licence. This will cause the weaker firms either not to bid or to be much 
more cautious in their bidding enabling the incumbent to win at a much lower price. 
Indeed, the incumbent may make it clear that they will bid very aggressively so 
guaranteeing a winner’s curse to any weaker bidder that outbid them. This may have 
been done through advertising the fact or bidding very aggressively in early auctions 
with the hope o f discouraging bidders in later auctions. This will be particularly a 
problem, as identified by Bikhchandani (1988), when the licences are complementary to 
licences sold at a later point. This could certainly be considered the case if  a bidder is 
attempting to build a pan-European network. Indeed the very high fees paid for the early 
licences may have been an attempt to do just this.
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Klemperer identified other potential problems linked to collusion and entry deterrence 
that might depress the size of the licence price. If  we consider the possibility that 
collusion or entry deterrent behaviour has taken place then it is essential to protect the 
auction with an appropriate reserve price. Klemperer identifies the Swiss auction as a 
particular example o f an administration where the reserve price was set far too low. In 
this case the government expected to raise 20 times the reserve price. Klemperer 
suggests that setting such a low reserve increased the attractiveness o f collusion as 
bidders saw the possibility o f getting a licence for a very low price. The risk o f collusion 
has to be set against risk o f not attracting enough bidders when the reserve price is set 
too high. Not attracting enough bidders to sell all the licences will be in effect a failure 
o f the auction. This is the same problem faced by a country running a beauty contest but 
charging a very high fee. As was seen with France, when the price was set too high the 
administration was only able to sell two out o f four licences. The political damage that a 
failed auction may cause provides considerable incentive to use a low reserve price. 
There is however a large potential range for a reserve price to ensure that it is low 
enough to guarantee that the licences are sold and high enough to discourage collusion. 
Once a reserve price has been set it must be enforced. For example in France, when they 
were unable to sell their licences at the original price, they then lowered the price and re­
administered the remaining two licences. By doing this they effectively undermine the 
credibility o f their price setting. There is a danger that bidders will not bid if  there is a 
high price when they know the regulator will drop the price at a later date. This does of 
course present the administrating authority with the problem of what to do with any 
remaining licences if  they wish to maintain credibility. The focus for the administering 
authority must be to set the correct reserve price.
Even if  the design o f the auction is able to prevent collusion the auction must have clear 
and credible rules. Due to the uncertainty around the technology and future market 
structure it can be difficult to lay down the precise regulatory regime in advance of 
selling the licences. Despite the problems seen in earlier FCC auctions many countries 
still left loopholes. When it became clear in the Italian auction that they were only going 
to raise a fraction o f the expected licence fee they attempted to change the rules. The
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bidding firms objected to this and under the threat o f legal action the Italian regulator 
caved in and ran the auction as originally stated. In many o f the 3G administrations 
procedures the future regulatory regime was not clearly laid out. This varied between it 
not being clear what rights new entrants would have to roam on incumbents’ existing 2G 
infrastructure, to the ability o f licence holders to sell spectrum wholesale to a Mobile 
Virtual Network Operator (MVNO). Indeed if we take the case o f Germany, because 
they were unable to define what MVNOs are, there was no mention o f them in the 
licence agreements. Even when there were clear licence arrangements made, these were 
not always enforced post-auction. In several 3G administration procedures, the roll-out 
conditions were relaxed post auction when it became clear that some o f the licence 
owners would not be able to meet them.
Although Klemperer was keen to ascribe the differences in licence fees to the design of 
auctions this may have been an overly simplistic view o f the administrations. The 
importance o f other factors as opposed to auction theory was raised by Melody (2001) 
and Van Damme (2002). As Kruse (2004) put it when discussing the position o f auction 
theory in causing the differential in licence fees; “Industry-specific, time-specific, 
country-specific, or other real world factors may be even more relevant”7
2.4.2: Other Empirical Studies
There has only been a limited examination o f the factors that influenced these licence 
fees. The European Commission commissioned McKinsey and Co to assess the relative 
success o f the various spectrum assignment processes (European Commission 2002a). 
They identified three key ex ante sets o f factors that may have affected the size o f the 
licence fee. The first was the impact o f the timing o f the licence administration. Because 
o f market conditions surrounding the mobile telecommunications sector at that time and 
the initially positive outlook for 3G technology, those countries that administered their 
licences first gained higher licences fees. Those who administered once the dotcom 
boom had ended may have fared worse. The second factor was the ability o f a particular 
licensing authority to attract new entrants to join the bidding process. With a higher
7 P. 199
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number o f potential entrants it may have been perceived that the 3G market in that 
country would be more competitive, and hence willingness to pay would be lower. 
McKinsey and Co’s third set of factors concerned the specific characteristics o f the 
award process. Auctions were expected to have produced, other things equal, higher 
licence fees. However the report finds little evidence that other characteristics of 
administration process had any significant impact on the size o f licence fees. For 
example, the report finds no correlation between licence duration and the size o f the 
licence fee. The study also examined the type o f bidders that were successful. It is 
claimed that auctions favoured international operators, whereas comparative selection 
processes favoured incumbent national 2G operators. However, who constitutes an 
international operator is open to debate. The McKinsey and Co study in essence 
comprises a descriptive analysis o f secondary data from the administration process. It is 
also limited to the extent that it focuses solely on licence administration within (then) 
EU member states, ignoring the experience o f other neighbouring western European 
nations.
Less attention has been given in the literature to factors which may have affected the 
size o f licence fees paid under comparative selection processes. The size o f licence fees 
in beauty contests is determined by the licensing authority and may depend on specific 
policy objectives. If an administering authority believes a lower fee will improve roll-out 
speed then they may price to achieve this. These policy decisions are by their nature 
very difficult to measure, and particularly so as they were not always made explicit. 
However all licensing authorities will be aware that radio spectrum is a valuable public 
resource. We may expect country specific factors such as GDP per capita and mobile 
penetration to have been of greater importance for the beauty contests.
This chapter has outlined the development o f spectrum administration and in particular 
the use o f auctions. It then goes on to discuss the decisions that brought about the 
administrations in the European 3G procedure. The key question that arises from this 
chapter is what were and how important were different factors in determining the size o f 
3G licence fees. Chapter 3 continues to address this question as it gives a detailed
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description of how each country involved in the European 3G administration assigned 
their licences and the consequences of licence fees post-administration. In particular, 
Chapter 3 will demonstrate how the level o f licence fees caused the failure, in the 
medium term, to attract entry into the European mobile telecommunications market. 
Finally, this section will attempt to quantify these effects in Chapter 4 through a cross­
country empirical evaluation o f the administration procedures.
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Chapter 3: A review o f the European licence administration process 
and the post-administration market.
The previous chapter gave a broad outline o f different types o f spectrum administration 
and how they were used in the European 3G administration and some o f the problems 
faced. This chapter will give considerably more detail on how each of the 
administrations were conducted and some o f the particular problems that were faced 
post-administration. The last chapter discussed the inability to attract entry as a problem 
both in terms o f raising revenue in an auction and encouraging post-administration 
competition. This chapter will build on this theme and see how problems in the post­
administration market had a direct effect on the level o f competition in the new 3G 
market.
3.1: Problems in the European Procedures
The objectives of countries administering spectrum were broadly the same, although not 
always explicitly stated. However, these goals universally included the development o f a 
sustainable, competitive 3G mobile telephone industry. After the success o f the GSM 
standard during the 1990s a more hands on approach was taken with the formation o f the 
3G industry. In each country a ‘big bang’ approach was used to administer licences. This 
meant that multiple licences were awarded in one go rather than awarding licences over 
a period o f time, and often on a first come first served basis, as was done during the 
development o f 1st and 2nd generation mobile telecommunication. There was also a 
degree o f organisation across Europe with a timeframe being put in place for when 
licences must be administered and when services should begin. This led to Gruber 
(2005) referring to the administration o f licences as caused by regulatory push rather 
than demand pull. Administrations occurred when they did and in the way they did 
because it was politically desirable but not necessarily economically viable.
The administration process across Europe led to considerably different outcomes from 
country to country, in terms o f funds raised and final market structure. Indeed the exact 
market structure is still fluid with returned and unadministered licences still being
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offered for sale. This section will review the results o f the administration and significant 
post-administration developments in pre-2004 EU countries including Switzerland and 
Norway. Particular attention will be given to regulatory success, or lack o f it, in 
encouraging entry and the handling o f post-administration difficulties. The chapter looks 
at Europe as a whole and by necessity can not go into all the nuances o f sector specific 
regulation for each country. Chapter 8 provides a case study o f the post-administration 
regulatory environment in the UK and how sector specific regulation has developed in 
the shadow of the 3G licensing procedure.
There were a number o f factors that influenced the success o f the initial series o f licence 
administrations, many of which were outlined in the previous chapter. Market 
expectations changed over time with sentiment deteriorating during the administration 
process. Apart from this, the characteristic o f the award process, the number o f licences, 
and the coverage obligations also played a factor. How these factors affected the 
administration outcome will be explored further in Chapter 4. When discussing these 
administration processes we can broadly split them into those that used auctions and 
those that used beauty contests. However, many procedures used a combination o f the 
two. Indeed it could be said that all procedures had a certain beauty contest element as 
they all had qualification criteria for bidders. In the description o f the procedures, 
auctions will be reviewed first and then beauty contests, both placed in chronological 
order. An abbreviated version of the information in the following two sections can be 
found in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, which contain a summary o f information on industry 
structure for auction and beauty contest procedures. They contain details on the licences 
that were offered, which bidder won them, when they launched their network and which 
firms own them now .1
1 For other descriptions of the auction administration procedures see Curwen (2002) for a general 
discussion, Klemperer (2001) for a focus on auction administrations and European Commission (2002) for 
a focus on the European impact.
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3.2: Auction Procedures
3.2.1: United Kingdom
The UK 3G administration was the first auction for 3G spectrum to take place world 
wide and, as will be seen, the result shaped the future o f European mobile 
telecommunication. There was in total 60MHz o f paired and 20MHz o f unpaired 
spectrum available. It was decided to split this spectrum into 5 licences. The largest was 
licence A made up o f 15 MHz paired and 5 MHz unpaired spectrum.2 Licence B was 
made up o f 15MHz paired spectrum and licences C, D and E all contained 10MHz 
paired and 5MHz unpaired. The auction took a standard simultaneous multiple round 
form, with the exception that the licence A was reserved for a new entrant. This measure 
was taken in an attempt to encourage entry.
At the time the auction was carried out the telecommunication sector was on the crest o f 
a wave. Expectations were very positive for the future o f 3G services. In addition to this, 
the UK had encouraged entry with an entrant only licence leading to a large number of 
bidders. In addition to the incumbent, the four incumbent bidders were Vodafone, 
BT3G, 0 n e20ne  Personal (now T-mobile owned by Deutsche Telekom) and Orange 
3G. The entrant companies were Crescent Wireless, Epsilon Tele.com, NTL Mobile 
(part backed by France Telecom), SpectrumCo (controlled by Sonera), TIW UMTS 
(with strong links to Hutchison Whampoa), Telefonica UK and WorldCom Wireless. An 
issue arose when Vodafone took over the German mobile operator Mannesmann. 
Mannesmann were the owners o f Orange but as Vodafone had made it clear that they 
wished to divest Orange after the auction it was decided to go ahead as planned. This left 
the auction with 13 bidders.
The auction lasted 150 rounds and 39 days raising a total o f £22.5bn (€38.4bn). At the 
time this was considerably higher than expected. The four incumbent GSM operators all 
won licences with the larger B licence being won by Vodafone. Vodafone paid a
2 When spectrum is allocated it is done so as paired or unpaired. Paired spectrum contains a portion of 
spectrum from an upper band and a portion of spectrum from a lower band. See appendix for a full 
description of the 3G technology.
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premium of almost £2bn over the three smaller licences. The entrants licence was won 
by the Hutchison backed TIW UMTS. Soon after the end o f the administration 
Hutchison took sole control of TIW. Hutchison posed an interesting issue as a question 
arose as to whether they should be able to bid for the entrant licence. The 2G incumbent 
Orange was formed and run by Hutchison. Orange was sold to Mannesmann in 
November 1999, shortly before the announcement that the UK would give preferential 
treatment to a new entrant. Hutchison was not allowed to bid directly due to its previous 
status but still gained the entrant licence through TIW. The fact that Hutchison 3G was 
the first 3G network to go live, in March 2003, suggests it was acting strategically in 
order to obtain the best licence. Vodafone followed with its network launch in April 
2004 and then Orange in July 2004. The two other operators’ networks went live in 
2005, 0 2  in February and T-Mobile in October. Currently the UK has five 3G network 
operators; one more then they had 2G incumbents. The UK had relatively light roll-out 
obligations with 80 percent of the population needing to be covered by the end o f 2007. 
Four operators met this deadline easily; however 0 2  missed the target with only 75.7 
percent coverage. Ofcom extended the deadline by which this target must be met until 
June 2008. A complete analysis o f the UK post-administration market and regulatory 
behaviour is given in the case study in Chapter 8.
3.2.2: Netherlands
The Dutch auction was the second to take place in Europe, and as in the UK auction a 
simultaneous multi-round auction was used. There were 5 licences auctioned. Licences 
A and B contained 15MHz paired spectrum and 5MHz unpaired. Licences C, D and E 
contained 10MHz paired and 5MHz unpaired spectrum. Unlike the UK auction no 
licences were set aside for an entrant. As there were five existing incumbent 2G 
operators the end result was somewhat o f a certainty. A further problem faced by the 
auction designers was that Dutch telecommunication law forced the government to 
always allocate the whole amount o f spectrum. This meant that they had to aim to 
allocate all the spectrum at the first attempt. As such, they were forced to start with a 
very low minimum opening price, indeed with the potential for the opening price to be
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zero. This, as discussed in Chapter 1, had the potential to seriously and negatively affect 
the size o f the licence fees.
Despite the potential for problems in attracting entry that the Dutch auction design 
presented, at first they appeared to be quite successful. The deadline for signalling intent 
to bid was on June 5 and, at this time, there were a potential 10 bidders. However, after 
a succession o f mergers and dropouts by the time the auction began on July 6th there 
were only six bidders remaining. O f these six there were the five incumbents KPN, 
Libertel (majority owned by Vodafone), Ben which had been recently bought by 
Deutsche Telekom, Dutchtone (controlled by France Telecom), and Telfort (controlled 
by BT) and one entrant company. The entrant Versatel did not have a large backer and it 
was suggested, even by the company themselves, that the only reason they were bidding 
was to force one o f the incumbents to allow them to operate as an MVNO on a licence 
winner’s network. The auction ended on July 24th after 306 rounds. The end of the 
auction was brought about when on July 21st Telfort’s lawyers sent a letter to Versatel 
stating that as Versatel’s only aim was to gain concessions from other participants this 
constituted a tort against Telfort and they would hold Versatel liable for any damages. 
Versatel complained to the regulator who dismissed their complaint. This led to Versatel 
withdrawing from the auction a couple o f days latter. The final result saw all o f the 2G 
incumbent operators winning licences. Libertel and KPN won the larger licences for 
1,573 million and 1,567 million Dutch guilders respectively. Duchtone, Telfort and Ben 
won the smaller license paying 960 million, 947.6 million and 870.4 million Dutch 
guilders.
In an attempt to increase the speed o f network roll-out the Dutch authority allowed a 
high degree o f network sharing. Any network sharing agreement was allowed to go 
through as long as at least two networks were rolled out nationally. This led to two main 
network sharing agreements, one between KPN and Telfort Mobiel and the other 
Dutchtone and 3G-Blue. Initially the agreement between KPN and Telfort was a 
network sharing agreement. However, by 2005 KPN had taken over Telfort’s operations. 
This then reduced the number o f active 3G networks to four. Although this merger was
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allowed to go through, in April 2008 Telefort was threatened with a €40 million fine for 
non-use o f the spectrum that they had been allocated. KPN’s response to this was that it 
intended to use Telefort’s spectrum and would not return or sell the licence. Further to 
this, Orange Nederland, the renamed licence winner Dutchtone, was sold to T-Mobile in 
August 2007. This now leaves only three 3G network operators, two less than the 
number o f incumbent 2G operators.
3.2.3: Germany and Austria
O f all the European auctions the Austrian and German auctions were perhaps the most 
complicated. Instead o f setting predetermined licences, they allow an endogenously 
determined number o f licences. Despite their similarities the two auctions raised 
considerably different sums. The rules of these auctions allowed the amount o f spectrum 
in each auction to depend on the bidding units strategies. The process was split into two 
stages. In stage one 60 MHz o f spectrum was split into 12 5MHz blocks. A bidder has 
the option o f bidding for a maximum o f 3 blocks and a minimum of 2 blocks. This 
meant there would be between 4 and 6 licences administered depending on bidding 
strategy. If a bidder managed to gain at least 2 blocks in stage 1 then they would move to 
a second auction where an additional 5 blocks o f 5MHz unpaired spectrum would be 
sold. It should be noted that, unlike the UK auction, these auctions did not set aside any 
licences for entrants, thus giving the incumbent companies the option to deter entry, as 
long as they were willing to pay for it.
3.2.3.1: Germany
Particular detail o f the German administration procedure as given in the event study in 
Chapter 6. The German auction began on the 31st July 2000; it lasted for 173 rounds and 
finished on 17th August 2000. Initially there were 12 bidders, one o f which was not 
approved by the regulator; then, subsequent to the auction, another five bidders 
withdrew or formed consortia. This left 7 bidders at the start o f the auction, 4 o f these 
were incumbents already holding licences to provide 2G services. These companies 
were T-mobile owned by Deutsche Telekom, Mannesmann owned by Vodafone, E-plus 
Hutchison owned by KPN and Hutchison Whampoa, and Viag Interkom later to become 
0 2  Germany owned by BT and E.ON. There were three entrant companies, MobilCom
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| part owned by France Telecom, Debitel part owned by SwissCom, and 3G owned as a
j joint venture by Telefonica and Sonera. Debitel dropped out on day 10 o f the auction, at
| which time the block price for the licences stood at DM 5 billion. At this point the
auction could have stopped and the bidders settled for six licence holders. In actual fact, 
the auction continued with prices increasing as incumbent firms appeared to attempt to 
prevent entry, to their finishing level of around DM 8.25 billion. No further bidder 
dropped out meaning that there were six eventual licence holders. This was then 
followed by a second auction at which additional spectrum was allocated. At this auction 
Viag Interkom was the only winner not to gain additional spectrum.
Licence winners were expected to cover 25 percent o f the population by the end of 2003 
and 50 percent by the end o f 2005. Infrastructure would be allowed but operators had to 
maintain their ‘Netzfunktionssherrschaft’ (network infrastructure). In practice this meant 
they were allowed to share antennae and masts but not the core network infrastructure. 
O f these licence winning firms, Group 3G ceased operations in July 2002 and 
MobilCom returned its licence in December 2003 when it became clear they would not 
be able to meet the coverage commitments. T-mobile launched its network in April 2004 
with E-plus following in August 2004. Vodafone and Viag Interkom launched in 
January and November 2005 respectively. This has now left four 3G network operators, 
the same number as there were 2G incumbents. However, there are seven main service 
providers, across 2G and 3G network operators, and one MVNO operating.
3.2.3.2: Austria
The Austrian auction began on the 2nd November 2000 and followed the rules o f the 
German auction. However, in this case the auction lasted only 14 rounds ending the next 
day on the 3rd November 2000. The short duration o f this auction can be put down to the 
inability to attract entry. The auction only managed to attract six bidders for the six 
licences. O f these bidders, four were current 2G licence holders. These were Mobilkom 
(owned by Telekom Austria), Max.mobil (owned by Deutsche Telekom), Connect One 
(owned by Connect Austria), and Tele.ring (a subsidiary o f Vodafone). The two entrant
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bidders were Hutchison 3G (owned by Hutchison Whampoa) and 3G Mobile (owned by 
Telefonica). With only six bidders, the number o f bidders matched the maximum 
number o f  licences. There was limited bidding, which did not last as the incumbents 
showed little sign of wishing to bar entry. The Austrian regulator suspended the auction 
on two occasions as it feared there was collusion between firms. However, they were 
unable to produce any evidence o f collusion and so the auction was allowed to go ahead. 
The auction ended with all six bidders winning two blocks o f spectrum each paying 
between €118 m and €144 m each. The second stage o f the auction saw Hutchinson 3G 
winning one block with Max.mobil and Mobilkom winning two blocks each. The total 
amount raised by the auction was €832 m, considerably less than in previous auctions.
O f these licence holders, all established 3G networks apart from 3G Mobile which sold 
its licence in December 2003 to Mobilkom Austria. Tele.ring was first sold to Western 
Wireless and then in August 2005 sold on to T-mobile. Tele.ring’s network was already 
in operation so strictly there are five 3G network in operation however two o f these 
networks are under the control o f T-mobile leaving a market with effectively four 
operators.
3.2.4: Italy
After the success o f the German and UK auctions, Italy, with its large mobile market, 
had high expectations for its auction. Indeed during the summer o f 2000, when the size 
o f potential licence fees became clear, Italy switched from its initial plan o f using a 
beauty contest to an administration by auction. The auction design they used was similar 
to the UK. The Italian auction sought to administer 5 licences each containing 10MHz 
paired and 5MHz unpaired spectrum and each lasting for 15 years. In order to encourage 
participation, any entrant company that won a licence would be eligible to engage in a 
second auction for two blocks o f 5 MHz paired spectrum. A further important feature of 
the Italian auction was its method o f encouraging competition. If  only five bidders were 
present to bid for the five licences the number o f licences would be reduced by one. As 
it was, there were 8 potential bidders. The four incumbent operators Telecom Italia 
Mobile, Omnitel (owned by Vodafone 76.9% and Verizon Communications 23.1%),
36
Wind (owned by Enel 56.6% and France Telecom 43.4%) and Blu (owned by 
Autostrade Telecommunicazioni 32% and BT 20%). The entrant bidders were in general 
large consortia made up o f a number o f different companies. These were Tiscali 
(controlled by the Andala consortium), TU TLC (Atitalia, E-tech and ESVES), Atlanet 
(made up o f Acea, Telefonica, Sonera and Fiat) and Dix.it (e.biscom, Pirelli, Ifil, Banaca 
di Roma, AEM and ePlanet). Before the auction began the Dix.it consortium collapsed 
with Baca di Roma and ePlanet joining the Atlanet consortium, now renamed as IPSE
2000. Hutchinson Whampoa bought a controlling stake in the Andala consortium and 
renamed the Tiscali bidder as Andala Hutchison. A further bidder, Anthill, was not 
approved in the primary phase o f the auction. Apart from Anthill, the seven other 
bidders were approved but TU TLC dropped out when it did not pay the required 
deposit.
When the auction began on October 19th 2000 there were six bidders remaining, 
meaning there would be no reduction in the number of licences offered. The auction
thlasted 10 rounds and in the 11 round, three days after the auction began, Blu, the BT 
backed consortium, dropped out. This left five bidders for the five licences on offer and 
so, the auction ended with each licence priced around 47000bn lire (€24bn). The final 
winners were the three incumbents Omnitel, Wind and Telecom Italia and the two 
entrant firms Ipse and Andala. The two entrants were each awarded additional blocks of 
unpaired spectrum for the price o f 16000bn lire (€8.3bn). An inquiry was started by the 
Italian authority into the possible collusive behaviour of Blu. The suggestion being that 
Blu only become involved in the auction in order to avoid there being a reduction in the 
number o f licences. This inquiry found no evidence o f collusive behaviour in the Italian 
auction.
The licences required that the winners cover the 20 regional capitals by the end o f June 
2004 and the provincial capitals by 2006. Incumbent operators with significant market 
power (SMP) were required to offer roaming to 3G entrants although this requirement 
was dependent on entrants achieving a certain level of network development. However, 
the winners o f the Italian licences struggled with roll-out and network development.
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Soon after the licences had been administered the Autorita per le Garanxie nelle 
Communicazioni (AGCON) took the step o f increasing the licence duration from 15 to 
20 years. Due to delays in roll-out there were requests by the new entrants to return the 
additional spectrum that they had been given. Initial problems in the Italian market 
manifested themselves in the collapse o f the failed 3G bidder BLU, which at the time 
was only a 2G operator. This left three GSM operators and five 3G operators. There was 
significant restructuring o f the 3G licence winners. Hutchison considerably increased its 
share o f Andala and subsequently renamed it H3G. Telefonica increased its share of 
IPSE as Sonera reduced its stake. Despite Telefonica’s actions in taking control o f IPSE 
they put very little extra money into network infrastructure investment. This lack of 
investment was to such an extent that it was clear that they would not meet their roll-out 
commitments and would not launch a service. In 2004/2005 Telefonica attempted to sell 
IPSE to Enel but when this failed AGCOM undertook to revoke IPSE’s licence. Ipse
thwas given until 20 January 2006 to find a buyer for their licence, they could not and 
their licence was revoked 5 days later. This has left Italy with four operating 3G 
networks, the same number o f GSM networks that were operating when the 
administration took place.
3.2.5: Switzerland
The Swiss auction followed an English ascending auction design with some 
modifications such as allowing bidders to pass on a round and giving the regulator the 
ability to change the size o f incremental bids. These modifications were made in order to 
avoid ‘excessive’ bidding. There were 4 licences on offer, all consisted o f 15MHz paired 
plus 5MHz unpaired spectrum and lasted for 15 years. Despite some o f the problems 
faced by previous auctions, the Swiss seemed to be successful in attracting entry, with 
10 bidders applying to be involved in the auction. These bidders included the three 
incumbents Mobile Com (owned by Swisscom), dSpeed (owned by diAx), and Orange. 
The entrant bidders were Teldotcom, Telenor, Cablecom Management (NTL), 
Hutchison 3G, T-Mobile, Sunrise and Team 3G (Owned by Telefonica, One.Tel and 
Sonera). The auction was due to begin on November 13th 2000. However, a week before 
the auction began, two bidders had dropped out, by three days before the start o f the
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auction there were only five bidders remaining. The most significant event was the 
takeover by TDC o f diAx and Sunrise with a view to merge the two. By the day the 
auction was due to start the only remaining bidders were the three incumbents and group 
3G (by this point owned wholly by Telefonica). This left the auction with the same 
number of licences as bidders. Due to concerns that they would be only able to raise the 
reserve price the regulator, Comcom, postponed the auction. In order to try and increase 
revenue, Comcom planned to abandon the auction format and instead tried to impose an 
annual fee on licence holder. Legal action was threatened against Comcom by those 
bidders left in the original auction. Faced with this legal action and not being able to 
provide evidence o f any collusive behaviour between bidders Comcom was forced to 
restart the auction.
The date that was set for this new auction was December 6th 2000 and, as expected, only 
the 4 bidders from the previous auction decided to bid. This inevitably meant that 
licences only reached their reserve price o f $29.3m. This is with the exception of 
Orange, which paid an extra SF5m in order to obtain specific spectrum to ensure 
regional roaming. A coverage requirement o f 50% o f the population by 2004 was 
imposed on the winners. An issue arose with the entrant operator as the incumbent 
operators refused to allow the now renamed, UMTS Switzerland to roam on their 2G 
networks. Only once UMTS Switzerland had covered 20% o f the population, with their 
own network, were the incumbents obliged to allow roaming. Team 3G had its licence 
revoked in April 2006 due to not meeting roll-out conditions. Swisscom had its network 
live by August 2004, Orange by September 2005. Di Ax/S unrise followed with their 
network in December 2005. Switzerland currently has three 3G networks in operations 
from the four licences they originally administered.
3.2.6: Belgium
The Belgium auction, like the French beauty-contest before it, was unable to distribute 
all o f its licences. Unlike the French administration this was not because the licence 
price was set too high, rather they were unable to attract entrant bidders. The Belgium 
Institute o f Postal Services and Telecommunication (BIPT), like many before it, settled
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on a simultaneous, ascending auction. The auction design was slightly unusual in that 
they split it into two stages. The aim o f the first stage was to stop ‘associated’ companies 
from bidding in the main auction. Associated companies were those that owned shares in 
each other. BIPT only wanted unassociated firms to gain licences. All associated 
companies would be placed into groups in order to bid against each other, leaving only 
unassociated firms to bid for the actual licences in the second round. Initially it was 
thought there would be no requirement for an incumbent to allow roaming on its existing 
2G network.
When the auction began only three companies had applied to bid and so the first stage 
was not needed. The companies that applied to bid were all existing incumbents, these 
being Proximus (owned by Belgacom and Vodafone), Mobistar (majority owned by 
France Telecom), and KPN Orange (owned by KPN). The auction began on 2nd March 
2001 and, due to there being fewer bidders than licences, it lasted only one round with 
each bidder paying around €150 million. These licences were linked to coverage 
requirements o f 30, 40 and 50 per cent after 3, 4 and 5 years respectively. In March 2002 
it was announced that due to a “force majeure” the licence holders would be allowed a 
one-year delay in their roll-out conditions. This was required due to delays in acquiring 
network infrastructure and gaining planning permission. An additional concern to 
network operators was the Flemish government’s plan to tax network infrastructure if 
they were placed in public areas. 3G roll-out was gradual with some operators offering 
an intermediate 2G platform (EDGE). By 2007 coverage was estimated by IBPT to 
exceed 40 percent, which is the level that was required under the licensing laws. 
Belgium currently has three active 3G networks.
3.2.7: Greece
tinThe Greek auction began on the 13 July 2001 and was set to administer a maximum of 
four, 20 year licences. The Greeks attached a slightly complicated pricing structure to 
their licences. The basic principle was the greater the number o f licences that were sold, 
the lower the upfront fee. The auction was split into two sections, the first administering
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a basic licence o f 10 MHz paired and 5 MHz unpaired and the second administering any 
additional spectrum. The three incumbent operators Cosmote (OTE 59 percent and 
Telenor 18 percent), Panafon (majority Vodafone) and Stet Hellas (majority Telecom 
Italia) and an entrant firm Infoquest, which was operating in the Greek IT sector, all 
entered the competition. Infoquest pulled out of the procedure leaving only the 
incumbent bidders. Panafon ended with the largest licence consisting o f 20 MHz paired 
and 5 MHz unpaired and costing €176,376,199. The Cosmote licence consisted o f 15 
MHz paired and 5 MHz unpaired costing €161,411,701. Stet Hellas only obtained a 
basic licence for which they paid €146,735,169. The licence winners were obliged to 
cover 25 percent of the population by December 2003 and 50 percent o f the population 
by December 2006. There was also an additional requirement for the site o f the Olympic 
Games to be covered by February 2004. This left Greece with three operating 3G 
networks. There were initial problems with the granting o f permission to establish 
network infrastructure. This led to requests in 2004 to the Ministry o f Transport and 
Communications for extensions o f the roll-out conditions. However these licensing 
conditions were eventually met with no need for any extension.
3.2.8: D enm ark
The final Western European auction was carried out in Denmark during September
2001. By this late stage any positive market sentiment had evaporated and demand for 
licences had deteriorated. This was partly bom out by a number o f countries switching 
away from auctions and back to beauty contests and by the deterioration in the equity 
prices o f 3G licence holder. In addition to the negative sentiment towards 3G, the 
Danish regulator was o f the opinion that the Danish market could only maintain four 
network operators. These factors led to the decision to only offer four licences all 
containing 15MHz paired and 5MHz unpaired spectrum. From a revenue raising 
perspective this was problematic as it meant there were the same number o f licences as 
incumbent operators. These licences were attached to coverage obligations o f 30% of the 
population by the end o f 2004 and 80% by the end o f 2008. There was no date by which 
services had to be in operation. 2G incumbents were under an additional obligation to
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accept any “reasonable” request for roaming from either entrant companies or MVNOs. 
Infrastructure sharing would be allowed but only at the mast level.
t
i
In order to try and encourage entry and avoid the outcome o f other less successful 
auctions, it was decided to use a single round sealed bid auction. Due to the amount o f 
information that had been released in previous administrations the potential for a 
winner’s curse would no longer be of such a concern. Incumbents were banned from 
forming consortia among themselves, although they were allowed to team up with 
entrant companies. All applicants were required to register and pay a deposit of 
DK200m (€91m). After this, each applicant provided a single sealed bid with a reserve 
o f DK500m (€227m). The Licences were awarded to the four highest bidders with each 
bidder paying the same price, which is the price bid by the fourth highest bidder. The 
payment would be deferred so that 25% was due up front and the remainder was to be 
paid in instalments over 10 years. The winners o f the auction were TDC, Telia, Orange 
and the new entrant Hi3G Denmark. Each bidder paid DK950m (€128mn) with total 
revenues o f just over €500m. Sonofon, the biggest incumbent 2G operator, did not win a 
licence and so became an MVNO.
All operators met their commitment to achieve a 30 percent roll-out by 2004. At the end 
of 2004 TeliSonera announced that it would buy Orange Denmark and it was agreed 
with the regulator that Orange’s licence would be returned in 2005. This licence was 
reauctioned at the end o f 2005 and won by the Norwegian operator Sonofon for DKK 
533 million. This licence required 30 percent population coverage by 19 February 2009 
and 80 percent by 19 February 2013. The licence holders were relatively slow to offer 
services with all four operators not being in service until December 2007. Telia was the 
final operator to offer services.
3.3: Beauty Contests
3.3.1: Finland
It is perhaps not surprising that Finland, the country with the highest mobile penetration 
rate in the world, was the first o f the European countries to administer its 3G licences.
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The Ministry o f Transport and Communications o f Finland carried out the first o f the 
European 3G administration procedures, which also happened to be a beauty contest 
procedure. On the 18th March 2000 Finland awarded four licences which each consisted 
o f 15MHz o f paired spectrum and 5MHz unpaired. The licensing conditions required a 
network to be in place by 1st January 2002. However this was relaxed to a network being 
in place to ‘a certain extent’. New 3G licence holders were allowed to roam on existing 
2G infrastructure however these arrangements were set up as service provider 
agreements. This was criticised by the new entrants as not true roaming. The four 
licence winning firms were the three incumbents Sonera, Radiolinja, Suomen 3G and the 
new entrant Telia Finland (also known as DNA Finland).
All licence holders were considered to have met the January 1st 2002 requirement of 
networks to be in place “to a certain extent”. They did this by setting up test networks. In 
December 2002, Telia and Sonera merged to form TeliaSonera. This would have meant 
that two licences would have been controlled by one operator. There were a number of 
firms interested in acquiring the assets o f Telia. An agreement was finally reached with 
Finnet Ltd in 2004. Finnet now operates a 3G network under the DNA Finland brand. In 
May 2003, Tele2 acquired all the shares o f Suomen 3G (some from Finnet) after 
previously having held 27.4 percent. However, Suomen 3G has its licence revoked in 
July 2005 after it did not meet the required coverage commitments. This licence was 
awarded to Sky Web at the end o f September 2005. Finland currently only has three 3G 
networks in operators from the four licences administered. This is the same number of 
operators as there were in the GSM market. In addition to problems in the home market 
there was also a debate in the Finnish parliament over the scale o f the German licences. 
This led to Kimmo Sasi, the Finnish minister for transport and communications, calling 
on the German authority to refund the fee o f any firm that wished to return its licence. 
This was partly linked to Sonera (a state owned firm) taking a large write down on the 
value o f the licence (3Gnewsroom, 2002).
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3.3.2: Spain
The Spanish licences were awarded via comparative selection on the 13th March 2000. 
Four licences were administered consisting o f 15MHz paired spectrum and 5MHz 
unpaired. Each licence was to last for 20 years and the licence winners were required to 
cover all cities with a population greater than 250,000 by August 2001. There were six 
applicants for the four licences. The three 2G incumbents were Telefonica, Amena 
Retevision Movil and Airtel, which was majority owned by Vodafone. The entrant 
applicants were Xfera, Jazztel which was majority owned by Deutsche Telecom, and 
Uni2 which was a subsidiary o f France Telecom. The three incumbents won licences 
with Xfera winning the fourth licence. Each licence cost $130 million with an additional 
$5 million yearly levy. The Spanish authority was concerned that they had severely 
undervalued the licences and so increased the levy to $135 million in 2001. Initially only 
those 2G licence holders which obtained a 3G licence were obliged to offer roaming to 
new 3G licence holders.
The Spanish authority attempted to make additional revenue from 3G licences when 
they increased the fees for spectrum usage charges by 30 times. However this was 
appealed as the licence winners claimed it would negatively affect investment. The 
roaming restriction was changed in March 2002 when roaming on all networks was 
introduced based on commercial negotiation. At the same time, a new type o f licence 
was created to allow the operation o f MVNOs. The Spanish authority because the first 
country to allow an extension in the roll-out conditions with the launch o f services being 
delayed from 1st August 2001 until 1st June 2002. This was then further relaxed on 8th 
April 2002 when it was announced that the 1st June launch would be performed on an 
‘experimental’ basis only. In June 2004, a new agreement over roll-out deadlines was 
reached. This meant that two operators were cleared as they were close to offering 
commercial servicing in 2004. One other licence holder was expected to offer services 
by October 2004 and the final licence holder (Xfera Moviles) by October 2005.
Three operators had services in place by the end o f 2004. However Xfera missed its 
2005 deadline. By the start o f April 2006 the Spanish government began proceedings
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against Xfera Moviles in order to remove their licence. The regulator gave Xfera 
Moviles a final deadline o f June 2006 as a final deadline for network launch. Xfera 
failed to meet this deadline; however this did not lead to the removal of the licence. The 
Spanish government appeared to be appeased when in June 2006 TeliaSonera increased 
its holding in Xfera from 16.5 percent to 80 percent with a guarantee to launch services 
by the end o f the year. Xfera’s network finally went live, although on a limited basis, in 
December 2006. Another significant ownership change was the purchase o f Amena by 
France Telecom in August 2005. Currently Spain has four 3G networks in operation 
after having initially administered four licences.
3.3.3: Norway
On the 31st May 2000 The Norwegian Post and Telecommunication Authority offered 
four licences consisting o f 15 MHz paired and 5 MHz unpaired spectrum. The applicant 
firms were Broadband Mobile (Enitel and Sonera), Netcom, Tele2 Norge, Orange 
Norge, Telenor, BusinessNet (Tele 1 Europe, Western Wireless and Rix Telecom) and a 
consortium consisting o f Orkla, Dagbladet, Hafslund, Hakon Gruppen, NorgesGruppen, 
OBOS/NBBL and Posten Norge. The firms that were awarded licence were Broadband 
Mobile, Netcom Telenor and Tele2 Norge.
The first of the licence winning firms that faced difficulties was Broadband Mobile. The 
consortium returned its licence in August 2001 after it went bankrupt. There was the 
possibility that another firm would purchase Broadband Mobile however, with no 
guarantee from the Norwegian regulator that they would receive the licence this did not 
happen. In November 2002, Tele2 Norge returned its licence and now operates as an 
MVNO on Telenor’s network. Due to deteriorating market conditions and the hand back 
of licences the regulator sought to take action. On the 7th February 2003 the Norwegian 
authority agreed to extend the roll-out deadline by 15 months and decrease the coverage 
commitment from 40% coverage within 5 years to 30% in 6 years. In 2003 Norway 
offered the two licences that had been returned via an auction procedure. In September 
2003 Hi3G Access Norway (Hutchison Whampoa 60%) was awarded a 3G licence for 
$8.2 million needing to cover 60% o f the population within 6 years. As yet they have not
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activated their network. The fourth licence was not administered at this time. This final 
licence was offered again and this time won by Mobile Norway on 13th December 2007. 
Mobile Norway paid NOK 47 million and was guaranteed the licence as the only bidder 
in the administration. As o f yet, Mobile Norway (Network Norway) has not established 
a network, they have however established a roaming agreement with Telenor. This 
leaves Netcom and Telenor as the only two networks currently operating 3G services.
3.3.4: Sweden
A greater amount o f detail on the Swedish administration can be found in Chapter 6. The 
Swedish beauty contest was one o f the most successful at attracting entry with ten 
applicants for the four licences on offer. The four licences each consisted o f 15MHz of 
paired spectrum and 5MHz in unpaired spectrum and would last 15 years. In addition to 
the 3G spectrum there were an extra 2G licences on offer to all-comers, although an 
applicant could not apply for a 2G licence without applying for a 3G licence. An entry 
fee o f €10000 was charged and at a later date it was decided that an additional charge o f 
0.15 per cent o f yearly turnover would be imposed. The companies that applied for 2G 
and 3G licences were Telia, Telenordia (owned by BT and Telenor), Tenora Networks 
and Reach Out Mobile which is predominately owned by Telefonica and Sonera. Those 
applying for 3G licences alone were Europolitan (majority owned by Vodafone), Orange 
Sverige Consortium (made up o f Orange, Skanska, Bredbands, the content provider 
Schibsted, and NTL), Hi3G (40 per cent owned by Investor AB and 60 per cent owned 
by Hutchison Whampoa), Broadwave Consortium (Tele 1 Europe, Western Wireless, the 
content provider Rix Telecom, Suomen 2G/3P Group and You Communication), and 
Mobility4Sweden (Deutsche Telekom, ABB Energy Ventures and the Swedish network 
operator Utfors).
Due to the large number o f applicants a decision was delayed until 16th December 2000. 
The assessment criteria that the regulator used were based around the applicants’ 
reliability, commercial feasibility, suitable experience and sufficient capital for roll-out. 
Further consideration was given to plans for geographic coverage, speed o f roll-out and
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service availability. The winners were Europolitan, Tele 2, Hi3G Access and Orange 
Sverige. The big surprise here was that the largest 2G operator, Telia, did not win a 
licence. The company took the decision to appeal, which was subsequently rejected. 
However, during the appeals process Telia agreed a 50/50 joint venture with Tele2. At 
the time this joint venture was called NetCom, but is now known as Svenska UMTS-nat. 
Those that won licences were under an obligation to cover 8, 860, 000 inhabitants by the 
end o f 2003, which is the equivalent o f 99.98% of the population. In addition to Telia, 
Telenordia Mobil AB and Reach Out Mobile AB also appealed to the Country
thAdministrative Court. However, in a judgment on the 27 June 2001, the court upheld 
the regulator’s original decision. The option to form joint ventures was widely used. As 
has been discussed, Telia quickly joined Tele 2 in a joint venture to run UMTS services.3 
Two o f the other winners, Hi3G and Europolitan formed a joint venture called 3G 
Infrastructure Services AB. This would involve the two operators sharing the majority o f 
network infrastructure. In May o f the same year,4 Orange bought a share o f 3G 
Infrastructure. However, Orange only remained in this agreement for 18 months.5 
Indeed, the withdrawal by Orange led to their eventual and total withdrawal from the 
Swedish market a month later.
The withdrawal o f Orange came about after they had requested a relaxation o f licensing 
conditions in the summer o f 2002. They requested a 3 year extension on the first roll-out 
condition and also a reduction in the required population coverage. The justification that 
Orange gave for this was the financial conditions, delays brought about by Telia’s 
appeal and delays due to planning regulations. All o f these arguments were rejected by 
PTS. The cooperation between operators and withdrawal o f one operator has led to a 
decrease in competition at the network level. At a latter date, Vodafone also applied for 
a relaxation o f licensing conditions. Vodafone wanted a 2 year extension to the first roll­
out condition. Vodafone not only sought to justify an extension due to building 
restrictions but also because the Swedish air forces were in the middle o f an interference 
review that would impact on Vodafone’s spectrum. Again, these requests were rejected
3 This agreement was signed on the 15th March 2001.
4 Agreement signed on 16th May 2001.
5 Orange left on 20th December 2002.
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on the grounds that the firm should have been well aware o f these potential problems. 
This left Svenska and Hi3G, who both applied for relaxation o f licensing conditions in 
2003 but these were again rejected on similar grounds. In December 2003 Orange 
requested that its licence be transferred to Svenska. This request was rejected by PTS 
and in November 2004 Orange Sverige had its licence revoked.
3.3.5: Portugal
The Portuguese regulator administered four licences that would last 15 years consisting 
of 15 MHz o f paired and 5 MHZ unpaired spectrum in January 2001. The applicants 
were the three incumbents 2G TMN (Portugal Telecom subsidiary), Telecel (majority 
Vodafone), and Optimus (Sonae, EdP and Orange) and the new entrants ONI-Way 
(Primarily ONI and Telenor), MobiJazz (Jazztel and Sonera) and a Vivendi consortia. 
The three incumbents gained licences and the one entrant ONI-Way. Each winner paid 
€100 million for licence and a small yearly fee. The companies that won were those that 
had generally committed themselves to the toughest roll-out conditions. The minimum 
roll-out condition was 20 percent population coverage by the end o f 2002 and 60 percent 
by the end o f 2006. In general, the winning companies had committed themselves to 
considerably stricter conditions than these. For instance ONI-Way committed itself to 90 
percent coverage by the end o f 2002, a target that even at the time seemed very unlikely 
that it would meet. There was a roaming agreement put in place to allow the new entrant 
to roam on the incumbents’ 2G networks. However, this was challenged by two o f the 
incumbents. One incumbent allowed roaming but the other two refused until ONI-Way 
had started operating its 3G network. This led to a drawn out period o f appeals to the 
regulator with ANACOM finally forcing all the incumbents to allow roaming by 
September 2002. ANACOM allowed an initial delay o f service launch until 31st 
December 2002 and then a further extension until 1st July 2004. However this was not 
enough for the new entrant ONI-Way, which at the request o f the share holders had its 
licence revoked in January 2003. This fourth licence was not readministered; instead the 
spectrum was split between the existing operators. This left Portugal with three 3G 
network operators from the four licences initially administered.
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3.3.6: France
The French authority, having seen the success of the UK and German auctions, sought to 
raise a similar sum but via a beauty contest. They offered four licences each consisting 
of 15 MHz paired and 5 MHz unpaired spectrum. Each licence would last for 15 years 
and roaming would be allowed over the 2G networks. Each licence would cost Ffr32.5 
billion. However only half o f this would be paid in the first two years; the remainder 
would be paid over the duration o f the licence. Although there was a fair amount of 
initial interest, by the time the licences were administered there were only two 
applicants. The two companies Orange (France Telecom) and SFR were unsurprisingly 
confirmed as licence winners in May 2001.
By October 2001, after appeals from the licence winners and in an attempt to make the 
remaining licences more attractive, the licence duration was increased to 20 years. The 
two licences that had not been administered were offered at a greatly reduced fee of 
€619 million and a 1 percent levy on revenues. The new charge was also applied to the 
winners o f the first two licences. Despite the lower fee, only one further licence was 
administered to Bouygues in September 2002. SFR’s network went live in November 
2004 with Orange following in March 2006. Bouygues did not launch its network until 
November 2007. However, even once it was launched, the network only had limited 
coverage (20 percent) and services were primarily focused at the mobile computing 
market.
During 2005 and 2006, plans were drawn up to attempt to administer the fourth 3G 
licence. An auction procedure to this effect occurred in March 2007. However, there was 
only one applicant for this licence, Iliad, whose offer was eventually rejected. The 
application was rejected on financial grounds given that Iliad wished to make the €619 
million payment in instalments rather than as a lump sum. The proposal to administer a 
fourth licence was then abandoned in April 2008 in favour o f a proposal to sell spectrum 
to MVNOs. Under this plan a MVNO would be switched to a partial network operator 
by allowing them to use other operators’ networks as long as they had enough spectrum 
to cover 25 percent o f the French population. This has left the French market with the
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same number o f 3G operators as there were 2G incumbents and one less operator than 
licences administered.
3.3.7: Luxembourg
The Institut Luxembourgeois de Regulation (ILR) offered four licences consisting o f 15 
MHz paired and 5 MHz unpaired spectrum each lasting 15 years. The charge for each 
licence was partly dependent on revenues but was set at a minimum o f €200 million. 
Despite the relatively low fee, there were only three applicants for the four licences. 
These applicants were the two incumbents, P & T Luxembourg (EPT) and Tango S.A., 
and the entrant Orange (France Telecom). A further licence was administered to 
VOXmobile on 15th July 2003.
Luxembourg had a number o f specific problems with their roll-out conditions. 
Luxembourg had in place a particularly rigid set of regulations regarding where and how 
a transmission mast could be built. The regulations would mean that only 5 percent of 
land would be available to build masts on. Faced with these problems, the ILR 
undertook to ease some o f the pressures faced by licence winners. During 2004 a series 
of court rulings not only made it more difficult to build 3G masts but also put some 
existing GSM masts under threat. Despite these problems three o f the network operators 
had a least a limited service in operation by 2004. However, in December 2004 Orange 
handed back its licence as it removed itself from the Luxembourg market. This has left 
Luxembourg with three network operators, one more than before the process. In May 
2007 VOXmobile was bought by Mobistar the France Telecom subsidiary allowing 
France Telecom to re-enter the Luxembourgish market. A point o f interest is the 
possibility that France Telecom was behaving strategically here; by returning a licence 
through Orange and then re-entering the market they reduced the number o f operators in 
Luxembourg to three.
3.3.8: Ireland
The Commission for Communications Regulation (CCR) followed a similar structure to 
the other beauty contest procedures by offering four licences o f 15MHz paired and 
5MHz unpaired spectrum. These licences would last for 15 years (this was subsequently
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| increased to 20 years). CCR had originally planned to hold the beauty contest in May of 
2001. However, with the industry turbulence and a series o f mergers in the Irish market,
\ the administration was delayed until the end o f June 2002. There were two types o f
| licence on offer. The licences were differentiated by the quantity o f spectrum and the
roll-out conditions. The A licence required 53 percent coverage (the 5 major cities) by 
2005 and 80 percent o f the population by 2007; additional spectrum would also be 
provided to the A licence holder to allow MVNOs. The B licence would require 33 
percent coverage by June 2006 and 53 percent coverage by the end o f June 2008. Each 
incumbent operator would be required to allow roaming once initial roll-out conditions 
had been met. In a further move, it was also announced that network infrastructure could 
be installed on public, commercial and industrial buildings without requiring planning 
permission. Despite these measures, when the administration finally took place, there 
were only three applicants for the four licences. These were the two incumbent operators 
Vodafone Ireland, 0 2  (formerly Esat Digifone) and Hutchison 3G Ireland. Hutchison 
won the A licence for a fee of €52.4 million the other two winners each paid €116 
million for their licences. The companies that won licences were relatively successful in 
meeting coverage commitments and by July 2005 all companies were operating live 
networks. This led Comreg to take the decision to reoffer the fourth licence which had 
remained after the first administration.
The fourth licence was awarded to Smart Telecom in November 2005. Smart Telecom 
incurred a relatively small fee of €114.3 million with an additional fee o f €2.2 million 
per year. However, Smart Telecom had its licence revoked in February 2006 when it 
was not able to provide a €100 million performance bond. This decision was appealed 
but the appeal was not successful. At that time and given the maturity o f the 3G market 
it was questionable whether a new entrant operator could successfully establish itself. In 
2006, this left Ireland with three 3G network operators and despite the legislation laid 
down for the A licence, there were no MVNOs operating in the Irish market. This was 
primarily due to technical issues with number portability. In March 2007, a decision was 
taken to administer the fourth licence to Eircom, the fixed line incumbent, again for a fee 
o f €114.3 million. In the original procedure Eircom had signed an agreement with
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Vodafone not to apply for a licence as a condition for Vodafone buying Eircell. Given
|
[ Eircom’s position in the fixed line market, it was hoped that they would be better placed
i
i  than a new entrant to form a network. Eircom has yet to go live with its 3G network.
i
3.4: Discussion
In retrospect, the success o f these administrations measured in terms o f funds raised and 
stability o f post-administration market is questionable. In particular, whether the method 
o f licence administration had any effect on the development o f 3G services is unclear. 
Gruber (2005) notes that o f the 70 licences granted only 51 have been used to provide a 
service. Out o f the 19 that have not been used 13 were from auction procedures. This 
may have partly been due to the countries that used auction procedures being more 
ambitious with the number of licences they offered. If  we look at Tables 3.1 and 3.2 we 
can see that every beauty contest offered four licences. The number offered by auctions 
varied between six and four with an average o f 4.8. Given this, it may not seem 
surprising that fewer licences ended up being used from auction procedures. Gruber’s 
analysis does not include those licences that were not administered and is now a little out 
o f date. If  we look at the most recent information presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2, we get 
a slightly different picture from the one presented by Gruber. O f the 75 licences offered, 
43 were through auctions and 32 through beauty contests. O f these licences three have 
never been administered, two from auctions and one from a beauty contest. Twelve 
licences have been revoked or returned at some point. Despite auctions administering 
considerably more licences, seven of those revoked were from beauty contests whilst 
five were from auctions.
It may seem peculiar that beauty contests had more licences returned than auctions. If  a 
country has settled on using a beauty contest in the first place it suggests they are open 
to a dialogue with operators over the development o f the industry. A certain amount o f 
evidence to support this proposition can be seen from the number licences offered. Each 
beauty contest offered four licences, which is the number o f licences requested by the 
UMTS Forum .6 Borgers and Dustman (2003) link the lobbying power o f incumbent
6 UMTS Forum Report No. 5 (1998)
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firms with the number o f licences offered and the use o f a particular administration 
procedure. The question is then why would more licences be revoked from countries that 
ran beauty contests. The post-administration picture is mixed however. There is a certain 
amount o f evidence that countries that used beauty contests were less willing to 
renegotiate licensing conditions and started with much stricter roll-out conditions than 
auction procedures. The most obvious example of this is Sweden. The strong political 
forces that were at work meant that varied from country to country. We can find an 
alternative explanation if, instead o f returned licences, we consider the number of 
operators in each country. Despite administering more licences and having less revoked, 
the average number o f operators in each country that used auctions is 3.7. This seems 
strange when we consider that the average for beauty contests it is only slightly lower at 
3.5. This reflects auction countries’ preference for allowing current operators to take 
over licences that had been returned rather than revoking them and readministering to 
new entrants as was done in beauty contests. This would again seem to present us with 
evidence that, once the administration had taken place, countries that had used auctions 
were more interested in supporting those firms in the industry rather than encouraging 
new entry.
A number o f issues have been raised in the last two chapters. The three main points that 
will be addressed in the remainder o f this thesis are as follows: what determined how 
much was paid for the licences, is there evidence that winning bidders overpaid for 
licences, and how did regulatory conditions change in the aftermath o f licence 
administration. Before addressing the evidence o f a winner’s curse and post­
administration regulatory easing, the next step will be to examine those factors that 
affected the size o f the licence fees and which bidding unit won licences. Chapter 4 will 
examine whether the size o f bids that bidders placed were determined by licence and 
country specific factors, administrative specific factors or whether there were other 
determinants outside o f the control o f the administrating authority that had an effect. 
After accounting for differences in type o f administration, are the differences in bids 
such as might be expected given the differences between countries and bidders? In
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addition to these questions, the issues o f whether particular types o f bidders were 
favoured in different licence administrations will also be addressed.
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Table 3.1: Licences Administered via Auctions
Licences
Offered
Licence
Winner
Date of 
adminis 
tration
Date of 
Service 
Launch
Current
Owner
(2008)
United
Kingdom
Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence E
TIW UMTS
Vodafone
BT3G
0ne20ne
Orange
Apr 2000 
Apr 2000 
Apr 2000 
Apr 2000 
Apr 2000
March 2003 
Apr 2004 
Feb 2005 
Oct 2005 
July 2004
Hutchison (3) 
Vodafone 
Telefonica (02) 
T-Mobile 
France Telecom
Netherlands Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence E
Libertel
KPN
Duchtone
Telfort
Ben
Ju l2000 
Ju l2000 
Ju l2000 
Ju l2000 
Ju l2000
Nov 2004 
Oct 2004 
None 
None 
Nov 2005
Vodafone
KPN
T-Mobile
KPN
T-Mobile
Germany Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence E 
Licence F
T-mobile
Mannesmann
E-Plus
Viag Interkom 
MobilCom 
Group 3G
Aug 2000 
Aug 2000 
Aug 2000 
Aug 2000 
Aug 2000 
Aug 2000
Apr 2004 
Jan 2005 
Aug 2004 
Nov 2005 
Returned 2003 
Returned 2002
T-Mobile
Vodafone
KPN
Telefonica
None
None
Austria Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence E 
Licence F
Max.Mobil 
Mobilkom 
Hutchison 3G 
Connect 
Tele, ring 
3G Mobile
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000
Dec 2003 
Apr 2003 
May 2003 
Dec 2003 
Dec 2003 
None
T-mobile
Mobilkom
Hutchison
One
T-mobile
Mobilkom
Italy Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence E
Omnitel 
Ipse 
Wind 
Andala 
Telecom Italia
Oct 2000 
Oct 2000 
Oct 2000 
Oct 2000 
Oct 2000
Mar 2004 
Revoked 2006 
Oct 2004 
Mar 2003 
Mar 2005
Vodafone 
None 
Wind 
Hutchison 
Telecom Italia
Switzerland Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D
Orange 
Swisscom 
Team 3G 
Sunrise
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000
Sep 2005 
Aug 2004 
Revoked 2006 
Dec 2005
France Telecom
Swisscom
None
TDC
Belgium Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D
Proximus 
Mobistar 
KPN Orange 
None
Mar 2001 
Mar 2001 
Mar 2001 
Mar 2001
May 2004 
2006 EDGE 
Sep 2006 
None
Proximus 
France Telecom 
KPN 
None
Greece Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D
Cosmote 
Panafon 
Stet Hellas 
None
Jul 2001 
Jul 2001 
Jul 2001 
Jul 2001
May 2004 
Nov 2004 
Sep 2004 
None
Cosmote 
Vodafone 
Wind Hellas 
None
Denmark Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence B (11) 
Licence C 
Licence D
Hi3G
Orange
Sonofon
TDC
Telia
Sep 2001 
Sep 2001 
Dec 2005 
Sep 2001 
Sep 2001
Oct 2003 
Returned 2005 
Sep 2006 
Oct 2005 
Dec 2007
Hutchison
None
Telenor
TDC
TeliaSonera
S o u rces:  V a r io u s  r e g u la to r s , E u ro p ea n  C o m m is s io n ,  G S M w o r ld  a n d  U M T S w o r ld .
N o te :  In th e  a c tu a l a d m in is tra t io n s  n o t  a ll l ic e n c e s  w e r e  a s s ig n e d  a  letter . In th e  a b o v e  ta b le  le tters  h a v e  b e e n  g iv e n  to  a ll l ic e n c e s  s o  
it c a n  b e  m a d e  c le a r  w h e n  a  l ic e n c e  h a s  b e e n  rea d m in is te r e d  and w h o  that l ic e n c e  p r e v io u s ly  b e lo n g e d  to .
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Table 3.2: Licences Administered via Beauty Contests
Licences
Offered
Licence
Winner
Date of 
adminis 
tration
Date of 
Service 
Launch
Current
Owner
(2008)
Finland Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence C (II) 
Licence D
Sonera 
Radiolinja 
Suomen 3G 
SkyWeb 
Telia Finland
Mar 1999 
Mar 1999 
Mar 1999 
Sep 2005 
Mar 1999
Oct 2004 
Sep 2004 
Revoked 2005 
None 
Dec 2005
TeliaSonera
Elisa
None
SkyWeb
Finnet
Spain Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D
Telefonica 
Amena Retevision 
Airtel 
Xfera
Mar 2000 
Mar 2000 
Mar 2000 
Mar 2000
Feb 2004 
Nov 2004 
May 2004 
Dec 2006
Telefonica 
France Tele 
Vodafone 
TeliaSonera
Norway Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence A (II) 
Licence D (II) 
Licence D (III)
Broadband Mobile
Netcom
Telenor
Tele2 Norge
Hutchison
None
Mobile Norway
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000 
Nov 2000 
Sep 2003 
Sep 2003 
Dec 2007
Returned 2001 
June 2005 
Dec 2004 
Returned 2002 
None 
None 
None
None
TeliSonera
Telenor
None
Hutchison
None
Mobile Norway
Sweden Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D
Europolitan
Tele2
Hi3G Access 
Orange Sverige
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000
Jan 2004 
Mar 2004 
Jan 2004 
Revoked 2004
Vodafone
Svenska
Hutchison
None
Portugal Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D
TMN
Telecel
Optimus
Oni-Way
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000 
Dec 2000
Apr 2004 
Feb 2004 
July 2004 
Revoked 2003
TMN
Vodafone
Optimus
None
France Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence C (II) 
Licence D (II)
Orange
SFR
None
None
Bouygues
None
May 2002 
May 2002 
May 2002 
May 2002 
Sep 2002 
Sep 2002
Mar 2006 
Nov 2004 
None 
None 
Nov 2007 
None
France Tele
SFR
None
None
Bouygues
None
Luxembourg Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence D (II)
P&T Luxembourg 
Tango S.A. 
Orange 
None
VOXmobile
May 2002 
May 2002 
May 2002 
May 2002 
Jul 2003
Jun 2003 
Jul 2004 
Returned 2004 
None 
May 2004
P&T Lux 
Tele2 
None 
None
France Tele
Ireland Licence A 
Licence B 
Licence C 
Licence D 
Licence D (II) 
Licence D (III)
Hutchison
Vodafone
02
None
Smart Telecom 
Eircom
Jun 2002 
Jun 2002 
Jun 2002 
Jun 2002 
Nov 2005 
Mar 2007
Jul 2005 
Nov 2004 
Mar 2005 
None
Revoked 2006 
None
Hutchison
Vodafone
0 2
None
None
Eircom
S o u rces: V a r io u s  r e g u la to r s , E u ro p ea n  C o m m is s io n , (J S M w o r ld  an d  U M T S  w o r ld .
N o te :  In th e  a c tu a l a d m in is tra t io n s  n o t  a ll l ic e n c e s  w e r e  a s s ig n e d  a  letter . In th e  a b o v e  ta b le  le tter s  h a v e  b e e n  g iv e n  to  a ll l ic e n c e s  s o  
it ca n  b e  m a d e  c le a r  w h e n  a  l ic e n c e  h as b e e n  r e a d m in is te r e d  and  w h o  th a t l ic e n c e  p r e v io u s ly  b e lo n g e d  to .
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis o f the 3G Administration
4.1: Introduction
Chapter 3 demonstrated the considerable range in the size o f licence fees raised across 
countries. This chapter will seek to evaluate those factors that affected how much was 
paid for the licence fee and who won the licences through a cross-country econometric 
evaluation. Empirical studies of auctions have more commonly followed the positive 
goals o f identifying whether bidders behave according to some equilibrium behaviour or 
whether bidders’ behaviour is correlated and the nature o f this correlation. Empirical 
evaluation o f auctions has also sought to identify optimal auction design often in terms 
of the administration method to maximise revenue. For a thorough investigation o f this 
type o f empirical study see Hendricks and Porter (2007). This empirical analysis takes a 
slightly different approach. Firstly, the type o f study mentioned previously would 
usually focus on one auction or a number o f auctions o f a similar type, for instance the 
auction o f a particular type o f coin on eBay (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2004). Although the 
present analysis looks only at 3G licences, the constitution o f these licences and the 
design o f the auctions would mean it would not be possible to conduct this type o f study. 
In addition to the differences in the formation of the licences this analysis is also not 
only interested in auctions. The inclusion o f the beauty contest procedure would exclude 
the type o f analysis discussed in Hendricks and Porter. Instead, the analysis that will be 
carried out in this chapter will seek less to examine whether bidders followed 
equilibrium behaviour or the best auction design but rather examine strategic, design, 
economic and structural factors that have affected the bidding units’ bidding behaviour. 
Due to the range o f administration methods used this will be a difficult process, the 
results o f which require careful consideration.
When examining the size o f the licence bids, data will be pooled across the 16 European
countries that administered their licences between March 1999 and June 2002 and are
outlined in the previous chapter. These 16 countries carried out a total o f 18 licence
administration procedures over the period in question. The data set will be analysed as a
whole but also split so that data for Auctions and Beauty Contest procedures can be
analysed independently. The analysis will not look at the licence fees themselves. Due to
the limited number o f licences actually offered, an examination o f the licence price
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would severely limit the number o f observations. Rather the analysis will look at the 
individual bidding units and through their ‘highest observed bid’. Although it would be 
preferable to examine the bidders’ willingness to pay these data is not available. The 
second section will take the modelled highest observed bid and use it as an instrumented 
variable in a Probit estimation o f a dependent variable for whether a bidding unit won a 
licence, in order to determine what affected the bidders’ probability o f winning. The key 
questions that this chapter seeks to answer are which factors determine the size o f 
bidding units’ bids, and which bidders were best placed to do well in the European 
licence administration process.
4.2: Modelling the winners and how much they paid 
4.2.1: Bidding Units’ Highest Observed Bid
This first section only covers the literature on the size of the bid placed by the bidding 
unit and does not motivate the probit equation for what factors are associated with a 
higher probability o f winning. Discussions in the previous two chapters have outlined a 
numbers o f areas, both in terms o f administration design and country specific 
characteristics that may have influenced the amount that a bidder was willing to bid. 
Chapter 2 focused on the theoretical issues associated with administration design and 
Chapter 3 on the specifics o f each administration procedure. From this, the first major 
factor in determining the size o f the highest observed bid seems to have been the method 
o f licence administration. In general, it would appear that auctions fared considerable 
better in raising revenue than the comparative selection procedure. Mean per capita cost 
o f an auctioned licence was almost four times greater than the mean o f those paid by 
winners o f beauty contest procedures. Indeed, when France initially attempted to charge 
comparable prices to the UK and German auctions they failed to administer all o f their 
licences, with only two out o f the four available licences receiving bids. However, even 
within the auction and beauty contest groups a large variation is apparent. This can be 
seen in Table 4.1 which shows the variability between administration procedures. The 
purpose o f this study is to attempt to identify those factors that have caused such a range 
o f prices via examining the bidders’ highest bid. These factors include the market that 
the licence is being sold for, the way the type o f licence is being sold and the 
characteristics o f the bidding unit itself. The exact form o f these variables will be 
outlined in the next section.
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A cross-country empirical analysis o f the size o f average licence fee charged in each 
country is severely limited by the small number o f individual country observations. 
Consequently the present analysis takes individual bidding units as the unit o f analysis.1 
The empirical strategy models two processes -  the first being the “observed highest bid” 
o f the bidder; the second being the probability that a particular bidder was able, as a 
result o f  determining a particular highest bid, to win a licence to operate a 3G network in 
a particular nation state. In the case of the countries which used an auction, observed 
highest bid is revealed in the highest bid made by the bidding unit. When the 
administration process was by comparative selection the licence fee was set ex ante and 
so the observed highest bid is the fee set by the administering authority. Given that 
bidders control the size o f highest observed bid in auctions and the administering 
authority controls the highest observed bid in beauty contest, the question arises as to 
what we are actually measuring. The temptation here is to consider the bid information 
as willingness to pay; this is particularly attractive as the goal o f an auction is to sell an 
asset to the individual that values it the most at their willingness to pay. In beauty 
contests no applicant unit that would have a willingness to pay lower that that charged 
by the country using a comparative selection. The bidding unit may have a willingness 
to pay much higher than the fee charged in a beauty contest. The data from the observed 
highest bid for bidding units that did not win licences can be considered willingness to 
pay. The drop-out bid for the losing bidders will be the highest value that they place on 
the asset. However, when it comes to the winners o f an auction this is not the case.
There are a number o f potential problems with identifying the price bid by a bidding unit 
as their willingness to pay. Firstly how close the winning bid is to the willingness to pay 
will depend on the structure o f the auction and indeed the number o f licences offered. If 
two licences were being auctioned in an English style auction then the winning bidder 
would pay the willingness to pay o f the bidder with the second highest valuation. This 
would be equivalent to a second price sealed bid auction. When there are five licences 
being administered in an English style auction then each bidder will pay the willingness 
to pay o f the bidder with the sixth highest valuation. As such, the willingness to pay will
1 In many cases bidding units were not a single company but a consortium which may have been formed 
specifically to bid for a licence from a particular national telecommunication authority.
diverge from the price paid by a greater amount as additional licences are offered in a 
particular administration. However, these may vary from administration to 
administration. Where the licences that are being offered are asymmetrical, whether this 
be in terms o f quantity o f spectrum offered, position o f the frequency or the conditions 
attached to the licence, the effect may not be as great as with symmetrical licences. 
Depending on the design o f the auction asymmetric licences may mean we should treat 
each licence as being auctioned individually. As such it may be more correct to refer to 
the dependent variable as the observed highest bid. Hong and Shum (2003), although 
taking a different focus, take the bid at which a bidding unit drops out from an auction 
and attempt to determine the distribution o f bidder valuations.
4.2.2: Modelling the Probability of Winning.
In general, no particular objectives were explicitly identified by administration 
organisers as to which bidders would win licences. As such, there is no definitive answer 
over what might be expected to affect the probability o f a bidder winning a licence. 
Given that the auctions were intended to be open procedures that maximised the amount 
o f revenue from the licences the only issue that determined how likely a bidder was to 
win a licence was the value that it placed on that licence. It is not entirely clear if  the 
administering authority had any preference for which bidder won a licence. Although 
they usually, although not always, had published selection criteria exactly how these 
criteria were applied is not always clear. As was alluded to in the previous chapter, 
where an administering authority has decided to use a comparative selection they may 
have already come under pressure from the incumbent firms. If  this is the case then we 
may expect to see this carried through to the decision on who wins a licence with the 
incumbent operators more likely to win. To that end, the structure o f the winner equation 
will be investigated by including an instrumented highest bid variable.
4.3 : The Model and Description of Variables
Given the definitions o f the dependent variables from section 4.2.1 as the observed 
highest bid and from section 4.2.2 as the probability that a bidding unit won a licence, 
the model can be summarized as follows:
BIDit =aQ+ a]Xu + a2X2i + a2Zu + a3t + uit (4.1)
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?r(winu = 1) = b0 + blZil + b2t + v„ (4.2)
In addition to this, the instrumented highest bid could be included in the winners’ probit 
equation to give:
Pr (winu =\) = b0+ \Zit + b2t + b3BIDit + eit (4 -3)
Where i denotes the bidder i and t denotes the timing o f the particular licence 
administration procedure. Equation (4.1) models BID, the highest bid price. X\ are 
covariates describing the characteristics o f the particular market for which the bidder 
seeks to obtain a licence, and X2 are covariates describing the characteristics o f the 
administration process. Z  captures particular characteristics of the bidding unit at the 
time o f the administration process, u and v are error terms. Equation (4.2) models the 
probability that a particular bidding unit will be successful (win= 1) in terms o f its 
particular characteristics. Equation (4.3) therefore models the probability that a 
particular bidding unit will be successful in terms of its particular characteristics and 
predicted highest bid, instrumented by the right-hand side variables contained in reduced 
form equation (4.1).
As was discussed in section 4.2.1, for the auction bidders it would be anticipated that the 
specification will be appropriate if  the highest bid observed accurately reflects 
willingness to pay. For bidders in beauty contests we would expect coefficient 63 to be 
statistically insignificant, since winners were selected on the basis o f characteristics 
other than the value that they placed on the licence or, in this case, their predicted 
highest bid. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated separately and jointly using an 
instrumental variable probit estimator.
Descriptive statistics for the whole dataset and the restricted dataset can be found in 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. All the data were collated by the author from National 
Regulatory Authorities, The International Telecommunication Union and EUStat. 
Highest bid is measured by the log o f the licence price paid per capita o f market 
population. In the case o f unsuccessful bidders it is the highest recorded bid prior to the
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bidder leaving the auction, and the case o f operators who registered and were accepted 
to bid, but did not in fact enter the auction, the variable is taken as the published reserve 
price. For participants in comparative selection administrations the variable is measured 
as the published licence price. Where a fee was also explicitly stated in the licensing 
conditions its present value was also included. Where this fee was a portion o f revenues 
an estimate o f revenue was taken at present value and included. To calculate a value for 
the revenue o f each licence holder, the number o f subscribers (S), change in the average 
revenue per subscriber (ARS) and the share o f subscribers for each operator are 
calculated. In order to calculate these numbers the country subscriber penetration (SP) 
and subscriber growth (SG) were calculated and the number o f subscribers per operator 
were also calculated. The ARS was assumed to increase at 5 percent per year for the first 
10 years of the licence and then held constant for the remainder o f the duration. The SP 
is included to account for the slowing growth as penetration increases, the subscriber 
growth is then calculated as:
SG, = ASG x (1 -  SP,2) (4.4)
Where ASG is average subscriber growth between 1997 and 2001 in the country in 
question. Subscriber growth is then used to calculate the number o f subscribers in a 
country as:
S, = S^xQ + SG,) (4.5)
From this, the number o f subscribers for licence holder i, which is an incumbent firm, is 
taken as:
S„ = MS,, x(S-(Sx Yt)) (4.6)
Where MS is the market share o f the firm at time t and Y is the growth rate o f an entrant
firm. When the firm is an entrant into the particular country the number o f subscribers is
taken as:
S„=YtxS, (4.7)
The revenue o f an operator is the present value o f the number o f subscribers multiplied 
by the ARPS.
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4.3.1: Description of Variables
Market characteristics (Xi) are captured by five variables. The first is GDP per capita 
measured at 1999 levels and converted to Euros using a 1999 exchange rate. This 
variable captures average income levels across countries. The second variable measures 
the physical size o f the market by taking the population level in 1999. It is anticipated 
that both income and population will be positively associated with the value o f a licence 
and in turn the bidding unit’s willingness to pay which should be reflected in their 
observed bid. The third, fourth and fifth variables provide more specific information on 
the development of the national mobile telephony market. Variables three and four are 
used together as the level o f mobile and internet penetration. The level o f mobile phone 
market penetration prior to the 3G administration in question is used, measured by the 
number o f subscribers per 100 o f population at the 1999 level. The internet penetration 
takes the percentage o f the population that have a fixed-line internet connection in 1999. 
The fifth variable, which is used as a substitute to the mobile penetration and internet 
penetration variables, is an index o f market conditions compiled by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). This composite indicator includes measures for the 
structure o f the regulator, fixed line market and mobile market. The index takes a value 
between 0 and 100, the higher the value attached to a particular country the more open 
and accessible its market.2 Again it is anticipated that these variables will be positively 
associated with willingness to pay, although the strength o f  the association may be 
attenuated if the existing market is already very highly saturated. We could infer from a 
high mobile penetration that a county’s population are open to the use o f mobile 
technology and there is a large potential market. However, a very high mobile 
penetration may also indicate limited possibilities for future growth. As such the mobile 
penetration will also be included as a quadratic equation. It may be anticipated that the 
internet penetration variable will have a positive coefficient as it indicates a developed 
technological infrastructure within a particular country. However, new broadband 
applicants and technologies such as Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) and Wi-Fi, 
internet services may come into direct competition with mobile telecommunication. If  
fixed-line internet connections are seen as substitutes then it may be more appropriate to 
expect a negative coefficient.
2 For a full explanation of the ITU mobile market index see International Telecommunication Union 
(2002, p. A72).
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Administration-specific factors (X2) are captured by a further five variables. The first is 
the number o f licences offered in the particular administration. The number o f licences 
on offer may provide an indication o f the extent to which the administration process was 
designed to encourage entry. If  there were only as many 3G licences on offer as current 
2G licences there would be limited incentive for entrant companies to attempt to win a 
licence. Additional licences should then increase the competition in the auction and we 
would expect a positive coefficient. However a greater number o f licences on offer will 
also mean more operators in the post-auction market. Greater post-auction competition 
will decrease the value o f the licence and hence willingness-to-pay. In addition to this, 
as discussed in the next chapter, if  a greater number o f licences does encourage entry 
into the auction procedure, then bidders may adjust their bids downwards in order to 
avoid a winner’s curse. Authorities opting for a “beauty contest” may also have been 
aware o f the potential to increase competition by allocating extra licences. However, an 
authority may only offer additional licences if the market is deemed large enough to 
support them. The larger the market was, or was thought to be, then the higher the price 
that the administration authority may have set. In some cases the number of licences that 
could be won in an administration was determined by the bidders’ behaviour. In each of 
these cases, the maximum number o f licences that were made available to bidders were 
all administered, and so this number is taken as the number o f licences offered.
The next variable is the duration o f the licences on offer. Here a positive association 
with the value o f the licence is anticipated since a longer operating period will be more 
valuable. However it should be noted that the McKinsey report (European Commission, 
2003) found no relationship between the duration o f the licence and the licence price. If 
we believe that once a bidding unit wins a licence and establishes its network then it will 
automatically be allowed to continue operating once the licence has expired, then the 
officially stated licence duration is arbitrary. In addition to this, given the speed o f 
technological change the licence duration may outlast the life o f the technology. A 
regulatory authority may withdraw the licence at a future date if  a new technology is 
being introduced. In both these circumstances we would expect no effect from increased 
licence duration.
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The timing o f the administration within the sequence o f European spectrum allocations 
may have determined willingness-to-pay, since market sentiment may have been 
influenced by bidders’ and by other authorities’ experiences in earlier auctions and 
comparative selections. Two variables are used interchangeably to try and capture any 
time effect. The first variable is defined as the date at which an administration procedure 
began in terms o f the number o f days after the first administration procedure (that o f 
Finland). The second variable looks only at the order that the administrations took place 
in. The first administration is given a value o f 1 and the final a value o f 18. Given the 
considerable decline in stock prices and fall in confidence about the future o f the 3G 
format, as the European administration process proceeded, it may be expected that both 
variables will have a negative association with the highest observed bid. However, once 
again this relationship may not be clear cut, in the previous chapter we saw how some 
beauty contests changed the size o f their licence fees in response to the high fees raised 
in early auctions. If  this is the case then we may expect to see considerably different 
coefficients when the data sets are separated.
A simple binary variable is included in the model to distinguish between a comparative 
selection and an auction, defined as one for an auction. This is to indicate the extent to 
which the licence price may have reflected revealed willingness-to-pay on the part of 
successful bidders, rather than ex ante valuation placed on the licence by the national 
authority. Since auctions were seen to be more successful in terms o f revenue raised a 
positive association is expected. This is despite the fact that some countries that were 
running beauty contests responded to the size o f auction licence fees by increasing their 
beauty contest fees.
The final administration-specific characteristic is the reserve price set on the licence by 
the administration authority. This variable is only included for the auction 
administrations as there would clearly be no reserve price in a beauty contest. If the 
reserve price was set too high then it may have discouraged bidders, particularly new 
market entrants. However, a high reserve may have offered a means o f increasing the 
licence price if  collusion was present or if  there was a limited number o f bidders. 
However, in almost all cases the per capita reserve prices were set relatively low 
compared to the final price. Ex ante it seems unlikely that they served to reduce
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competition. Whether collusion took place is a contested issue. If  collusion took place a 
positive association between reserve price and highest bid would be expected. In order 
to take account o f any interaction between the number o f bidders and the reserve price 
an additional variable will be included o f the reserve price multiplied by the number o f 
bidders in each administration procedure.
Four bidder-specific variables (Z) are included in the analysis. The first is a binary 
variable capturing if  the bidder was an incumbent 2G licence holder in the market in 
question. This is included to test whether incumbents performed better in the 
administration processes. In the comparative selection administrations incumbents may 
have been perceived by the authorities as more attractive bidders, and therefore may 
have enjoyed, other things equal, a higher likelihood o f success or may have had an 
advantage in terms o f some form o f regulatory capture. In auction procedures the 
incumbent bidders may place a greater value on licences due to synergies with their 
current 2G operations. In both cases the variable would be expected to have a positive 
coefficient.
Two variables capture the bidder’s current 2G exposure across Europe and give an 
indication o f whether the bidder could be considered an international operator. One is a 
binary variable capturing if bidder held licences in two or more European states that 
took part in the process under consideration. If  the bidding unit or the constituent firms 
that make up the bidding unit operate in two or more countries the variable takes a value 
o f 1. The other variable takes the total number o f 2G licences held which should give a 
better reflection o f the level o f a bidding unit’s international operations. Where a bidding 
unit consists o f a number o f different firms and consist o f at least one international 
operator then this international operator will be counted as long as it holds more than 25 
percent stake in the bidding unit. Where there is more than one international operator in 
the bidding unit then the number o f 2G licences held by the operator with the most 2G 
licences will be included. The final bidder-specific information concerns planned 3G 
exposure at the time o f the administration in question. A variable is included measuring
3 See Klemperer (2002a) for further discussion on the likelihood of collusion in 3G spectrum auctions.
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the number o f 3G licences in other countries that are included in the study that had 
already been won by the bidder at the time o f each administration process. One 
motivation for including variables capturing international market exposure was the 
assertion in the McKinsey & Co. report that international operators fared better in the 
administration procedures that used auctions and incumbent operators fared better in 
administrations that used beauty contests.
There is a discrepancy between the number o f administration procedures described in 
the previous chapter (17) and the number o f administrations used in this analysis (16). 
Data from one administration, Denmark, is omitted from the empirical analysis. 
Denmark operated a sealed bid fourth price auction. These sealed bids were not made 
public and the Danish regulator refused to release them into the public domain. Without 
bidding information, each bidding unit’s highest observed bid cannot be determined. The 
only data that are available is the observed bid o f the bidding unit with the fourth highest 
bid. As discussed in section 4.2.1, this may be a similar amount o f data as that available 
in other auctions; however, this is also the only data that is available for the losing 
bidders as well. As such, it was deemed appropriate that this administration should be 
excluded.
4.3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 provide descriptive statistics on the model’s dependent variables 
and each o f the covariates. The descriptive information in Table 4.2 is presented on three 
sample definitions. The first column includes data on bidders in all administrations 
including comparative selections and includes information on bidders who were 
authorized to bid in auctions but did not in fact bid above the reserve price once the 
auction had started. The total number o f observations is 102. The second column 
provides descriptives on bidders for just the auction administrations, reducing the 
sample to 59 or 58% of the total number o f bidder observations. Like the first column, 
the second column includes the bidders that did not enter a bid. The third column shows 
the statistics for the Beauty Contest administrations only. This reduces the number of 
observations to 43, which is 42% of the total observations. Table 4.3, like Table 4.2, 
provides the descriptive statistics for the whole and auction dataset. However these data
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excludes those organizations authorized to bid but who did not in fact bid above the 
reserve licence price. This reduces the number o f observations further by 12. All o f the 
observations that have been removed were from auction procedures and so the auction 
only sample now consists o f 47 observation or 52 percent o f the total. The beauty 
contest sample does not change and is only included in Table 4.2.
The table shows clearly higher bidding in the auction procedures than beauty contests. 
The mean o f the log o f licence bid per capita in the auctions is between 0.9 and 1.2 
Euros per capita more than the average across all administrations and between 2.2 and 
2.6 greater than the average across beauty contest procedures. O f all bidding units, 66 
per cent o f all candidates were successful, although in the auctions for authorized 
bidders prepared to bid above the reserve (once announced) the success rate was rather 
higher at 80 per cent. O f those entering a beauty contest procedure 70 per cent were 
successful. Larger countries, in terms o f population size, are more likely to have used an 
auction administration method. However there is no evidence in the data that wealthier 
countries preferred auctions with an almost identical mean for the GDP o f auction 
countries and beauty contest countries. The number o f additional licences offered 
averages barely above one, with auctions offering more than comparative selections. 
This number questions how committed authorities were to encouraging competition in 
the allocation process and post allocation market. Most licences were offered for 
between 15 and 20 years duration with auction administrations having, on average, 
slightly longer durations. Mobile penetration averaged just above 46 percent for the 
whole group with countries that used beauty contests having slightly higher mobile 
penetration than auction countries, 51 and 43 percent respectively. Countries that used 
beauty contests also had slightly higher internet penetration than auction countries with a 
level o f 25 percent compared to 18 percent for auctions. The ITU market index was 
similar for both groups sitting between 87 and 88. There was a clear preference, as the 
European process progressed, for beauty contests to be held rather than auctions. Beauty 
contests have a mean o f 660 days after the initial administration compared to between 
548 and 563 days for auctions (unrestricted and restricted respectively).
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On average, half o f the bidders in any national administration process possessed a 
licence to operate 2G mobile services in that country. However over 70% o f bidders had 
significant 2G market exposure elsewhere across Europe, with the average number o f 
2G licences held per bidder at around 3.5. Bidders who proceeded beyond the opening 
o f the auction administrations had even higher average 2G exposure with an average of 
over 4 licences each. Bidders that entered into beauty contest procedures had both lower 
international exposure and a lower number o f  2G licences when compared to those in 
auction procedures. However, there was not the same differential in the probability o f 
winning for an incumbent bidder between auction and beauty contest procedures. They 
were also more likely to have been successful in earlier 3G licence administrations. The 
correlation matrix can be found in Table 4.13 to Table 4.17.
4.4: Empirical Results 
4.4.1: Total Data Set
Table 4.4 reports estimates for equation (1) modelling bidder highest bid for the full data 
set. Estimates are presented for six different specifications. Results are presented for 
estimations where the mobile penetration and internet penetration variables are 
substituted for the ITU market index variable. Specifications are also shown where the 
two timing variables are interchanged. Column (5) in Table 4.4 has the addition of the 
mobile penetration squared variable and Column (6) excludes the GDP variable. The 
GDP variable is excluded because estimation of the model reveals some 
multicollinearity between GDP per capita and the variables capturing characteristics of 
the administration process. The inclusion o f GDP per capita reduces the size and 
statistical significance o f the coefficients on most o f the administration characteristics 
variables. This is particularly a problem for the auction-only data and all the restricted 
data. As such, the restricted total data set in Table 4.7 includes the same specifications as 
the unrestricted table but the GDP variable is only included once. R-squared statistics 
indicate that the model explains between 68 and 86 percent o f the variation in highest 
bid, with a higher degree o f explanatory power for the restricted sample.
GDP per capita in those equations in which it is included attracts a negative coefficient 
in all but one instance. In both columns 1 and 3 o f Table 4.4 this coefficient is
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statistically significant. This is somewhat surprising but what it may indicate is that in 
wealthier markets the potential for 3G roll-out may have been perceived to be more 
limited. This is because current levels o f 2G market penetration may be higher and 
therefore it would be more challenging to persuade existing customers to upgrade, 
whereas in less developed markets 3G roll-out would be concerned to a greater extent in 
recruiting entirely new customers to mobile communications services. However there is 
a strong hint in the results with higher GDP per capita may have also offered a greater 
number o f licences (higher potential future competition) and licences o f shorter duration, 
making bidding less attractive.
The significant positive coefficient on population does indicate that, other things equal, a 
larger market was seen as more attractive. In the full sample evaluated at sample mean 
population o f 29 million, a one percent increase in population is associated with a 0.84 
to 1.1 percent increase in observed bid, for the restricted data this figure is between 0.87 
and 1.1 percent evaluated at a sample mean o f 28 million. An improvement in market 
conditions as measured by the ITU index is also associated with an increase in observed 
bid in the full sample model, although not for the restricted sample. The level o f mobile 
penetration is positively associated with the observed bid in all cases, although not 
always significant in the restricted sample. When the quadratic mobile penetration 
specification is used, mobile penetration is still positive but the squared variable is 
negative. This would suggest that as mobile markets became saturated the effect 
decreased.
Turning to the characteristics o f the administration process, the results reveal a positive 
association between the number of additional licences on offer and licence fee in the full 
sample and the restricted sample. The licence duration has a negative coefficient in the 
majority o f cases although this is significant in only a small number o f instances. The 
positive significant coefficient on the two administration timing variables in the full and 
restricted sample suggests that either regulators become “greedier” as the European 
process developed or bidders became willing to pay more. This will only be determined 
once the data set has been split.
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The coefficient on the administration method included in the full sample reveals the 
extent to which those countries which adopted a comparative selection method lost out 
in terms of revenue. Auction bidders highest observed bids regardless o f success was, 
other things equal, around 169 and 187 percent higher than the equivalent fee set in a 
comparative section administration across both the restricted and unrestricted samples. 
This difference reflects the difference ex ante between the valuation placed on the 
opportunity to provide improved mobile telephony by regulatory authorities and by 
bidders. The size o f this relationship strongly encourages the examination o f the data as 
separate auction and beauty contest sub-sets.
Any association between bidder characteristics and willingness to pay is quite weak in 
terms o f statistical significance. Local 2G incumbents do appear to have been prepared 
to bid more by as much as 40%. However this association disappears in the restricted 
auction sample, suggesting that once weaker potential bidders (who did not in fact enter 
the full bidding process) are excluding no such incumbent effect remains. This does 
however suggest that existing incumbents were better placed in getting to the start of the 
bidding compared to newly formed, untested potential operators. The scale o f a bidder’s 
current 2G operations, as indicated by holding more than two other 2G licences is also 
positively associated with highest observed bid in all cases. However this relationship is 
only significant for the full data sample The 3G licences won to date attracts a weak 
negative coefficient in nearly all cases, there is no significant evidence to suggest that if 
a bidder had won in the early allocations that they were discouraged from continuing to 
commit funds to acquiring further 3G licences.
4.4.2: Auction Data Subset
Table 4.5 to Table 4.8 contain the results for the auction data set for the total and 
restricted samples respectively. The specifications are the same as for the combined data 
sets apart from the exclusion o f the binary variable for the type o f administration used 
and the inclusion o f a reserve price variable. Unlike the combined data the positive 
relationship between population and observed bid is only significant for the restricted 
data. The magnitude o f the relationship is also smaller than with the combined data. 
Likewise, the ITU index is only significant for the restricted data and surprisingly takes 
a negative sign.
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The coefficient on the additional licence variable reverses sign when considering 
auctions alone (although only becomes significant when GDP per capita is omitted). 
This combined with the full data set results would suggest that regulators, where 
comparative selection was adopted, set higher fees if they had more licences to allocate. 
However for auction bidders, greater potential competition reduced the attractiveness of 
licences and therefore the highest bid they would place. As anticipated, there is also a 
positive association between licence duration and observed bids in the case o f auction 
bidders (again particularly if  GDP per capita is omitted). Unlike the combined data, 
auction bidders appear to reveal a significant drop in the observed bid as the process 
continued. The coefficients for the timing variables in Table 4.5 suggest that highest 
observed bid fell, other things equal, by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points per day. For every 
administration that took place the observed bid dropped between 20 and 27 percentage 
points. Table 4.8 reports similar results a daily fall o f between 0.6 and 0.7 percent and an 
administration decrease o f between 23 and 24 percent. The results also reveal a positive 
association between auction reserve price and the highest observed bid. This was the 
case in all but two specifications (one o f which is significant). This suggests that a 
higher reserve price indicates that opportunity for collusion may have been present. 
There is no suggestion in the results that a higher reserve price discouraged bidding. 
This is supported by the positive and significant coefficient for the reserve price 
multiplied by the number o f bidders variable.
There is a stronger association between the bidder characteristics and observed bid than 
with the combined data. 2G incumbents bid around 45% more in unrestricted and 17% 
more in the restricted data. However the incumbent variable has a lower significance 
level than the international operator (more than two 2G licences) variable, which was 
also positive in all cases. This is in contrast to the number o f 2G licences held which 
although positive were not significant in any case. There is also no statistical evidence 
that the number o f 3G licences won previously had an impact on highest bid in later 
administration procedures.
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4.4.3: Beauty Contest D ata Subset
Table 4.6 reports the results from the beauty contest data subset. As no beauty contest 
observations were removed for the restricted sample these results are consistent across 
both. As with the auction subset the binary method variable is removed and as discussed 
earlier the reserve price variable is not included. There appears to be no evidence that 
regulators have set higher charges for longer licences where comparative selection was 
adopted. This perhaps reinforces the idea that the length o f the licence was not 
considered to be realistic. As was expected from the combined and auction results, 
where the regulator administered additional licences they also charged a higher price. 
Also, as time went on regulators became greedier and increased their charges. This was 
around 0.3 percent a day or 25 percent per administration. Unsurprisingly the bidder 
characteristics had very little influence over the size of the licence fee charged by the 
regulator. The bidder characteristic variables are only significant in two instance and 
these are only at the 90% level.
4.4.4: P robability  of W inning Equation
The second stage o f the empirical analysis is to consider the question of what factors, if 
any, are associated with the likelihood of winning a licence in the European 
administration process. Two specifications are reported. The first is a simple model 
which seeks to predict winner status on the basis o f bidder characteristics as shown in 
equation (4.2). The second specification reports the results of an instrumental variable 
probit regression in which instrumented highest observed bid is included shown in 
equation (4.3). This variable is, in effect, predicted from the appropriate corresponding 
equation in Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and Table 4.7.
Table 4.9 reports the results o f probit regressions for the probability o f being a licence 
winner (winner = 1 ) .  The table contains the same specification for the entire data set, 
auction only, beauty contest only, the total restricted and auction restricted. In all cases 
being an incumbent in administering country increase the probability o f winning a 
licence. Being an international operator only increases the probability o f winning for 
auction administrations.
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Table 4.10 to Table 4.12 report the results o f the reduced form equations and the 
instrumented variable probit. A result for the restricted auction subset could not be 
obtained due to the small number o f observations. The results for the IVProbit are 
reported as marginal effects. A key finding in all o f these tables is that instrumented 
highest bid is not significantly associated with the probability o f winning a licence.4 In 
the case o f the full sample this would not be a surprising result if  those regulators 
administering a comparative selection process used criteria other than the value o f the 
licence to a bidder as the dominant means o f allocating licences to winners. This was, o f 
course, the case since by indicating their willingness to be considered as a bidder each 
candidate must have been prepared to pay the pre-published licence fee, and winner 
selection would have been conducted on the basis o f  other additional criteria. The 
regression findings are far more surprising for the auction sample found in Table 4.11. 
In the case o f the auctions, actual willingness to pay, revealed by contestants’ highest 
bids, by definition explains who won. The models reported in Table 4.11 to predict 
willingness to pay, despite explaining the majority o f the variance in final bidding, 
appear to omit other information which determined who was prepared to remain in the 
bidding longest.
All the probit results suggest that incumbent 2G operators had a huge advantage in 
bidding to win licences in countries in which they were already established operators, 
under both comparative selection and auction administration processes. There is also 
some evidence, particularly in the instrumental variables models, that possession o f a 
number o f current 2G operator licences conferred a further advantage. Being an 
incumbent increased the probability o f winning a licence between 45 and 57 percentage 
points for the combined and auction data. The relationship between incumbency and 
winning a licence appears to break down for the beauty contest data when the instrument 
observed bid is included. In the auction sub-sample holding two or more 2G licences 
also increased the probability o f winning a licence between 54 and 58 percentage points.
4.5: Assessment
Chapters 1 and 2 discussed how governments realise that radio spectrum is a highly 
valuable public resource and how they attempted to administer it in the European 3G
4 The first stage of the reduced form equation is estimated with a maximum likelihood estimator in order 
to be able to obtain marginal effects for the probit analysis.
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mobile communications licence allocation whilst attempting to achieve a number of 
goals. The analysis presented in this chapter highlights a number o f key findings. Firstly 
it documents the scale to which those countries which allocated spectrum on a fixed fee 
comparative selection process lost out by ignoring lessons from elsewhere in the world 
that auctioning radio spectrum could be made to work successfully. Results presented 
here suggest that, other things equal, revenues per capita o f population raised by such 
“beauty contests” could have been as much as 160 percent higher if  auctioning had been 
adopted. Changes in market sentiment as the European process progressed resulting in 
lower bidder valuations, but higher valuations being set by authorities adopting 
comparative selection as their administration method. This served to narrow the gap 
between the two methods, but only very partially. This left some countries, though little 
fault o f their own, with little revenue from their licence allocations but the same 
regulatory problems as other countries.
The second key feature is that incumbent operators appear to have enjoyed a 
considerable advantage over new bidders in the allocation process even under auctions. 
This was partly understood in advance by some authorities who reserved particular 
licences for new entrants. However the results from this chapter suggest that incumbent 
advantage was very great and that further efforts to improve the contestability o f the 3G 
market may have been warranted. In deciding which administration method to adopt, the 
European Commission left individual member states to their own devices. Removing 
this option would have reduced the discrepancy. Introducing issues o f timing mean that 
the matter becomes more complicated. If an auction had been universally adopted then 
in principle it would have been possible to have conducted a single multi-unit European 
auction. This would, though, have been very complicated and exacerbated apparent 
information asymmetries between entrant bidders and 2G incumbent bidders. Adopting 
comparative selection on a universal basis may have resolved this but would have led to 
other inefficiencies. Not least o f these the potential loss in revenues from a beauty 
contests. Across Europe there are overlapping regulatory concerns and so the more 
appropriate method o f licence administration is far from certain.
Thirdly, variation in national market conditions and in administration processes is 
associated with variation in the highest observed bid (or “willingness to charge” in the
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case o f comparative selection allocations). The greater or more promising the market 
potential the higher was the willingness to pay. However simple levels o f economic 
well-being (GDP) do not correlate easily with greater market potential. Bidders may 
have preferred licences in less developed markets where the opportunity to bring entirely 
new customers to mobile telephone communications were greater. Selling to new 
customers may have been at least as attractive as persuading existing 2G subscribers to 
upgrade and use expanded services. In the auction allocations greater market 
competition (a larger number o f eventual operators) reduced the attractiveness of 
licences. Market and administration characteristics, combined to some extent with 
information on bidder characteristics, explain a high proportion o f the variance in 
highest observed bid. But predicted highest bid does not appear to be associated with a 
higher probability of winning a licence. This suggests that other unobserved or 
unobservable information was present in the bidding process.
This chapter’s analysis supports some o f the findings o f  the McKinsey and Co. report 
(European Commission, 2002a) on the operation of the administration process. However 
it also finds some key differences. Although the timing o f administration was negatively 
associated with the highest bid for the auction bidders, there was a positive association 
for the whole dataset and, in particular, for the beauty contest dataset. Some support is 
also found for the McKinsey assertion that offering additional licences increased licence 
fees, but only when data from auctions and comparative selections is pooled. For the 
auction-only sample this relationship is found to be negative. McKinsey and Co. stated 
the view that additional licences increased competition in bidding, causing more 
aggressive bidding and higher licence fees. Our results suggest that the opposite is true - 
offering more licences appears to have been taken as a signal that eventual market 
competition would be higher and therefore licences less attractive. The results also seem 
to suggest, in contrast to the official European Commission report, that licence duration 
is positively associated with highest bid placed.
The past three chapters have primarily focussed on those factors that determined the 
level o f licence fees in the European administrations. Given the way that licence 
administration procedure have interacted with each other particularly, over timing a 
question remains o f whether too much was paid. Although some decisions made by the
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administering authority did impact on their revenue raised, there were other 
determinants that were luck rather than judgement. The size o f effect from the timing 
variables is a key example. With the integrated nature o f the European 
telecommunications market, overpayment in one country can impact upon others. The 
next three chapters will explore the issue o f overpayment in the 3G administration. If 
overpayment has occurred then the winners may have suffered a winner’s curse. The 
possibility o f a winner’s curse will be explored and the possible regulatory implications 
of this considered.
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Chapter 4
Table 4.1: European 3G spectrum administration
Country Date Method No. of 
Bidders
No. of 
Licences 
awarded
Total 
Revenue 
Raised (€m)
Revenue 
per 
capita (€)
Finland 16/03/99 CS 4 4 5.6 1.1
Spain 13/03/00 CS 6 4 301 7.6
UK 27/04/00 Auction 13 5 36,880 619.9
Netherlands 24/07/00 Auction 5 5 2,690 169.6
Germany 18/08/00 Auction 9 6 50,810 618.4
Italy 23/10/00 Auction 8 5 13,820 240.9
Austria 03/11/00 Auction 6 6 704 86.1
Norway 29/11/00 CS 7 4 94.4 21.3
Switzerland 06/12/00 Auction 9 4 132 18.4
Sweden 16/12/00 CS 9 4 28.3 3.2
Portugal 20/12/00 CS 7 4 399 40.0
Belgium 02/03/01 Auction 4 4 450 44.4
France (1) 31/05/01 CS 2 4 9,900 168.9
Greece 13/07/01 Auction 4 4 485 45.6
Denmark 20/09/01 Auction 5 4 510 95.9
Luxembourg (1) 22/05/02 CS 3 4 8.4 19.5
Ireland 25/06/02 CS 3 4 284 76.8
France (2) 27/09/02 CS 1 2 1033 17.6
Luxembourg (2) 15/07/03 CS 1 1 2.8 6.5
Source: collated by the author from data published by European national regulatory 
authorities.
Note: CS denotes Comparative selection (“Beauty contest”)
78
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
( 1)
All administrations 
N=102
(2 )
Auctions only 
N=59
(3)
Beauty Contests 
only 
N=43
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev
Dependent variables:
Log licence bid per capita (1999 €) 0.556 1.77 1.492 1.291 -0.727 1.519
Licence winner 0.657 0.477 0.627 0.488 0.698 0.465
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita 1999€ ‘0000s 2.719 0.845 2.72 0.641 2.717 1.073
Population (m) 28.982 27.873 39.484 29.606 14.572 17.038
ITU market conditions index 87.096 4.361 87.846 4.959 86.068 3.149
Mobile Penetration 0.464 0.105 0.427 0.108 0.505 0.112
Internet Penetration 0.213 0.117 0.177 0.006 0.252 0.154
A dministration characteristics:
No. of licences in addition to 2G 
licences
1.049 0.635 1.119 0.646 0.953 0.615
Licence duration (yrs) 17.392 2.822 18.136 2.439 16.372 3.016
Administration timing (elapsed days) 604.177 248.996 563.136 119.649 660.488 351.725
Administration timing (ordering) 7.696 4.402 6.508 3.266 7.860 5.672
Administration method (auction=l) 0.578 0.496 - - - -
Reserve licence price, €  per capita - - 8.658 11.694 - -
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market 0.490 0.502 0.492 0.504 0.488 0.506
Two or more 2G licences held 0.706 0.458 0.712 0.457 0.698 0.465
Total 2G licences held 3.598 4.108 3.559 4.236 3.651 3.975
Total 3G licences won to date 1.804 2.221 1.661 1.872 2.00 2.637
Source: author’s computations from data published by national regulatory authorities. 
Population and GDP data from European Commission: Statistical Office o f the 
European Communities.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics (Restricted Sample)
0 )
All administrations
(3)
Auctions only
(Restricted Sample) 
N=90
(restricted sample) 
N=47
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev
Dependent variables:
Log licence bid per capita (1999 €) 0.634 1.846 1.879 1.081
Licence winner 0.744 0.439 0.787 0.414
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita 1999€ ‘0000s 2.678 0.835 2.642 0.544
Population (m) 28.205 27.075 40.678 28.645
ITU market conditions index 87.135 4.53 88.11 5.35
Mobile Penetration 0.464 0.105 0.427 0.082
Internet Penetration 0.217 0.117 0.175 0.044
Administration characteristics:
No. of licences in addition to 2G 1.033 0.643 1.106 0.667
licences
Licence duration (yrs) 17.433 2.864 18.404 2.355
Administration timing (elapsed days) 660.488 351.726 548.213 154.35
Administration timing (ordering) 6.933 4.63 6.085 3.249
Administration method (auction=l) 0.522 0.502 - -
Reserve licence price, €  per capita - - 8.17 11.522
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market 0.544 0.501 0.596 0.414
Two or more 2G licences held 0.744 0.439 0.787 0.414
Total 2G licences held 3.944 4.23 4.212 4.477
Total 3G licences won to date 1.9 2.293 1.809 1.952
Table 4.4: Highest Bid Equation
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
( 1)
All
(2)
All
(3)
All
(4)
All
(5)
All
(6 )
All
Constant -11.786***
(2.571)
-5.059***
(1.391)
-7.965***
(2.766)
-4.554***
(1.478)
-17.379***
(2.434)
-5.336***
(-3.87)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.475***
(0.136)
-0.231
(0.184)
-0.303**
(0.15)
0.02
(0.178)
-0.252
(0.156)
-
Population 0.029***
(0.005)
0.033***
(0.005)
0.034***
(0.005)
0.038***
(0.005)
0.036***
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.005)
ITU market conditions index 0 .111***
(0.027)
- 0.072**
(0.029)
- - -
Mobile Penetration - 0.059***
(0.0152)
- 0.063***
(0.016)
0.654***
(0.097)
0.063***
(0.015)
Mobile Penetration2 - - - - -0.007***
(0 .001)
Internet Penetration - -0.039**
(0.017)
- -0.058***
(0.017)
0.008
(0.018)
-0.053***
(0.013)
Administration
characteristics:
No. of additional licences 
offered
0.542***
(0.170)
0.403**
(0.174)
0.512***
(0.191)
0.369**
(0.183)
0.827***
(0.171)
0.32*
(0.162)
Licence duration -0.081*
(0.042)
-0.024
(0.047)
-0.081*
(0.047)
-0.044
(0.049)
0.005
(0.042)
-0.021
(0.047)
Administration timing 
(Elapsed Days)
0.004***
(0 .001)
0.003***
(0 .001)
- - - 0.003***
(0 .000)
Administration timing 
(Ordering)
- - 0.173***
(0.036)
0.139***
(0.035)
0.093***
(0.03)
-
Administration method 
(auction=l)
1.685***
(0.223)
1.833***
(0.247)
1.758***
(0.252)
1.755***
(0.261)
1.134***
(0.242)
j 711*** 
(0.228)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market 0.392*
(0.228)
0.116
(0.233)
0.353
(0.258)
0.082
(0.247)
0.365*
(0.213)
0.116
(0.233)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.649**
(0.251)
0.721***
(0.258)
0.572**
(0.284)
0.731***
(0.273)
0.571***
(0.231)
0.73***
(0.258)
Total 2G licences held 0.036
(0.0326)
0.045
(0.033)
0.042
(0.037)
0.052
(0.036)
0.027
(0.03)
0.045
(0.034)
Total 3G licences won to 
date
-0.069
(0.060)
-0.064
(0.061)
-0.068
(0.071)
-0.077
(0.068)
-0.046
(0.057)
-0.061
(0.061)
R2 0.743 0.738 0.675 0.709 0.850 0.733
N 102 102 102 102 102 102
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Table 4.5: Highest Bidder Equation (Auction Data)
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
( 1)
A uction
(2)
A uction
(3)
A uction
(4)
A uction
(5)
A uction
(6)
A uction
(7)
A uction
Constant 4.225
(2 .891)
2.636
(2.821)
-2.554
(2.119)
-2.866
(2.32)
0.638
(3.462)
451.87
(582.032)
2.732
(2.784)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.966*
(0 .532)
- - - " " *
Population 0.006
(0 .006)
0.006
(0 .006)
0.005
(0.006)
0 .014
(0 .012)
0 .02**
(0 .01)
-0 .014
(0.045)
0.004
(0.006)
ITU market conditions index 0.027
(0 .040)
-0.027
(0.027)
0.003
(0.023)
“ ” -0.039
(0.028)
Mobile Penetration - - - 0.024
(0.03)
0.038
(0.024)
-33.976
(43.872)
“
Mobile Penetration 2 - - - 0.425
(0.549)
Internet Penetration - - - -0.014
(0.044)
-0.063
(0 .047)
4.784
(6.252)
“
Administration
characteristics:
No. of additional licences 
offered
0.143
(0 .381)
-0.458**
(0.194)
-0.458**
(0.189)
-0 499*** 
(0.186)
-0.431**
(0.197)
-36.203
(46.14)
-0.562***
(0.19)
Licence duration 0.0006
(0 .160)
0.269***
(0.062)
0.269***
(0.06)
0.224**
(0.098)
0.124
(0.086)
5.661
(7.141)
0.314***
(0.068)
Administration tim ing 
(Elapsed D ays)
-0.007***
(0 .002)
-0 .008***
(0 .002)
- • -0.005**
(0.003)
0.0955
(0.13)
-0.007***
(0 .002)
Administration tim ing  
(Ordering)
- - -0.271***
(0.054)
-0.204*
(0 .103)
“ -
Reserve licence price 0.010
(0 .026)
0.051***
(0.051)
0.043***
(0 .012)
0.023
(0.03)
0.005
(0.024)
-0.424
(0.554)
-
Reserve Price x N .O  bidders 0.007***
(0 .002)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in m arket 0.455*
(0.244)
0.503**
(0.248)
0.477*
(0.242)
0.455*
(0.244)
0.455*
(0.244)
0.447*
(0.245)
0.486*
(0.246)
Two or m ore 2G  licences 
held
0.606**
(0 .264)
0.534**
(0 .267)
0.562**
(0.257)
0.604**
(0.264)
0.606**
(0.264)
0.659**
(0.273)
0.548*
(0.264)
Total 2G licences held 0.004
(0 .033)
0.011
(0 .033)
0.007
(0.257)
0.004
(0 .033)
0.004
(0.033)
0.004
(0.033)
0.01
(0.033)
Total 3G licences w on to 
date
-0.009
(0 .0743)
-0.041
(0.074)
-0.018
(0.0742)
-0.009
(0.074)
-0.009
(0.0742)
-0.02
(0 .076)
-0.032
(0.073)
R2 0.751 0.733 0.747 0.75 0.751 0.75 0.74
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
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Table 4.6: Highest Bidder Equation (Beauty Contest Data)
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
( 1)
Beauty
Contest
(2 )
Beauty
Contest
(3)
Beauty
Contest
(4)
Beauty
Contest
(5)
Beauty
Contest
(6)
Beauty
Contest
Constant -0.964
(7.368)
-22.044***
(7.449)
-3.449*
(1.91)
-46.119***
(3.596)
-12.706***
(4.502)
-2.5**
(1.129)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.628***
(0.134)
- - - - -0.406***
(0 .102)
Population 0.019**
(0.019)
0.041***
(0 .01)
0.036***
(0 .012)
0.052***
(0.005)
0.039***
(0.008)
0 .02 1**
(0.008)
ITU market conditions index -0.015
(0.077)
0.193**
(0.08)
- - 0.081*
(0.048)
-
Mobile Penetration - - 0.046
(0.032)
1.741 *** 
(0.14)
- -0.018
(0.019)
Mobile Penetration2 - - - -0.019***
(0 .002)
- -
Internet Penetration - - -0.056***
(0.018)
0.071***
(0.013)
- 0.000
(0.013)
Administration 
characteristics:
No. of additional licences 
offered
1.323***
(0.17)
1.048***
(0.204)
0.997***
(0.189)
2.168***
(0.125)
1.354***
(0.163)
1.455***
(0.137)
Licence duration -0.055
(0.043)
-0.005
(0.0528)
-0 .112*
(0.055)
0.208***
(0.035)
0.025
(0.043)
-0.026
(0.038)
Administration timing 
(Elapsed Days)
0.003***
(0 .001 )
0.004***
(0 .001)
0.003***
(0.000)
-0 .00 1**
(0.000)
- -
Administration timing 
(Ordering)
- 0.259***
(0.032)
0.234***
(0 .02)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market 0.42*
(0 .211)
0.302
(0.268)
0.215
(0.259)
0.16
(0 .11)
0.061
(0 .221)
0.207
(0.169)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.12
(0.244)
0.156
(0.311)
0.314
(0.294)
0.069
(0.126)
0.23
(0.253)
0.184
(0.19)
Total 2G licences held -0.012
(0.035)
0.003
(0.044)
0.01
(0.042)
0.011
(0.018)
0.028
(0.036)
0.011
(0.027)
Total 3G licences won to 
date
0.096*
(0.054)
0.101
(0.069)
0.063
(0.066)
-0.012
(0.029)
0.016
(0.059)
0.026
(0.044)
R2 0.886 0.807 0.841 0.972 0.839 0.902
N 43 43 43 43 43 43
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Table 4.7: Highest Bidder Equation (Restricted)
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
( 1)
All
(restricted)
(2)
All
(restricted)
(3)
All
(restricted)
(4)
All
(restricted)
(5)
All
(restricted)
(6)
All
(restricted)
Constant -2.764
(-2.764)
-3.968*
(2.335)
-1.07
(1.182)
-4.681**
(2.337)
-1.823
(1.216)
-13.786***
(2.251)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.391***
(0.138)
- - - - -
Population 0.031***
(0.005)
0.033***
(0.005)
0.034***
(0.005)
0.037***
0.005
0.038***
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.004)
ITU market conditions index 0.0326
(0.025)
0.029
(0.026)
- 0.033
(0.026)
-
Mobile Penetration - - 0.024
(0.015)
- 0.03*
(0.015)
0.571***
(0.088)
Mobile Penetration 2 - - - - - -0.006***
(0 .001)
Internet Penetration - - -0.04***
(0.013)
- -0.04***
(0.013)
0.005
(0.013)
Administration
characteristics:
No. of additional licences 
offered
0.572***
(0.162)
O.43 4***
(0.161)
0.45***
(0.154)
0.48***
(0.158)
0.481***
(0.151)
0.814***
(0.139)
Licence duration -0 .112***
(0.042)
-0.072*
(0.041)
-0 .102**
(0.044)
-0.73*
(0.041)
-0.095**
(0.043)
-0.044
(0.037)
Administration timing 
(Elapsed Days)
0 .002***
(0 .000)
0 .0 0 2***
(0 .000)
0 .0 0 1***
(0 .000)
- - 0 .00 1*
(0 .000)
Administration timing 
(Ordering)
- - 0.149***
(0.03)
0 .122***
(0.028)
•
Administration method 
(auction=l)
1.697***
(0.23)
1.63***
(0.239)
1.625***
(0.224)
1.869***
(0.232)
1.83***
(0.223)
1.068***
(0.204)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market -0.209
(0.233)
-0.138
(0.242)
-0.232
(0.231)
-0.149
(0.238)
-0.252
(0.228)
0.102
(0.197)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.205
(0.253)
0.193
(0.264)
0.307
(0.256)
0.291
(0.262)
0.39
(0.253)
0.296
(0.21)
Total 2G licences held 0.027
(0.031
0.028
(0.033)
0.028
(0.031)
0.035
(0.032)
0.035
(0.031)
0.011
(0.026)
Total 3G licences won to 
date
-0.011
(0.056)
-0.000
0.059
-0.004
(0.057)
-0.056
(0.062)
-0.04
(0.06)
0.007
(0.046)
R2 0.793 0.772 0.792 0.779 0.801 0.864
N 90 90 90 90 90 90
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Table 4.8: Highest Price Equation (Auction Data Restricted)
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
( 1)
A uction
(restricted)
(2)
A uction
(restricted)
(3)
A uction
(restricted)
(4)
A uction
(restricted)
(5)
A uction
(restricted)
(6)
A uction
(restricted)
(7)
A uction
(restricted)
Constant 7.569***
(0 .937)
6.694***
(0.977)
6.734***
(1.117)
2 344*** 
(0.735)
256.243
(168.302)
1.976***
(0 .666)
6.772***
(0.934)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.519***
(0.177)
- - ■ " "
Population 0.017***
(0 .002)
0.016***
(0 .002)
0.025***
(0.003)
0.017***
(0 .004)
0.006
(0.013)
0.017***
(0 .002)
0.015***
(0 .002)
ITU market conditions index -0.05***
(0 .014)
-0.079***
(0 .01)
- - ” -0.051***
(0.008)
-0.087***
(0 .01)
Mobile Penetration - - 0.008
(0 .008)
-0.009
(0 .01)
-18.803
(12.689)
"
Mobile Penetration 2 - - - - 0.235
(0 .159)
“ “
Internet Penetration - - -0.148***
(0.016)
-0.086***
(0.014)
2.534
(1 .809)
“ _
Administration
characteristics:
No. of additional licences 
offered
-0.119
(0 .123)
-0.433***
(0.066)
-0.135**
(0.063)
-0.22***
(0.059)
-19.921
(13.346)
_0 44*** 
(0.06)
-0.507***
(0.064)
Licence duration 0.14**
(0 .055)
0.285***
(0.026)
-0.006
(0 .027)
0.12***
(0.032)
3.057
(2.066)
0.281***
(0.023)
0.315***
(0.027)
Administration tim ing 
(Elapsed Days)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0 .001)
- 0.049
(0 .038)
- -0.007***
(0.001)
Administration tim ing 
(Ordering)
- - - -0.257***
(0.035)
- -0.234***
(0.02) n
Reserve licence price 0.012
(0 .009)
0.034***
(0.005)
-0.019**
(0.008)
0.005
(0.01)
-0.256
(0.160)
0.026***
(0.004)
jL
Reserve Price x N .O  bidders - - - - - 0.005*** 
(0 .001)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in m arket 0.168**
(0.081)
0.158*
(0.089)
0.167**
(0.08)
0.168**
(0.081)
0.162**
(0 .079)
0.168**
(0.08)
0.162*
(0.094)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.194**
(0.091)
0.151
(0.098)
0.198**
(0.09)
0.195**
(0.09)
0.235**
(0.092)
0.188**
(0.088)
0.16*
(0.094)
Total 2G licences held 0.005
(0.01)
0.01
(0 .011)
0.005
(0.01)
0.005
(0.01)
0.005
(0.01)
0.005
(0.01)
0.008
(0.01)
Total 3G licences w on to 
date
0.006
(0 .024)
-0.015
(0.026)
0.005
(0 .024)
0.006
(0.024)
-0.001
(0 .024)
0.005
(0.024)
-0.007
(0.025)
R2 0.971 0.964 0.971 0.971 0.973 0.971 0.958
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 47,-;,
Table 4.9: Winner Probit Equation
( 1)
All
(2)
Auction
(3)
Beauty
Contest
(4)
All
(Restricted)
(5)
Auction
(Restricted)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
2G incumbent in 0.556*** 0.617*** 0.524*** 0 471*** 0.428***
market (0.09) (0.132) (0.129) (0.098) (0.156)
Two or more 2G 0.264 0.465** 0.054 0.186 0.297
licences held (0.150) (0.203) (0.207) (0.143) (0.214)
Total 2G licences held 0.002 0.011 -0.011 -0.002 0.001
(0.019) (0.028) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015)
Total 3G licences won 0.039 0.040 0.050 0.033 0.028
to date (0.033) (0.054) (0.041) (0.026) (0.031)
N 102 59 63 90 47
Log likelihood -40.156 -20.329 -17.805 -32.884 -13.737
Pseudo R2 0.388 0.478 0.324 0.357 0.435
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Table 4.10: Reduced Form Highest Bidder Equation
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
(1)
All
(2 )
All
(3)
All
(4)
All
(5)
All
(6 )
All
Constant -12.768*** -4 97 9*** -9 599*** -4 429*** -17.746*** -5.323***
(2.32) (1.319) (2.491) (1.395) (2 .2 ) (1.307)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.503*** -0.243 -0.335*** -0.004 -0.346** -
(0 .121) (0.175) (0.129) (0.171) (0.148)
Population 0.03***
(0.004)
0.033***
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.005)
0.038***
(0.005)
0.036***
(0.004)
0.035***
(0.005)
ITU market conditions index 0.127***
(0.025)
- 0.095**
(0.026)
- “ "
Mobile Penetration - 0.058*** - 0.061*** 0.682*** 0.063***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.088) (0.014)
Mobile Penetration 2 - - - - -0.007***
(0 .001)
-
Internet Penetration - -0.038** - -0.055*** 0.022 -0.053***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0 .012)
Administration
characteristics:
No. o f additional licences 0.494*** 0.396** 0.45*** 0.357** 0.827*** 0.318**
offered (0.151) (0.164) (0.167) (0.172) (0.154) (0.155)
Licence duration -0.097*** -0.025 -0.099** -0.046 0.002 -0.021
(0.037) (0.044) (0.041) (0.046) (0.038) (0.044)
Administration timing 0.004*** 0.003*** - - - 0 .0 0 2***
(Elapsed Days) (0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .000)
Administration timing - - 0179*** 0.14*** 0.093*** -
(Ordering) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027)
Administration method 1.6 6 6*** 1.844*** 1.705*** 1.78*** 1.151*** 1.712***
(auction=l) (0.203) (0.233) (0.232) (0.245) (0.218) (0.215)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market 0.428** 0.122 0.39 0.091 0.409* 0.118
(0.214) (0.218) (0.241) (0.232) (0.198) (0 .22)
Two or more 2G licences 0.648*** 0.718*** 0.591** 0.726*** 0.543** 0.73***
held (0.236) (0.241) (0.266) (0.255) (0.216) (0.243)
Total 2G licences held 0.033 0.044 0.039 0.051 0.023 0.045
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.03) (0.032)
Total 3G licences won to -0.057 -0.063 -0.064 -0.076 -0.041 -0.061
date (0.056) (0.057) (0.065) (0.064) (0.053) (0.058)
IVProbit
Highest Bid Instrument -0.041 0.000 -0.056* -0.05 -0.027 0.005
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033)
2G incumbent in market 0.547*** 0.556*** 0.537*** 0.556*** 0.569*** 0.555***
(0.089) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.089) (0.09)
Two or more 2G licences 0.282** 0.262* 0.285** 0.265* 0.298** 0.261*
held (0.143) (0.15) (0.141) (0.15) (0.15) (0.151)
Total 2G licences held 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Total 3G licences won to 0.033 0.04 0.033 0.039 0.042 0.04
date (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
N 102 102 102 102 102 102
Log Likelihood -169.846 -174.147 181.267 -179.344 -158.944 -175.105
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Table 4.11: Reduced Form Highest Bidder Equation (Auction Data)
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
( 1)
Auction
(2)
Auction
(3)
Auction
(4)
Auction
(5)
Auction
(7)
Auction
Constant 2.669
(1.949)
0.802
(2.075)
-2.025
(2.341)
-2.302
(2.152)
-0.242
(2.543)
0.887
(2.055)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.765**
(0.326)
- - - - *
Population 0.016***
(0.004)
0.014**
(0.007)
0.015
(0.005)
0.023***
(0.007)
0.027***
(0.006)
0.013
(0.006)
ITU market conditions index 0.021
(0.03)
-0.013
(0 .021)
0.003
(0.025)
- - -0.021
(0 .021)
Mobile Penetration - - - 0.021
(0.019)
0.028*
(0.015)
-
Mobile Penetration 2 - - - - - -
Internet Penetration - - - -0.022
(0.031)
-0.057
(0.033)
-
Administration
characteristics:
No. of additional licences 
offered
0.014
(0.227)
-0.514**8
(0.143)
-0.486**
(0.126)
-0.476***
(0.164)
-0.431***
(0.157)
-0.575***
(0.143)
Licence duration -0.017
(0.09)
0.23***
(0.05)
0.23***
(0.043)
0.172**
(0.081)
0.1
(0.075)
0.264***
(0.057)
Administration timing 
(Elapsed Days)
-0.004***
(0 .001)
-0.006***
(0 .002)
- - -0.003**
(0 .001)
-0.006***
(0 .002)
Administration timing 
(Ordering)
- - -0.184***
(0.05)
-0.127**
(0.059)
- -
Reserve licence price -0.005
(0.015)
0.03***
(0.015)
0 .0 2 1***
(0 .011 )
0.001
(0.018)
-0.011
(0.016)
-
Reserve Price x N.O bidders 0.004***
(0 .002)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market 0.51**
(0.215)
0.558**
(0 .221)
0.529*
(0.216)
0.51**
(0.215)
0.511**
(0.215)
0.544**
(0.218)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.576**
(0.239)
0.539**
(0.242)
0.538**
(0.238)
0.574**
(0.293)
0.567**
(0.239)
0.547**
(0.239)
Total 2G licences held -0.000
(0.029)
0.004
(0.030)
0.001
(0.029)
-0.003
(0.03)
0.001
(0.029)
0.004
(0.029)
Total 3G licences won to 
date
-0.021
(0.063)
-0.043
(0.065)
-0.03
(0.064)
-0.021
(0.064)
-0.021
(0.064)
-0.038
(0.064)
IVProbit
Highest Bid Instrument -0.068
(0.063)
-0.063
(0.075)
-0.072
(0.068)
-0.068
(0.063)
-0.073
(0.061)
-0.054
(0.073)
2G incumbent in market 0.487***
(0.174)
0.555***
(0.182)
0.475**
(0 .211)
0.486***
(0.175)
0.468***
(0.169)
0.561***
(0.179)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.393***
(0.147)
0.461***
(0.169)
0.391**
(0.17)
0.391***
(0.147)
0.381***
(0.14)
0.458***
(0.169)
Total 2G licences held -0.009
(0 .021)
-0.004
(0.024)
-0.006
(0 .021)
-0.09
(0 .021)
-0.009
(0 .02)
-0.005
(0.025)
Total 3G licences won to 
date
0.007
(0.044)
0.003
(0.052)
-0.002
(0.048)
0.007
(0.044)
0.005
(0.043)
0.007
(0.052)
N 59 59 59 59 59 59
Log Likelihood 72.265 -75.225 -73.235 -72.356 -72.186 -74.576
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Table 4.12: Reduced Form Highest Bidder Equation (Restricted)
Dependent variable: log 
licence bid per capita
( 1)
All
(Restricted)
(2)
All
(Restricted)
(3)
All
(Restricted)
(4)
All
(Restricted)
(5)
All
(Restricted)
(6 )
All
(Restricted)
Constant -2.731
(1.878)
-3.886**
(1.954)
-1.483
(1.025)
-4.244**
(2.067)
-2.143**
(1.073)
-12.086***
(2.259)
Market characteristics:
GDP per capita -0.408***
(0.118)
- - - - -
Population 0.025***
(0.005)
0.027***
(0.005)
0.029***
(0.005)
0.033***
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.005)
0.032***
(0.004)
ITU market conditions index 0.029
(0 .021)
0.024
(0 .022)
- 0.024
(0.023)
-
Mobile Penetration - - 0.025*
(0.014)
- 0.03*
(0.014)
0.489***
(0.092)
Mobile Penetration2 - - - - - -0.005***
(0 .001)
Internet Penetration - - -0.04***
(0 .011)
- -0.041***
(0.013)
-0.002
(0 .012)
Administration
characteristics:
No. o f additional licences 
offered
0.621***
(0.139)
0.497***
(0.139)
0.509***
(0.133)
0.545***
(0.141)
0.547***
(0.133)
0.808***
(0.127)
Licence duration -0.0925**
(0.036)
-0.053
(0.036)
-0.082**
(0.038)
-0.057
(0.027)
-0.082**
(0.038)
-0.0458
(0.033)
Administration timing 
(Elapsed Days)
0.003***
(0 .000)
0 .002***
(0 .000)
0 .0 0 2 ***
(0 .000)
- - 0 .00 1***
(0 .000)
Administration timing 
(Ordering)
- - 0.169*** 0.145***
(0.025)
-
Administration method 
(auction=l)
1.736***
(0 .201)
1.664***
(0 .211)
1.641***
(0.199)
1.956***
(0.213) (0 .202)
1.176***
(0.196)
Bidder characteristics:
2G incumbent in market -0.373
(0 .22 )
-0.301
(0.231)
-0.380
(0.219)
-0.256
(0.226)
-0.353*
(0.214)
-0.033
(0.198)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.22
(0.241)
0.216
(0.253)
0.331
(0.243)
0.308
(0.248)
0.418
(0.238)
0.307
(0.197)
Total 2G licences held 0.042
(0.03)
0.043
(0.031)
0.042
(0.03)
0.046
(0.031)
0.047
(0.029)
0.022
(0.025)
Total 3G licences won to 
date
-0.066
(0.053)
-0.057
0.057
-0.055
(0.053)
-0.097
(0.059)
-0.092
(0.056)
-0.022
(0.047)
IVProbit
Highest Bid Instrument 0.032
(0.026)
0.036
(0.027)
-0.035
(0.027)
0.03
(0.026)
-0.03
(0.026)
0.013
(0.024)
2G incumbent in market 0.454***
(0 .101)
0.457***
(0 .101)
0.463***
(0 .102)
0.463***
(0.099)
0.464***
(0 .102)
0.455***
(0.099)
Two or more 2G licences 
held
0.192
(0.146)
0.187
(0.145)
0.228
(0.141)
0.169*
(0.141)
0.195
(0.15)
0.18
(0.143)
Total 2G licences held -0.002
(0.016)
-0.004
(0.016)
0.005
(0.016)
-0.005
(0.015)
-0.005
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.015)
Total 3G licences won to 
date
0.037
(0.025)
0.037
(0.027)
0.037
(0.027)
0.039
(0.025)
0.038
(0.026)
0.031
(0.026)
N 90 90 90 90 90 90
Log Likelihood -136.851 -142.634 -137.024 -143.976 -138.094 -124.408
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Part 2
Chapter 5: The Winner’s Curse and 3G Auctions
5.1: Introduction
In the previous three chapters the primary focus was the outcome o f the European 
administration procedures and which factors affected how much was bid and who won 
the licences. One o f the key conclusions from the last chapter was that some o f the most 
influential factors that affected licence fees were out o f the control o f the administering 
authority. The question that now becomes particularly important is whether some licence 
winners overpaid and suffered a winner’s curse. It is clear from the discussion in the 
previous section that not all licence winners paid too much for their licences. In some 
administrations, both auctions and beauty contests, very small licence fees were charged. 
However, there were certain administrations where there was at least an impression that 
overpayment occurred. Due to the integrated nature o f the European 
Telecommunications market, overpayment in one country has knock on effects to 
development o f the 3G industry in other countries. Chapter 3 outlined the difficulty that 
some countries faced with their 3G roll-out and indeed how this was not confined to 
countries with high licence fees.
The next three chapters will seek to identify if in some administrations the licences 
winners paid too much for their licence. In particular if the winners o f 3G licences 
suffered a so called winner’s curse. Section 5.2 to 5.4 o f this chapter will discuss the 
development o f the concept o f a winner’s curse, how it has been identified and 
controversy around the evidence o f its existence. Section 5.5 will then examine the 
rationale behind the presence o f a winner’s curse in the 3G auctions. Section 5.6 
examines the evidence that has been presented thus far that supports the supposition that 
there was a winner’s curse in some 3G administrations. The chapter finishes in Section 
5.7 with a discussion o f how overpayment may impact on the post-administration 
industry.
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5.2: Concept of the W inner’s Curse
The idea that bidders may do badly by buying assets at an auction is certainly not a new 
one. If it was the case that an auction winner paid more for an asset than its value, then 
they may have experienced a winner’s curse. Klemperer and Temin (2001) suggest that 
one o f the earliest examples of the winner’s curse was in Rome around AD 193, when 
Sulpicianus and Julianus were involved in a bidding war over the Emperorship of the 
Roman Empire. Julianus won the bid but defaulted and was executed.
The modem concept o f the winner’s curse, without the same fatal consequences, was 
first explored by Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971)1 in relation to oil and gas drilling 
rights. When buying the drilling rights to a ‘wild tract’ piece o f land, that is land in 
previously unexplored areas, a firm will be able to perform certain exploitative activities 
such as seismic studies. This provides each firm with information from which an 
estimate can be made over the quantity o f oil that could be extracted. In addition to the 
estimation o f the quantity o f oil, the firm may also wish to make some estimate over the 
future value o f the oil due to future price changes. Clearly there is a difficulty in valuing 
the tracts o f land that are being auctioned, and so the estimated value o f  the land by 
different firms will vary considerably. Even if the firms bid somewhat less than their 
estimated value of the asset, those firms with the higher estimates will bid more 
aggressively due to their view o f the higher value for the land. In an auction, this would 
lead to the highest bidder, and hence the wining bidder, being the one with the highest 
estimated value. As oil and gas are internationally traded commodities the value of the 
extracted material will be the same for each firm. This will mean that, apart from some 
relatively small differences in costs brought about through variations in the cost of 
extraction, once it is known how much oil and gas the tract contains, the value o f the 
tract will be the same for each firm. As such, it is possible to say that the asset that is 
being auctioned has a common value. If  we assume that the estimates o f the value o f 
each tract are unbiased then the mean o f the estimates will be equal to the common value 
of the asset. However, the winning firm will not be the one with the mean estimate but
1 For a thorough account of the development of the winner’s curse theory see Thaler (1992).
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j tract is worth.
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More generally, when a common value asset, which has an uncertain value, is sold 
through an auction mechanism, the winning bidders will overpay and suffer a winner’s 
curse. Once a bidder has won an asset there are two possible ways in which they can be 
cursed. If  the winning bid is greater than the true value o f the asset, this is known as the 
strong form o f the winner’s curse, or version 1 winner’s curse. Quite simply the winning 
bidder has paid too much for the asset. Alternatively, the value o f the asset is less than 
the expected value placed on the asset by the firms. This may manifest itself so that the 
firm has lower than expected profits, which is the weaker form o f the curse, version 2 
winner’s curse. When Capen, Clapp and Campbell calculate the ex post returns from the 
purchase o f these oil and gas drilling rights they found them to be negative. A result that 
they conclude shows that the winners of these auctions suffered a version 1 winner’s 
curse.
When a bidder wins a common value auction it is an informative event. Winning the
auction conveys the information to the winner that the value o f the assets was higher
than all the other bidders’ valuations. A bidder should then condition their bidding 
strategy on winning the auction. If  bidders do behave in this way then attracting too 
many bidders can decrease the revenue raised by the seller. Indeed, Bulow and 
Klemperer (2002) find the rationing of an asset or exclusion o f potential buyers will 
increase prices in sales o f common value goods. The greater the number o f bidders, the 
more a bidder will need to adjust for the winner’s curse. This leads to the 
counterintuitive outcome that limiting the amount o f competition can be revenue 
enhancing.
It was suggested by Cox and Isaac (1984) that the winner’s curse can not occur if  the 
bidders are rational, which it is assumed that they are. Hence the existence o f a winner’s 
curse will pose some sort o f anomaly. This suggestion misses the problem that acting 
rationally within this type of auction can be extremely difficult. It involves not only
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determining the expected value with limited information availability, but also taking into 
account the number o f other bidders and their bidding strategies. Even if a bidder can 
avoid a version 1 winner’s curse they may not be able to avoid version 2. Due to the 
complexities associated with different types o f auctions identifying whether an auction 
may suffer from the winner’s curse is impossible to say with theory alone. The 
identification of a winner’s curse must be an empirical matter.
5.3: Experim ental evidence
Two papers by Bazerman and Samuelson (1983, 1985) report on experiments to test for 
the existence o f the winner’s curse. These experiments were conducted by giving a 
number o f MBA students certain assets to value within the context o f an auction. The 
authors found that students systematically overvalued these assets, which provided 
support for the winner’s curse. A question can be raised regarding these experiments as 
to whether the results would persist. The suggestion here is that those involved in the 
auction learnt from the mistakes they were making. As learning occurred, the students 
reduced their bids to avoid the winner’s curse. If  this was the case, then the winner’s 
curse could only exist in auctions for new assets or those auctions that involve new 
bidders who did not have experience in valuing assets. To test for this, an extension of 
Bazerman and Samuelson’s second experiment was carried out in a study by Ball, 
Bazerman and Carroll (1991). This experiment explicitly considered the students’ ability 
to learn when having to value assets on a number o f occasions. O f 69 students only five 
demonstrated the ability to learn, and this began to be observed after 8 attempts. Very 
little learning ability was found with the remaining 64 students.
Further support for the winner’s curse is provided in a study by Kagel and Levin (1986). 
They conducted a study in which students took part in a sealed bid auction. The students 
were provided with a range o f values for the assets in the auction and are then required 
to bid. Kagel and Levin did not just wish to examine whether the bidders made a profit 
or a loss. They decided to also calculated what the result o f the auction would be if  all 
bidders behaved rationally. They called this the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium the 
(RNNE) model. They found that in smaller groups there were average profits o f 65.1%
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below that which RNNE predicted. When bidding occurred in larger groups the 
participants experienced losses, whereas the RNNE predicted considerably higher 
profits. This comes about bidders need to bid more aggressively when there are a greater 
number o f bidders, which was discussed in section 5.2
5.4: Field D ata
Further research on field data in addition to Capen, Clapp and Campbell are broadly 
supportive o f the winner’s curse. Studies by Mead, Moseidjord and Sorensen (1983) and 
Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987), using the Capen, Clap and Campbell 
methodology, but with more complete data, find mixed evidence o f the winner’s curse. 
Mead, Moseidjord and Sorensen calculated the present value o f the oil tracts. Using a 
discount rate o f 12.5%, they found an average loss o f $192,000. O f the leases sold, 62% 
were dry, 16% were unprofitable (on an after tax basis) and 22% o f licences were 
profitable. O f these profitable tracts, the average post-tax return was 18.74%. Even those 
companies that did perform well only did so because they were helped by the fact that 
oil prices increased from $3 to $35 per barrel between 1970 and 1981. The results from 
Mead, Moseidjord and Sorenson would at least be consistent with version 2 o f the 
winner’s curse, that the licence winners obtained smaller returns than they expected and 
probably shows a version 1 winner’s curse. Hendricks, Porter and Boudreau use a 
slightly different methodology and a discount rate o f 5%. They find that those firms that 
made profits would have done so even if oil prices had not increased. On average then, 
the winning firms made a profit from buying a licence and so there would appear to 
reject the existence o f a winner’s curse. However, they also find support for the winner’s 
curse. When comparing the firms’ actual bids to their optimal bidding behaviour, they 
find that 12 out o f the 18 firms overbid, with an average overbid o f just under 50 
percent. If  winning firms had reduced their bid by a constant factor then, assuming that 
all others bidders keep their bids the same, they could have increased their profits. In 
some cases the size o f this reduction was by a factor o f almost seven. This result would 
suggest that the winning firms were not sufficiently able to condition their bids to 
account for the winner’s curse. Indeed, it would appear that they suffered at least a 
version 2 winner’s curse.
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Hendricks and Porter (2007) are critical o f the studies on oil and gas drilling tracts, in 
particular the time-frame used by Capen, Clapp and Campbell. The Capen, Clapp and 
Campbell study was performed before the end of the productive life o f the tracts and so 
did not include all o f the potential revenues. Hendricks and Porter cite a study by Meade 
et al. (1980), which uses a longer time period and found that the rate o f return on oil 
tracts was almost 7 percent. In addition to this, they cite the problem o f some 
‘unpredictable adverse common payoff shock’ causing the results to be skewed in favour 
of a winner’s curse. Unpredictable adverse common payoff shock occurs when a 
common value asset is sold but the returns are realised over a period o f time. During this 
returns realisation period unanticipated events can occur that change the value o f the 
asset. An example o f this sort o f event in the oil tract auctions in spike in oil prices 
during the 1970s. Although the problem o f unpredictable adverse common payoff 
shocks poses a valid criticism o f the study o f ex-post returns, one which will be returned 
to later in the chapter, the same argument could be made for an unpredictable favourable 
common payoff shock. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the sharp increase in oil prices 
during the late 1970s poses one o f these favourable common payoff shocks.
Although Hendricks and Porter’s only use o f the concept o f payoff shocks is to criticise 
Capen, Clapp and Campbell, they actually form part o f a more fundamental problem. 
These common payoff shocks present an important flaw with the study o f ex-post 
returns data for determining whether a winner’s curse is present. The research will not 
only have difficulty in adjusting for any potential shock that are observed but also 
having to identify unobserved positive or negative common payoff shocks. These issues 
are discussed in more detail in Section 5.5 and 5.6, when the winner’s curse is applied to 
3G auctions. Hendricks and Porter (2007) report on studies that search for the winner’s 
curse in two types o f oil and gas leases for the Outer Continental Shelf. They take the 
leases for wild tracts and drainage leases, which are for unexplored tracts o f land and 
tracts o f land where a commodity has already been discovered respectively. When using 
two different types o f tract there is different information available to each potential 
bidder depending on if they already hold a licence in an adjacent tract. Hendricks,
Pinkse and Porter (2003) find that bidders on wildcat tracts do make on average positive 
rents from winning a tract but these average rents are approximately equal to the cost of 
entry. As such the winning firms make zero economic profit. They also find evidence 
that bidders are aware o f the potential for a winner’s curse and attempt to correct for it 
by bidding less than their estimated tract value. They calculate that this correction is so 
large in some cases that the firm bids less than their tract value conditional on winning. 
This would appear to be an extreme form o f winner’s curse avoidance. However they 
did find evidence that this correction was only adequate in tracts that attracted large 
numbers o f bidders. Bidders seemed to not identify a need to correct their bid for the 
winner’s curse in less competitive auctions. The bidders appeared to believe that a lower 
number o f bidders reduced their chance o f a winner’s curse. Although this is 
understandable, Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter report that bidders appeared to be 
overconfident in these auctions as the result o f them not correcting their bids led to 
overpayment.
This is an interesting, although slightly strange result. Although Hendricks, Pinkse and 
Porter argue against the existence o f the winner’s curse, one possible explanation of 
their findings is that bidders are particularly bad at adjusting for a winner’s curse. When 
there are a large number o f bidders there is an over-reaction and when only a small 
number there is an under-reaction. An alternative explanation is simply that those tracts 
that were worth less attracted fewer bidders. Entry into an auction then becomes an 
informative event. Those bidders in auctions with only a small number o f bidders are 
those which have overvalued the asset. If  the bidders take the traditional view o f the 
winner’s curse, that when there are a small number o f bidders they will only perform a 
small adjustment to their valuation, then they will overbid for the asset. Instead of 
treating the lack o f bidders as positive, they should have interpreted it as a sign that other 
bidders were not willing to incur the costs that were associated with entering the auction. 
Rather than seeing the auction as having only a small number bidders it would be more 
accurate to see them as having the same number o f bidders as any other auction but 
many o f these bidders place such a low valuation on the asset that they drop out before
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! the auction begins. This assumes that the only reason that bidders choose not to enter an
1 auction procedure is because they place such a low value on the asset being auctioned.
The experimental research has shown how the winner’s curse occurs in auction setting. 
And the field data has provided examples o f auctions where the winner’s curse is 
believed to have occurred. However, they do not provide an adequate method for 
analysing whether the winner’s curse is present within a particular auction, or, as with 
the oil tract research, not until a considerable amount o f time has passed. In these 
auctions a winner’s curse was not identified until at least some o f the licence winner’s 
revenues had been observed. If  a winner’s curse is going to alter regulatory stance then 
information on its existence needs to be identified at an earlier point in the term o f the 
licence.
5.5: The 3G Winner’s Curse.
Given that the auctions for 3G licences were carried out when there existed considerable 
uncertainty over the value o f the licences, it is possible that a winner’s curse occurred. 
However, should we expect a winner’s curse within these auctions? The winner’s curse 
that has been discussed thus far has been within common value auctions. Licences to run 
3G services cannot be considered to be common value assets; T-mobile with its 
customer base and existing GSM infrastructure will make better use o f a licence than a 
much smaller firm such as MobilCom. This private part o f the valuation o f the licences 
will be made up of factors such as current size o f market share, projections for future 
market share, current network infrastructure etc. Indeed, in Chapter 4 it was shown that 
incumbency and international status had a significant effect on observed highest bid. 
However, it would not be accurate to treat these licences as private value assets. A large 
part o f the value o f a licence will be determined by common factors. Rather, it is better 
to refer to an auction o f this type o f asset as an affiliated value auction. An affiliated 
value auction occurs when the value o f the asset depends on private information but also 
a particular state o f the world. It could be agued that there will even be asymmetries in 
the information to make estimates over the future state o f the world. An incumbent will 
be in a better place to judge the probabilities o f future states o f  the world. However,
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given the uncertainty that surrounded the future of the 3G technology and its future 
market, it is difficult to see how an incumbent would have sufficient additional 
information to gain an advantage. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the auction designers 
were well aware of the winner’s curse and as such set up the auctions to try to maximize 
the amount o f information to the bidders by using open multi-round auctions. The 
participating firms will have been aware o f the winner’s curse so why would they not 
just adjust their bids downwards in order to account for it? There were also a low 
number o f bidders, although as has been discussed this may have given bidders a false 
sense o f security.
5.5.1: How can the winner’s curse be present?
Despite the licences to run 3G services not being pure common value assets, they did 
have a certain common value element which was determined by the success o f the 
technology and the future market conditions. And, due to the uncertainty that existed 
within this technology it is feasible that a winner’s curse could be present. 
Anandalingam and Lucas (2005) give an overview o f why the high tech sector is 
particularly prone to the winner’s curse. They assign blame for this to uncertainty over 
future market conditions and lack o f experience with new technologies. Even if the 
bidders did adjust their bids to take account o f the winner’s curse, due to the uncertainty 
around this type o f technology this adjustment may not have been sufficient. As was 
seen from Hendricks and Porter’s work, adjustments may be difficult to calculate and do 
not provide a guarantee o f avoiding a winner’s curse. Even if  the adjustment was 
sufficient, winners may still have suffered from version 2 o f the curse. In Capen, Clapp 
and Campbell’s original example this was relatively easy to assess when compared to 
the 3G licences. The value of the tract could be measured by how much oil is removed 
from the ground. The only decision that needed to be made was whether to price the oil 
according to the price at which it was actually sold or the market price when the licences 
were acquired. This is an important distinction considering the large increases in the 
price o f oil that occurred during the 1970s. Taking the original market price would 
assume that the winning firms did not take into account price variations in their 
estimation o f tract worth. Is it unreasonable to believe that when making their
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investment decisions firms would not take future price fluctuations into consideration? 
The problem then becomes deciding what events are reasonable to expect and which are 
unanticipated. The problem o f determining predictable and unpredictable events is even 
more difficult with 3G licences. It is precisely this variation in the market that 
determines the licences’ common value.
Beyond determining what is an unanticipated event there may be a more fundamental 
problem with valuing the ex-post returns to these assets. Even if  we waited until the end 
of the licence period and calculated the profit made by the winning firms it will not 
provide a guide to whether the auction suffered from a w inner’s curse. As with any 
investment decision that has an uncertain return, a firm should use the expected return to 
evaluate the investment decision. The expected return would depend on the size of 
return in any particular state of the world and the probability o f this state o f the world 
occurring. O f course it is entirely possible for an investment to return less than the 
expected return without the estimated expected return being incorrect. Likewise, a firm 
may make a large profit from holding a licence, which does not mean that the estimation 
of the expected return was incorrect, just that a positive state o f the world has occurred. 
The winner’s curse exists not because a particular negative state o f the world exists. 
Rather it occurs because the administration process awards the licence to the firm with 
the highest estimated value. It is the fact that an auction is being used, meaning those 
with the highest estimated value win the licence, and not necessarily the fact that the 
item’s value is particularly difficult to estimate that causes a winner’s curse to be 
present. The returns on the investment decision that is being undertaken have a very high 
variance and so the inability of the firm to avoid the winner’s curse will be exacerbated.
If it is accepted that the only information that we can derive from the ex post returns is 
the particular state o f the world that has occurred, then examining the value o f a single 
licence at the end o f the licence period would in no way reveal if the licence winners 
suffered a winner’s curse. Nor would examining the licence winner’s performance over 
any period since the licences were administered. It is true that calculating the ex post
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returns does provide information on whether the firm made a profit and which state of 
the world occurred, but neither o f these identify a winner’s curse.
Although it is not possible to use ex post returns to identify a winner’s curse in an 
individual auction, it is possible to use ex post returns when examining a series o f assets 
that have been auctioned, where the states o f the world that affect the value o f the asset 
are uncorrelated. For instance, taking the Capen, Clapp and Campbell study, it is 
acceptable to take ex post returns for oil drilling rights for a number o f different tracts 
and aggregate them, as long as it is assumed that the estimate o f the value o f a tract is 
based on geological factors and not on the price paid for previous tracts, which could 
force prices upwards. If  the amount o f oil in each tract is independent of the amount of 
oil in all other tracts, then we should have as many positive states o f the world as 
negative. In this case a positive state o f the world occurs when a tract contains a large 
amount o f oil relative to what is expected and vice versa. An aggregation o f the sales 
should show if, on average, the price paid by winning bidders for a tract o f land was too 
high. The aggregation process would allow the researcher to draw conclusions about any 
systematic overpayment brought about by a winner’s curse.
Although this aggregation process may be used for auction o f tracts o f land, the 
aggregation o f ex post returns cannot be used for the auction o f 3G licences. If the 
market for 3G services is strong, then all licence holders will do well, due to the 
common value being determined by the state o f the 3G market and technological 
developments. If  the market is weak or there are technological difficulties, all licence 
holders will do badly. As such, no aggregation effect is possible and ex-post returns 
cannot return information on the winner’s curse. All licence holders will face the same 
state o f the world in all cases. There may be some differences from country to country 
but these differences will only be minor when compared to the industry trends.
5.6: Other attempts to identify a winner’s curse.
Two papers have attempted to test for the winner’s curse, both examining the UK 3G 
auction. Instead o f only estimating the revenues from 3G services, Basili and Fontini
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(2003) used an option pricing approach in an attempt to value the licences. They found 
that the revenue extracted by the government was slightly less than the true value of the 
licences. Given the nature o f these licences and indeed the nature o f an investment in the 
high tech sector using an options based approach is clearly better than a simple 
summation o f revenue and costs. However, the authors do not make it clear why they 
believe their valuation should be anymore accurate than that of the licence winning 
firms. Even if we are happy with Basili and Fontini’s calculation o f the option value o f 
these licences, and accept that it gives us an accurate estimate o f the licence value, it 
does not tell us the whole story. Their results suggest that there was not a version 1 
winner’s curse. However, they cannot use this method to tell if  there is a version 2 
winner’s curse.
Cable et al. (2002) employed an event study methodology to determine whether too 
much was paid for the licences. An event study compares the stock market valuation of 
the licences with the winning firm’s valuations. A negative stock market reaction would 
suggest that winning firms overpaid for the licences they won. It could be argued that 
the use of an event study is no better than the Basili/Fontini approach. Why, after all, 
would the equity market’s estimate o f licence value be any more accurate than that of 
the winning firms? The market valuation will be the aggregation o f a large number of 
individual estimations. As long as these valuations are unbiased, the actual value of the 
licence will be the same as the market valuation. That is, the correct valuation at the time 
of bidding. If  we are happy to assume semi-strong market efficiency, then any abnormal 
return will reflect a differential in the true valuation o f the licences and the fee the firm 
paid. The advantage o f using the equity markets in this way is that we can factor out 
valuation problems associated with the dot.com boom. The market valuation accounts 
for all expectations o f future revenue at that time. If it emerged in the future that the 3G 
technology was overvalued because of misconception about this technology, in essence 
a particularly negative state o f the world arose, and it would have also been overvalued 
by the markets at the time the licence was sold. Any negative reaction will then be 
brought about by overpayment o f that over valuation. At a more fundamental level, if 
shareholders, as the owners o f a company, consider the firm to be worth less as a result
107
o f buying a licence, they have been cursed. Before the licences were bought the market 
would have a belief over their correct valuation or at least the fee that a firm should pay 
for them. Any deviation away from this valuation either positive or negative would bring 
about a returns reaction. The market reaction will not only pick up a version 1 winner’s 
curse but also a version 2. The market will react negatively if  they believe the firm will 
not receive adequate returns for their investment. The UK study found that there was a 
short-term negative market reaction to the 3G licence winners but there were not 
consistent negative abnormal returns for the winners or negative for the losers and as 
such they conclude that no winner’s curse exists and so no regulatory response was 
necessary.
5.7: Does a winner’s curse matter?
The discussion thus far has focussed on the correct definition o f a winner’s curse and the 
problems posed in attempting to identify it. Given that standard economic theory would 
tell us that a firm will price according to their marginal costs, sunk fixed costs will have 
no impact on the post-administration industry. However there have been two suggested 
consequences o f overpayment and a winner’s curse. The first is a direct result of 
overpayment and is caused by the industry no longer being able to support as many 
operators which bring about firm exit from the industry. This would then impact on the 
aim to increase the amount of competition in the industry. The second indirect effect is 
that there will be a social cost associated with a regulatory relaxation brought about by a 
firm undergoing financial distress and the regulator being obliged to take action.
Gruber (2001, 2005) developed a model to determine the equilibrium number o f firms in 
the post-administration market. In his model there were three factors that affected the 
number o f licences that could be sustained. The prevailing technology determined how 
efficiently spectrum could be used. If  a high level o f technological efficiency was 
available then a greater number o f firms were able to operate and be sustained in the 
market given a certain amount o f spectrum. The second factor was the regulatory stance, 
primarily this was considered to be the amount o f spectrum that was made available but 
also whether a particular technical standard was imposed. The third factor was
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endogenous sunk costs through licence fees. The higher the licence fees the lower the 
number of firms the industry can maintain. Although the number o f licences is 
determined exogenously o f the industry by the regulator, the size o f the licence fee is 
determined endogenously by the firms bidding for them. If  the licence fees are so high 
that there are negative profits in the industry and some firms have to leave then Gruber 
believes these to be “excessive” licence fees. If  the fixed costs in the industry -  in which 
he includes licence fees and network roll-out cost -  are large enough that negative profit 
will be made, and then firms will exit the industry. Firms will continue to leave the 
industry until those firms that remain are profitable. If  the government decides to 
reallocate these licences then there will be no additional profit for the firms that did not 
leave the industry. In this case Gruber argues that firms winning the reallocated licences 
will pay less for them making them more profitable when they enter the industry. Firms 
will hence leave and enter the industry until they all have paid low enough licence fees 
to be able to make a profit.
Gruber’s analysis is limited in a number o f respects. It does not give a convincing reason 
why the size o f the licence fee should cause firms to exit from the industry. He claims 
that a firm will exit if it is not able to cover its fixed costs including the sunk costs o f the 
licences and network setup. He suggests that this will come about by the firm becoming 
bankrupt. However, as long the firm can cover its variable cost it will be better for it to 
stay open. Gruber does not identify why he believes this will not be the case. Secondly 
there is no indication o f time scale for entry and exit. At what stage o f network 
development will it become apparent that fixed costs will not be met? This is 
particularly important given the possibility for additional value associated with follow- 
on options that may be present with this type o f technology. Given that excess fees were 
paid, due to over optimism, how will the firm’s behaviour be affected by future 
expectation over economic conditions? An argument can be made that high sunk will 
affect the firm’s other costs due to capital market inefficiencies. Once licence winning 
firms have been burdened with a large debt they will find it affects their ability to 
borrow for future investment. Worthington (1995) found evidence o f these types of 
inefficiencies affecting firms’ investments decisions when sunk costs are involved.
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Using industry level data in the US he finds that gaining external financing for projects 
is more difficult when the investments have a high sunk element. This point will be 
considered in more detail in Chapter 9.
In his studies, Gruber gives an example o f how national operators may be disadvantaged 
when firms operate across countries. He then goes on to class those countries with high 
licence fees as low profit countries and those with low licence fees as high profit 
countries. Gruber does not consider the importance o f other regulatory levers or the 
ability of these levers to change in response to changing market conditions. If  these 
regulatory decisions impose costs on the operating firms then it is too simplistic to just 
look at licence fees. Apart from the number of firms operating, the licensing procedure 
also determines a number of other regulatory levers. It is possible that rather than 
allowing firm exit the regulator may seek to adjust these levers. An example o f this sort 
o f behaviour would be relaxing the licence coverage obligations in the early stages. All 
licences placed conditions on the licence with the range o f these conditions being seen in 
chapter 2. One example is the winning firms’ obligation to cover a percentage of the 
population or country within a certain amount o f time. Changing these conditions will 
change the value of the country in terms o f Gruber’s high/low profit countries.
An alternative view o f the costs associated with a winner’s curse, and in particular with 
regulatory behaviour was developed by Swann and Tether (2003). They discussed how a 
winner’s curse can affect a post-administration environment. In particular how a 
winner’s curse can cause higher prices in the post-administration industry or can result 
in some other social costs. Indeed their argument is not only that this comes about due to 
a winner’s curse but in contrast to standard microeconomic theory where our profit 
maximising firm is only concerned with marginal cost, that any lump sum sunk cost will 
affect the post-administration market. They claim that this may occur if a firm that has 
suffered a winner’s curse is able to recoup costs by not meeting all the usual regulatory 
requirements that they would otherwise be expected to meet. This is particularly an issue 
with the development of 3G services which, as was shown in Chapter 3 and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, experienced a considerable amount o f post­
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administration turmoil. In the post-administration market there were a large number of 
regulatory requirements and regulatory interventions. They show that when a resolute 
regulator is operating the firm will engage in standard profit maximising behaviour and 
the winner’s curse will have no effect. However if  the regulator is ‘soft’ then they place 
a greater value on the profitability of the firm when determining regulatory action. As 
the licence fee increases, the minimum regulatory requirement decreases. This then has 
two possible consequences; if the regulatory requirement has an effect on fixed costs but 
not on marginal costs then the only effect with be the loss o f  consumer surplus from the 
regulatory requirement not being met. However, if the fixed costs or the regulatory 
requirement has an effect on marginal costs then a change in minimum regulatory 
requirement will have an effect beyond the initial loss in consumer surplus. A reduction 
in the minimum regulatory requirement comes about when fixed costs are high. So when 
fixed costs are high marginal, cost of production will be low. A low marginal cost leads 
to a lower profit maximising prices and a higher output. In contrast, low fixed costs 
leads to a stricter regulatory requirement, higher marginal costs, higher prices and a 
lower output. Again, Swann and Tether find a similar result if the minimum regulatory 
standard is not reduced but the chance o f prosecution or the fine incurred for failure to 
meet the minimum requirement is reduced.
Such a situation can seriously undermine the claim that auctions provide the most 
efficient means o f administering spectrum licences. If  regulators are willing to ease their 
regulatory stance in response to perceived difficulties in the 3G market then this may 
impose a social cost on the market. Swann and Tether (2003) give an overview o f the 
potential social cost caused by the winner’s curse. They find that if  the regulator is not 
resolute in their regulatory stance then companies have the ability to pass on the cost of 
the winner’s curse to consumers. They stress that this does not mean that the regulator 
should not help troubled companies by easing regulation, rather that the assumption that 
using an auction maximizes efficiency should be questioned. From a licence pricing 
perspective, if the regulator is more likely to ease regulation then there is a danger that 
the bidders are more likely to overbid as they are no longer concerned about the
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w inner’s cure. They believe that regulatory truncation provides a form o f winner’s curse 
insurance.
Closely link to the proposal o f Swann and Tether is the argument put forward by Bennett 
(2000) and Bennett and Canoy (2000). They show a specific relationship between prices 
and the up front sunk costs again as a result o f the regulatory approach. They link this 
work back to labour economics and the work on shirking from Shaprio and Stiglitz 
(1984). In this case they believe that the firm’s probability o f being caught colluding 
(shirking) is decreased when they have incurred high sunk costs due to the regulator not 
having information on the firm’s costs and having to assessing collusion on the rate of 
return basis. The higher the licence fee the greater the prices would have to be for the 
regulator to believe that collusion is taking place. They conclude that higher licence 
costs will lead to more aggressive collusion and higher prices for the consumers. Bennett 
particularly identifies termination charges as an area where this type o f collusion could 
take place.2
Although both the proposals from Swann and Tether, Gruber and Bennett are situated in 
the context o f a winner’s curse, none o f them actually require a winner’s curse to occur. 
All o f them only refer to an increase in the size o f the licence fees which does not 
necessarily mean a winner’s curse is present. Given the way that the winner’s curse has 
been defined it this chapter, does one need to be present for there to be the type of 
impact discussed in the previous section. A winner’s curse does not mean the licence 
winning firms will be making a loss and just because the firms appear to be profitable 
does not mean they have not suffered a winner’s curse. Does the existence o f a winner’s 
curse then require a regulatory response, or should a regulatory response come about 
after an unpredictable adverse common payoff shock which has brought about firm 
distress?
Although it may be tempting for a regulator, where the distress is brought about by 
adverse payoff shocks the regulator should not take corrective action. These shocks are
2 See chapter 8 for a discussion of termination charging.
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not the responsibility o f the regulator; instead they are part o f the risk associated with the 
project for the firm. However, if  overpayment for a licence was brought about by a 
winner’s curse, then it was caused by the way that the administration process was 
constituted and performed. This is not to say that the bidding firms were not responsible 
for their bids. Rather the way the administrations were designed allowed overpayment to 
occur. In this case it could be argued that a regulator or government should take 
corrective action to rectify a situation that they have created. This then requires the 
source o f the financial distress to be determined, whether it be due to a winner’s curse or 
an unpredictable negative common payoff shock. As I have discussed the best method 
for doing this is through an event study. However a UK event study in isolation can only 
provide part o f the overall picture. Using an event study on this type o f event produces a 
number o f specific problems, some o f which were not addressed by Cable et al. The next 
chapter will outline the use o f event study methodology and how an event study can be 
performed on a 3G administration procedure. Chapter 7 presents the results o f event 
studies on the German and Swedish administration procedures. This event study 
improves on the Cable et al. study. By performing a comparative study between auction 
and beauty contest procedures a clearer picture should be gained as to the relative 
performance o f winners and losers in differing administration procedures. This study 
will also account for clustering and non-parametric tests which were not performed in 
the Cable et al. study. These results read in conjunction with the UK event study provide 
clearer insights into the existence o f a winner’s curse. The following chapter will discuss 
the methodology behind event studies and the justification for their use. It will also pick 
up on some o f the particular problems that are presented by using an event study to 
examine an event such as a licence administration. Chapter 7 will then discuss why the 
German and Swedish administrations are particularly suited to use an event study to 
search for a winner’s curse and report the results o f the event study on these two 
administrations.
113
Chapter 6: Event Study Methodology
For over seventy years event studies have been carried out to examine a wide variety 
o f different events. These have ranged from the analysis o f  mergers and acquisitions 
to the changes in the regulatory environment that a firm faces. The basic method that 
underlies the event study is to model the normal returns o f  a firm that has been 
affected by a particular event, and then, by examining the actual equity returns, test 
for any abnormal returns after the particular event. The first known event study was 
carried out by Dolley (1933), however the methodology remained somewhat 
primitive until Ball and Brown (1968) developed the methodology that is still widely 
used today. Strong (1992) and MacKinlay (1997) give relatively up to date outlines 
o f the procedure for carrying out an event study. However, the circumstances in 
which the event study is used will have an important effect on how it should be 
carried out and how the results can be interpreted.
The issues and criticisms that surround event studies are wide ranging. The central 
concept that allows the use o f  event study to analyse real world events is the 
assumption o f  market efficiency. In order to draw any meaningful conclusion from 
the estimated abnormal returns the assumption that markets accurately adjust prices 
to account for all available information must be accepted. In recent years, this 
assumption has come under increasing attack from the behavioural finance literature. 
Section 6.1 will outline the main arguments that have surrounded the efficient 
market hypothesis. Beyond the broader issue o f the efficient market hypothesis there 
are specific concerns that must be addressed with event studies. A key aspect o f the 
event study is to model a securities' normal returns, however, a large number o f 
alternative models have been used in order to model these returns. The estimation o f 
these models can be problematic, particularly since the introduction o f daily returns 
data, due to non-normality in the form o f skewness and excess kurtosis. Even once 
abnormal returns have been estimated the nature o f the event will influence the use 
o f test procedures. W hen the thin trading problem exists or events are clustered, 
traditional test techniques may be misspecified. This has led to an array o f possible 
non-parametric tests to overcome this. Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 will address these 
problems and the methods proposed to overcome them. Even if  we are happy with
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the underlying methodology o f an event study, analysing the effect on an auction 
procedure presents additional problems from that o f an earnings or merger 
announcement. This chapter will end with a discussion o f  the exact specification o f 
evemt study and test procedures that will be used to analyse the 3G administration 
procedures. Section 6.4 will address those problems particularly associated with this 
evemt study and section 6.5 will describe how the event study will be carried out.
6.1: Efficient Markets and Event studies.
The use o f event studies to analyse real world events relies on the assumption o f at 
least semi-strong market efficiency. The level o f information that is required to make 
abnormal returns determines the level o f market efficiency that is present. The 
consequence o f semi-strong market efficiency is that, given all publicly available 
information, it is not possible for an investor to make abnormal returns. I f  markets 
are semi-strong then they will also be weak-form efficient. W eak-form efficiency 
reduces the amount o f information required to make abnormal returns. Meaning it is 
not possible for an investor to make abnormal returns given information on past price 
movements. The consequence o f this assumption is that equity prices follow a 
random  walk. A stricter form o f market efficiency is strong-form efficiency. Strong 
form  efficiency would mean that no abnormal returns could be made given all 
publicly and privately available information. If  markets are strong-form efficient then 
insiders would not be able to make abnormal returns. As insider trading is an illegal 
activity there is a clear attempt to impose strong form efficiency on markets. 
However, it is perhaps unrealistic to assume that insiders will not be able to make 
some abnormal returns even if  they are behaving legally. Only assuming semi-strong 
m arkets is necessary for event study methodology to be valid.
The consequences o f  accepting semi-strong market efficiency are twofold. When 
new  information is released the markets react instantaneously, and prices will move 
to their new and correct value. The release o f  bad news would lead to a decrease in 
the price o f  the equity and good news would lead to an increase in price o f the 
equity. This in turn would lead to temporary negative or positive abnormal returns. 
The size o f the abnormal returns can then give an indication o f  the magnitude o f the 
event’s effect.
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6.1.1: Foundation of Efficient Market Hypothesis
The efficient market hypothesis can be justified from three possible theoretical 
foundations. The first o f these justifications is that all investors are rational and so 
will value assets according to the NPV o f the assets and their particular attitude 
towards risk. These rational investors will then respond to information as it is 
released and price equities correctly. Although this assumption would be convenient 
it may be problematic when seen in the context o f the previous chapter. It would be 
contradictory to assume that all investors could value a 3G licence correctly when in 
the previous chapter it was suggested that a bidding firm would struggle to do the 
same.
However, it is possible to still have efficient markets even if  all investors are not 
assumed to be rational. If, instead, it is assumed that those investors that are irrational 
behave in a random and unbiased way, then the trades o f  the irrational investors will 
cancel each other out. There will be as many overvaluations as undervaluations. With 
these misvaluations cancelling each other out the price o f  equities should move to 
their correct values. The over and under valuation o f  securities must be unbiased and 
uncorrelated or the dealings will not cancel each other out. In the presence o f some 
form o f bandwagon effect the misvaluation o f  equities will no longer be 
uncorrelated.
This justification for the existence o f market efficiency is quite closely related to the 
concept o f  the w inner’s curse. However, market efficiency brings about the correct 
valuation o f an asset whereas an auction with a w inner’s curse overvalues the asset. 
In a market there are a large number o f  investors estimating the value o f  equities that 
have a common but uncertain value. A piece o f news will change the value o f the 
equity, also by an uncertain amount. W hen a piece o f  news is released some 
investors will overvalue it and some will undervalue it. As long as the valuations are 
conditionally independent and identically distributed, then the net effect will be 
prices moving to their correct level. This is unlike a w inner’s curse, where the bidder 
with the highest estimate will win the item and so will overpay for it.
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Even if  the assumption that over and under pricing are uncorrelated is relaxed, the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis can still be argued to hold. If  it is assumed that some 
investors do not pursue rational investment strategies and that these strategies are 
correlated, market efficiency can still be brought about as long as there are sufficient 
rational investors to perform arbitrage. Let us assume that, through correlated buying 
behaviour by irrational investors, a security becomes overpriced. The rational 
investors would sell this security and purchase other securities that were not 
overpriced. Rational investors engaged in this behaviour will bring the price o f  the 
overpriced security down until it is at its correct level. With rational investors acting 
in this way prices should only be able to move a short distance from their correct 
value. Those rational investors engaged in arbitrage will compete to earn the 
abnormal returns from the arbitrage process so prices should move to their correct 
value quickly.
If  this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then not only will arbitrage keep 
prices at the correct level but irrational investors will be driven from the market. The 
irrational investors will make abnormal losses by buying overpriced and selling 
underpriced securities. As the irrational investor continues to lose money they will 
eventually be driven from the market. Only rational investors can remain in the 
market. These were the justifications for the Efficient M arket Hypothesis developed 
by Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965). The efficient market hypothesis was well 
supported by a range o f early empirical literature. W eak form efficiency was 
supported by early work from Fama (1965), which found that markets follow a 
random walk. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find that securities respond to takeover 
announcements by jum ping when the public announcement is made and then 
remaining constant suggesting a correct and fast price adjustment. Further support 
was provided by examining the performance o f professional investment managers. I f  
markets are efficient then investment mangers should not be able to perform any 
better than a passive strategy. Jensen (1968) found that mutual fund managers that 
engaged in active portfolio management performed no better than the market and 
tended to underperform. Malkiel (1995) carried out a similar study, with more recent 
data, and supported Jensen’s results. Malkiel also found that there was a considerable 
survivor bias and that actual fund manager performance was even worse than 
Jensen’s original results suggested.
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6.1.2: Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis
The assumption that markets react efficiently to new  information has been 
challenged on a number o f levels. A more realistic assumption is that the markets 
will not react perfectly and instantaneously. However, this does not necessarily 
invalidate the use o f event studies to analyse real world events. There are two 
possibilities for market behaviour that would affect the way that the abnormal returns 
are interpreted. The markets may react slowly to the information that has been 
released leading to a slower change in prices and in turn positive or negative 
abnormal returns. This may then present a longer period o f time where abnormal 
returns are present as the market adjusts. An alternative is that markets do react 
instantaneously but overreact to the new information and then over a period correct 
for this overreaction. If  the information was positive then this would lead to an 
instantaneous jum p in the price, followed by a period where the price would 
decrease, ending at a point above the original price. This will be reflected by an 
instantaneous positive abnormal return, followed by a period o f  negative abnormal 
returns.
Exactly how long this period o f adjustment takes and how fast ‘instantaneous’ can be 
considered to be is an empirical matter. It may be the case that even with a delay all 
the adjustment occurs within one day, and so using daily analysis would capture the 
correct level o f  abnormal returns. The delay or adjustment may go on for a number 
o f days and an event study will need to account for this. In practical event studies, it 
may be unrealistic to assume that we can identify the exact day that information is 
released. Although there are quite tight conditions on releasing information to the 
market, it is likely that information will be anticipated or leaked beforehand.
6.1.3: Behavioural Finance
A more fundamental challenge to the assumptions behind market efficiency came 
from the field o f  behavioural finance. This field o f  finance identifies market 
behaviour that appeared not to conform to market efficiency and then put forward 
psychological and sociological explanations for these observations. An example o f 
this behaviour is investors being caught in a “bandwagon effect” . The bandwagon 
effect occurs when investors are drawn in to stock prices rising, or conversely a
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panic, at the sight o f prices falling. Other effects that seem to deviate from market 
efficiency are the so called January and Day o f the W eek effects. The January effect 
was the observation by Rozeff and Kinney (1976) that average returns in January 
were consistently higher than average returns in any other month between 1904 and 
1974. Similarly, French (1980) and Gibbons and Hess (1981) find that the day o f the 
week can affect the returns received on a security, with M ondays producing 
consistently lower returns than any other day o f the week. Another example is the 
existence o f return reversal. This is simply that investors will over-react to a 
particular piece o f information. Although each o f these examples would appear to 
contradict the efficient market hypothesis, they are all to a greater or lesser degree 
explainable. Malkiel (2003) provides an argument against these identified 
inefficiencies and behavioural explanation. The Seasonal and day o f  the week effects 
do not appear to be consistent between periods after 1974. Indeed it would appear to 
a certain extent that once these patterns were identified they ceased to exist as 
investors altered their behaviour to take account o f  them. In addition to this, the 
potential gains from these effects are so small as to be o f no consequence once the 
level o f  transaction costs are accounted for, leading to no potential net profit from 
these investments.1 Indeed, this can be said for almost all examples o f anomalies that 
have been identified within the market. Again, for return reversal, the empirical 
evidence is not consistent over time. Fama (1998) found that return anomalies were 
highly sensitive to methodology and when different models or statistical techniques 
were used the anomaly would disappear. The main criticism o f the use o f these 
anomalies to contradict the efficient market hypothesis is that although researchers 
are able to spot patterns in returns ex post these do not last into the future. As such 
investors would not be able to make to make abnormal returns from these perceived 
anomalies.
Another argument against market efficiency is the observation o f  market bubbles and 
sudden decreases in market value. Malkiel (2003) recounts the case o f the 1987 US 
market crash. The fact that the US market dropped in value by a third, over a small 
amount o f  time, without a fundamental change in the economy has been blamed on 
psychological factors. In particular the drop had been brought about by a bandwagon
1 This relative transaction cost was shown to dominate the potential returns in Keim (1989)
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effect. Although there is no one event that could be identified as causing the drop in 
equity prices, it can be explained by the culmination o f a number o f events. For 
instance, events such as a proposed new mergers tax and government intervention in 
the exchange rate markets could interact to make a multi-event super-event. These 
unexplained events may be a result o f an ill-defined event period rather than 
evidence o f market inefficiencies. Whilst not undermining the use o f event studies, 
these dangers should reinforce in the researcher’s mind the need to carefully identify 
the correct event period and any possible confounding factors. This is especially the 
case when dealing with the European licence administration which could itself be 
considered to be some form o f multi-event super-event.
6.1.4: Unanticipated Events and Confounding Effects.
For an event to be analysed using an event study it must be unanticipated and have 
an identifiable event date. Identifying an event date when dealing with a procedure 
that develops over a period o f  time is particularly challenging. Added to this, other 
events, within the event window, that may impact o f the equities returns must be 
checked for, and taken into account. The ability o f a study to isolate an event from 
confounding effects that surround it is potentially one o f the greatest challenges and 
potential weaknesses o f  the event study methodology. How to exactly identify 
confounding factors is uncertain. It is reasonable to expect events such as earnings 
announcements or merger announcements to produce an effect, but other less 
obvious events may also convey information to the markets. The problem of 
confounding effects becomes particularly acute as the event window gets longer. To 
identify all possible confounding effects may be impossible; it is advisable to 
perform at least a superficial check for other potentially important events around the 
period in question. The hope is that the effect o f the event under investigation will be 
o f such a magnitude that it will dw arf the effect o f any confounding events. I f  an 
event is worthy o f examination it would be expected that it would be larger than any 
other potential confounding effect. However, particular caution needs to be taken 
when examining an extended post-event window.
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6.2: Modeling Normal Returns.
The central purpose o f the event study is to measure the abnormal returns on a stock. 
To do this the normal return o f a security must be modelled and, once this is done, 
the abnormal returns for the particular security estimated. There is however some 
debate over the best method for estimating these normal returns. The models for 
measuring normal performance can broadly be split into two categories; those based 
on statistical assumption and those based on economic theory.
6.2.1: Statistical Models
Two o f the most commonly used statistical models are the constant mean return 
model (CMRM) and the M arket Model (MM). The CMRM estimates the return on 
the security by the mean return on the security over a period o f time. The expected 
returns for the security are constant and only vary across firms.
E(Rj,) = kj (6.1)
This is where RJt is the estimated and hence expected returns on security j at time t 
and kj is the mean return o f the security. Abnormal returns can be calculated as:
“yi=Rjt~kj (6 '2>
Despite being one o f  the simplest models, when it was tested by Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985) it was found that it returned similar results to more complicated models. 
A  more advanced, although still relatively simple statistical model is the Market 
Model proposed by M arkowitz (1959), which models the returns o f  a security against 
the return to a market portfolio. In practice a stock index such as the FTSE 100 
would be used for the market portfolio. The MM is considered to be an improvement 
over the CMRM  as it accounts for variance in the market returns. In the MM the 
variance o f the abnormal return is reduced by removing the part o f the securities 
return that is due to the m arket’s return. The market model estimates normal returns 
through:
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Rjt - aj+ PjKt + ujt (6.3)
Rm is the return to the market portfolio at time t and ujt is the error term. The 
abnormal returns can then be calculated as:
( a , + 4 A , )  (6-4)
A simplification o f  both o f these models would be the market adjusted return model 
(MARM). This model is similar to the market model, but with restrictions placed on 
the coefficients. The constant is assumed to be zero and the coefficient on market
return set at one. The expected return to any security is equal to the expected return
on the market. So normal returns are estimated as:
E(Rj) = E(Rm) (6.5)
And the abnormal returns are then:
(6-6)
There is the distinct possibility that the restrictions placed on the MARM  are false 
and the M ARM is usually only used when no security data is available so it is not 
possible to estimate normal returns. Unless there is a very good reason for assuming 
that the expected returns on the security should equal the expected returns to the 
market the MARM  should not be used. An example o f when the M ARM  might be 
used would be for estimating returns when studying initial public offerings.
6.2.2: Economic Models
Other models based on economic theory can be considered to be restrictions on the 
statistical models. One o f these is the Capital Asset Pricing M odel (CAPM) 
developed by Sharp (1964) and Linter (1965). This model, which determines a 
security’s expected return by its covariance with the market, was widely used after 
its conception. In recent years, questions have been raised over the validity o f the 
model’s assumptions and the empirical support for CAPM has been mixed at best. 
Particular criticisms have come from Fama and French (1992, 1996) who found 
parametric models performed considerably better than CAPM when estimating
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returns. Using the CAPM model would involve estimating the expected return on a 
particular security using the return on a risk-free security (usually the returns on 
Treasury Bills) and /?y the systematic risk o f our security relative to the market
index.
R ^ R ^ + ^ - R ^  + Uj, (6.7)
The predicted abnormal returns can be calculated from:
Uj,=Rj,-(  (6-8)
A later model is the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) suggested by Ross (1976) 
which uses a multifactor model when modelling a security’s expected returns. It has
been found that these models have little improvement over the much more
convenient MM as demonstrated by Brown and Weinstein (1985). Although the APT 
does eliminate biases produced by the CAPM model, the statistical models also take 
account o f these biases. The statistical models are therefore more widely used. O f 
these statistical models, the MM  is the model that is most popular and widely used in 
modem event studies.
More recent empirical evidence has added support to the use o f  MM  in event studies. 
Cable and Holland (1999) tested CAPM, MM, MAR and MARM. They found that, 
using a sample o f 30 UK companies, both the CAPM and the M M  performed well. 
The MAR was rejected against the MM in all cases and M ARM  was rejected in more 
than one in three cases. Although the CAPM and MM performed well the MM 
dominated the CAPM in only a small number o f cases. The model that will be used 
to estimate normal returns in this study will be the market model. This is due to the 
m odel’s strong performance when compared to other more complex models, its ease 
o f use, and the absence o f overly restrictive assumptions.
6.2.3: R etu rns D ata
The data for daily returns was collected from Datastream and defined so that Rjt the 
return to asset j at time t can be written as
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R.. =
PJt+DJt- P Jt_x (6.9)
W here Pjt is the price o f security j at time period t, Djt is dividends paid over time 
period t, both o f these are adjusted for any capital change. Then Pjt-i is the price o f 
the security at time period t-1
6.3: Estimating the Normal Returns Model
On top o f  the issues identified in the previous section with regards to choosing the 
correct model for predicting normal returns, estimating the normal returns using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) presents its own difficulties. It has been found, in 
general, that estimates o f the market model using OLS suffer from non-normality. 
Chan and Lakonishik (1992) and Mills et al. (1996) identify this non-normality in the 
case o f excess kurtosis. Brown and Warner, (1985), Chan and Lakonishik, (1992), 
Campbell and Wasley, (1993), Draper and Paudyal, (1995) identify it due to 
skewness. The consequence o f this non-normality is that the regression results may 
produce incorrect estimates o f beta and consequently incorrect estimation o f 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. Also, the test statistics that are 
obtained will not be reliable. Mills et al. (1996) found that using OLS to estimate the 
m arket model was particularly unreliable in the presence o f  outliers.
To account for possibility o f  non-normality being present when using OLS to 
estimate abnormal returns, a range o f  robust estimation techniques have been 
suggested. Cable and Holland (2000) find that for portfolios o f  a size greater than 60, 
non-normality was no longer a problem. With an event study on the German and 
Swedish 3G administrations, as Cable et al. (2002) point out in their event study o f  
the U K 3G auction, the model will be run with, at best, very small portfolios and in 
m any cases single companies. This will mean the aggregation effect noted by Cable 
and Holland will not take place. To attempt to overcome this potential problem Cable 
et al. use robust and median estimation techniques and found that there was little
2 Definition o f Rjt is taken from the Datastream glossary.
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deviation across estimation techniques, so OLS was an adequate estimation 
technique.
Despite Cable et al.’s findings that OLS was adequate, this study will employ three 
methods for the estimation o f the model. In addition to Ordinary Least Squares, two 
robust-to-outlier methods will be used to account for the risk that the assumption o f 
normality is violated .3 When using OLS, there can be problems when sampling from 
a heavy tailed distribution. To overcome these potential problems the first alternative 
estimation technique is a ‘Robust’ estimator, using a method suggested by Beaton 
and Tukey (1974) that applies differential weights to outlier observations. The 
regression is run using iteratively reweighted least squares. Once the regression has 
been run the Cook’s D statistics are calculated for each observation. Any observation 
with a D statistic greater than 1 is excluded. Each observation is then given a 
weighting depending on the scaled residuals. These scaled residuals are based on the 
median absolute deviation about the median residual divided by a constant according 
to the Huber (1964) method. The regression is run again with these weights, the 
results are stored and weights are recalculated and the regression run again. This is 
done until the maximum change in weight drops below some tolerance level. Using 
the result from the Huber iterations the process is performed again but using 
biweights. These biweights are calculated by giving all non-zero residuals a 
downweighting and attaching a value o f zero to very large non-zero residuals. The 
reason that two weighting systems are used is that Huber weights may have problems 
converging in the presence o f  extreme outliers and biweights may not converge to 
single solution.
The second method is a median regression estimate. This involves the coefficients 
being estimated by minimising the absolute deviation from the median rather than 
the sum o f the squares o f  the residuals, as in OLS. So it finds a regression coefficient 
that minimises the function:
V I  Al (6-10>Zj\y~xb |
/=i
3 See Chan and Lakonishok (1992) and Mills et al. (1996) in the case o f kurtosis, and Chan and
Lakonishok (1992) and Campbell and Wasley (1993) in the case o f skewdness.
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The median estimator may still be distorted in the case o f serve outliers; however it is 
preferable to OLS where the data are skewed. All o f these regressions estimates will 
be carried out using STATA.
6.4: Event Specific Problems
Before we consider the usual matters concerning an event study there are some event 
specific issues that need to be considered. Due to the nature o f an administration 
procedure, and in particular the 3G procedures, carrying out an event study can be 
troublesome. Cable et al. identify a number o f issues that must be addressed when 
using an event study to analyse the results o f an auction. The event in question, an 
auction, will not be a surprise as it lasted for some time with the outcome becoming 
more certain as time went on. This led to the market forming expectations o f the 
event over time and making it difficult to determine the exact date o f the event. 
Further to this, a problem was identified with respect to the companies involved in 
the auction being trans-national. Due to the participants being listed on different 
markets, the reactions o f the markets on which these companies had their primary 
listings are needed.
These problems mean that it is particularly important to make a careful choice o f 
estimation and event windows. The long drawn out nature o f  these administration 
procedures would allow expectations to form. The estimation window needs to be in 
a period that was not affected by the administration procedures. The event window 
needs to take account o f  the expectations being formed. With an open ascending 
auction there is the potential to have multiple dates as each firm  drops out. A closed 
auction or beauty contest will not suffer so badly from this problem although it is still 
possible that expectations o f the identity o f  the winners will form as the result 
announcement draws closer.
An additional factor that could impact on an event study is the prevailing industrial 
climate during the European administration procedure. The administration occurred 
whilst the telecommunications bubble was at its peak and bursting. The changing
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industrial climate needs to be accounted for as a confounding factor when analysing 
abnormal returns. However this is not the only problem that changing market 
conditions caused. Due to the turbulence in the telecommunications sector and 
concerns about the size o f  the spectrum licence fees, there was a great amount o f flux 
in the organisational structure o f  the industry. This led to the formation o f consortia. 
Thus, it is sometimes difficult to identify the ownership o f the company that is 
bidding. For instance, E-plus was originally owned by the Dutch company KPN. 
Before the start o f the German auction, a consortium was set up between Hutchison 
and KPN with support from N TT DoCoM o.4 This consortium was E-plus Hutchison. 
However, by a day after the auction the company was again solely owned by KPN, 
with NTT DoCoMo owning a 15% stake in KPN mobile. Due to worries about the 
size o f licence fees and experience in previous auctions, many companies who 
originally applied to be involved in the auction withdrew before it began. A  final 
added complication o f the German auction was that a second auction took place 
where additional spectrum was allocated. One o f  the winning firms from the first 
process did not receiving any additional spectrum. Although the Swedish beauty 
contest only had one allocation date, the formation o f consortia became more 
extreme. The 10 consortia applying were made up o f over 30 different companies. 
Some o f these issues will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter.
The problem o f  the telecommunication bubble will be overcome, as with CHH, by 
comparing a portfolio o f winning and losing firms to try and account for any sectoral 
factors. All companies that were approved by the German regulator on June 1st will 
be included in the analysis, even if  those firms dropped out before the bidding 
process began5. When a company drops out o f a consortium, after the auction has 
finished, that company will be considered a loser. The event date for these losing
4 Both Hutchison and NTT DoCoMo had originally planned, and been approved, to bid independently. 
NTT DoCoMo is worthy o f special consideration; as they were approved by the regulator, they must 
be included in the analysis. When they dropped out, they joined the E-plus Hutchison consortium but 
only as a very minor part owner o f a part owner. As such, they should not be considered losers as they 
are still involved. But it is difficult to consider them as winners in the same sense as the other winners. 
Indeed it would be comparable to considering Vodafone a double winner because they have a small 
share in France Telecom. As such, NTT DoCoMo will be included as a winner but should be treated 
with care.
5 With exception to Vivendi, in this case it was impossible to get a reliable estimation due to the fact 
that the company made its intention to not bid clear during the estimation period.
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companies will be taken as their withdrawal date.6 Results will also be examined for 
the second auction, however they will be given less weight. The second auction only 
existed to administer additional spectrum. It has no effect on who the winners are, 
and the prices paid for this additional spectrum were negligible when compared to 
the; main auction. As such, when the end o f the German auction is referred to it will 
m ean the end o f the first stage, as this is when it has become clear who can be 
considered a winner. However, it will be worth examining the AR for the day o f the 
announcement o f  the winners o f the second auction to assess if  there was any effect 
o f not gaining extra spectrum.
6.5: Conducting an event study
The procedure for conducting an event study can be split into three distinct sections. 
These consist o f defining the estimation window, defining the event window and 
defining the post event window. Mackinlay (1997) gives an account o f  this process 
and denoted the estimation window as between time T0 and Ti, the event window 
between Ti and T2 which contains x = 0, the actual event day7, then the post-event 
w indow is between T2 and T3. The AR on the day o f  the event can then be used to 
observe the effect o f  the event on the market value o f  the firm; this is assuming that 
the event is exogenous o f  a change in the value o f  the firm, which in this case it 
clearly is. I f  the AR is negative for a licence winning firm in a particular 
administration then we may say that we have a w inner’s curse. The ARs o f  the losing 
firms on the day they withdrew from the auction will also be examined, if  there was a 
general negative feeling o f the market to the auction then the expectation would be o f 
a positive AR for these firms. These ARs and those o f  the winning companies will 
then be used to show an overall wealth effect by multiplying the AR by the firm ’s 
market capitalisation. Although this number can only give an indication o f  the level 
o f  over or underpayment and does not in itself identify a w inner’s curse.
The one day AR on it own is not enough to provide a clear conclusion on the 
existence o f a w inner’s curse. MacKinlay states that “The abnormal return
6 This only happened in two instances that o f Hutchinson and E-on.
7 In the case of this event study x = 0 is the day the auction ends.
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observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall inferences for the event o f 
interest”(MacKinlay, 1997, p i 60). This will be especially true if  we wish to check 
for a delay or overreaction. We shall calculate the cumulative abnormal returns 
where CARj(xi,X2) is the cumulative abnormal return between xi and X2 for company 
i. We can then use the standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) as a test 
statistic where
SCARi(xix2) =  CARi(xi>x2)
(6.11)
Oi(Xl,X2)
Where
a  =  (1/CLi —2) * CumulativeCAR2)
(6.12)
This will give us a test that follows a t  distribution with Li -  2 (where Li is the 
number o f  trading days in the estimation period) degrees o f  freedom and we have a 
null that the CAR is not significantly different from zero8. The CAR will be obtained 
for each firm and from this the effect o f the event over the 30 day post-administration 
period as well as the entire event period can be judged.
Due to the nature o f the event and the fact that only a small number o f firms are 
available, it will not be possible to undertake the usual method o f aggregation across 
securities and through time. However, an alternative method o f aggregation is to 
create portfolios. This method, used by Cable et al., creates portfolios o f the winning 
and losing companies, weighted by market capitalisation. These portfolios should 
then be able to account for sectoral factors. These portfolios will show if  there is any 
clear disadvantage from being a winner. This will be done by comparing the CAR for 
each o f  the portfolios over the entire event period. Although these portfolios will 
provide a way to analyse the abnormal returns there are still two important issues that 
require us to be cautious in our interpretation.
8 Within an event study such as where we shall be looking at CARs over a minimum o f 31 days we 
would expect the test always to reject the null, as such the result o f this t-test will be o f limited value.
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6.6: The Thin Trading Problem and Clustering.
W hen using daily returns a potential problem can exist if  thin trading is present. This 
can b e a particular issue when dealing with securities o f different size companies and 
across countries. For instance, historically Nasdaq stocks were much less frequently 
traded than stocks NYSE. The problem was first identified as daily returns data 
became available by Scholes and Williams (1977). Thinly traded stocks may suffer 
from non-normal distributions due to a potentially large number o f zeroes and large 
outliers. Brown and Warner (1985) used returns data from NYSE and the more thinly 
traded ASE to test for the effect o f thin trading. They find that thin trading has no 
effect. Also, return variance is likely to differ between the estimation period and the 
event period. Various alternative tests have been suggested to overcome the problem 
o f thin trading. These tests are non-parametric so are still valid when non-normality 
is present.
For cross-sectional data, Boehmer et al. (1991) developed a test to overcome 
increases in return variation. The test allows the abnormal returns variance to be 
different between the estimation and event windows. Cowan, Nayar and Singh 
(1990) and Sanger and Peterson (1990) develop the generalised sign test, which is a 
variation on the sign test. The generalised sign test accounts for asymmetries in the 
returns distribution. Corrado (1989) outlines the uses o f the rank test as opposed to 
other non-parametric tests. The rank test does not suffer as much as other non- 
parametric tests from event-date excess returns variance. The rank test was found to 
perform well by Campbell and Wasley (1993) but Cowan (1992) finds it is 
misspecified when using Nasdaq data. In particular the rank test is not as powerful as 
the generalised sign test as the size o f the event window becomes greater.
In order to draw a conclusion from the aggregated CARs we must be cautious o f the 
clustering o f events. I f  the events overlap then there will be covariances between 
each CAR. If  this is the case then the assumptions that underlie the standard 
parametric tests will be violated. The covariance between the abnormal returns will 
not be zero. Clearly the events for those firms involved with an auction or a beauty 
contest will be clustered. The event date for those firms involved will be the same for 
all the firms involved. To take account o f this clustering M acKinlay suggests
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creating portfolios o f the affected securities and then analysing the results at a 
security level. The existence o f event clustering does pose problems for non- 
parametric tests. When event clustering is present, Cowan reports that rejection rates 
are higher than when compared to random dates. The issues o f thin trading and 
clustering were only superficially considered in the CHH study. They did not report 
any non-parametric test relying only on the SCAR test and the analysis o f the plots o f 
the CAR. Due to its noted better performance, this study includes results o f a 
generalised sign test for each o f the firms this study. The sign test for the cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) is:
CAARD]J, = - ' Z C A R h { n , (6'13)D\>D<1 y, jXDt,Dd)n j =i
With the null hypothesis
Ho: CAARoi.Dd <= 0 
Ha: CAARoi.Dd > 0
The sign test compares the number o f stocks with positive cumulative abnormal 
returns in the event window with what would be expected without abnormal 
performance. This is based on the fraction o f positive returns in the estimation 
period.
1 n 1
n J= i i^  /= £ ]
Where
fl if  A R it > 0
|M 5 1
W is the number o f  stock in the event window for which CAARoi,Dd is positive. The 
test statistic is then:
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, _  w-np 
[np(\-p)]2
( 6 .1 6 )
The test uses the normal approximation to the binomial distribution with 
parameter p . A full description o f the generalised sign test and its benefits can be 
found in Cowan (1992).
This chapter has outlined the justification and methodology behind the use o f event 
studies to analyse real world events. Particular attention has been given to the 
problems that are associated with use an event study to analyse the results o f licence 
administration procedures. The next chapter will begin with a discussion o f  particular 
aspects o f the German and Swedish procedures that make them suitable for analysis. 
It will then go on to report the findings o f the comparative event studies and how 
these results are informative in the search for a w inner’s curse.
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Chapter 7: A Comparative Event Study: Germany and Sweden
7.1 in tro d u c tio n
The previous two chapters have outlined the importance o f the winner’s curse, how it 
can exist and the selected method for identifying it. Chapter 5 discussed the existence of 
the winner’s curse and where it has been identified before, whilst Chapter 6 detailed the 
event study methodology that this chapter will use to search for a winner’s curse. The 
aim o f this chapter is to extend the event study methodology to perform a comparative 
analysis on two procedures in the European administration. The comparison o f an 
auction and a beauty contest should enable a more thorough assessment as to the 
existence of a winner’s curse. If a winner’s curse is present in some o f the European 
licence auctions, then those firms that won a licence through a beauty contest and only 
paid a nominal fee should experience a ‘winner’s bounty’. A winner’s bounty should be 
present as long as a 3G licence held some value above the nominal fee that they were 
required to pay.
The two administration procedures that will be considered in this chapter are those used 
in Germany and Sweden. The German authority used a simultaneous ascending auction 
which raised many billions of Euros. Sweden used the alternative option o f a ‘beauty 
contest’. The Swedish beauty contest involved participating bidders submitting 
proposals outlining their suitability to run 3G services, but only a very small upfront 
charge was levied upon the winning participants.1 There was also a charge o f 0.15 per 
cent o f yearly revenue. As this charge was dependent on the size o f revenue, it in effect 
insured against a less favourable 3G market. Within the range o f administrations in 
Europe, the Swedish and German administrations are particularly appropriate for 
comparison. Although Sweden and Germany are not homogenous in terms o f size of 
population, industrial focus etc, there are nevertheless a number o f similarities that make 
them suitable for this study. Both administration processes were relatively successful at
1 Germany and Sweden raised €45.85bn and €42800 respectively.
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attracting bidding applicants, with 10 initial applicants in the Swedish beauty contest and 
12 in the German auction. This was probably down to the importance o f both countries 
for building a regional network. It would be very difficult to operate as a Nordic or 
central European operator without holding licences in these countries. There were only a 
small number o f administrations that were this successful at attracting entry. A large 
number o f entrants are important for an event study as it ensures that the final result is 
uncertain. It also signals that the licence administration was an important event and so 
will be less affected by confounding factors.
Using an event study when dealing with the administration o f licences in multiple 
countries in a process like the 3G licence administration, poses a particular problem for 
event identification. It may not be appropriate to consider each process individually but 
rather to see the German and Swedish administration procedures as two in a series of 
sequential European licence awards. This would be equivalent to treating the European 
process as one long event made up o f many micro-events. The market reaction then 
occurs over the entire period with different micro-events providing information as time 
goes on. Although the German auction occurred at a relatively early stage in the 
European procedure, by the time o f the Swedish beauty contest much o f the stock 
market reaction may have already occurred.
To understand fully the market’s reaction to 3G auctions would then require monitoring 
stock market reaction for the entire European administration process. The length of the 
European administration and the number of confounding factors would make an event 
study o f this type impossible. To examine abnormal returns over the entire period would 
be a fruitless task and no conclusion could realistically be drawn from it. Although the 
German and Swedish administration procedures are part o f a wider European process 
both had enough o f a regional impact to be worth looking at as events individually. They 
were significant micro-events within a broad encompassing event. Importantly for the 
purpose o f this comparative study, there was a considerable difference in licence fees. It 
may be fair to assume that the Swedish licence would be worth less than a German 
licence due to the smaller potential market (in terms o f population coverage),
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alternatively one could take the view that the smaller number o f licence holders in the 
Swedish post-administration market will make these licences more valuable. Although 
both o f these factors should be considered, neither would account for such a large 
variation in prices. When comparing the two procedures the only conclusion that could 
be reached is that the German winners overpaid, the Swedish winners underpaid or some 
combination o f the two occurred. A final area which makes the two countries 
particularly suitable for comparison is in post-administration distress. In both countries 
there were considerable difficulties in meeting roll-out conditions and there was eventual 
return o f licences and withdrawal o f some firms. An automatic conclusion from this is 
that some licence winners must have overpaid for their licences. A particular area of 
interest will be the reaction to those firms that won licences but eventually handed them 
back.
Through examining two procedures, one auction and another beauty contest, a clearer 
picture of the market reaction to winning a 3G licence should be provided. Firstly, there 
would be an expectation that the winners in the Swedish beauty contest will perform 
relatively better than the losers when compared to the German auction. This is because 
o f the differential between the prices o f the licences brought about by the beauty 
contests selling licences below ‘market value’. However, there are other factors that may 
have negatively affected the winners o f the Swedish beauty contests. Due to the high 
licence fees that had gone before and the uncertainty surrounding the development o f 3G 
services, there may have been a general negative reaction to any company that obtained 
a licence. Although the beauty contest does not require price bidding, there is a form of 
bidding process in the proposal submitted by the firms. It is worth noting that the 
winners o f the Swedish licences were those companies that offered the best coverage 
and rollout commitments.2 If  these were considered to be excessively strict and costly, 
then there may be a negative response to the winning bidders. The results from the Cable 
et al. (2002) study can also be compared to these results to take the analysis further. 
Again, this would be with the expectation that the winners o f the UK auction would
2 Each of the winning firms guaranteed 99.98 per cent coverage by 31 December 2003, although due to 
network sharing rules they had the option of building just 30 per cent of this.
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perform relatively worse when compared with the winners o f the Swedish beauty 
contest.
This chapter will first review the outcomes of the German auction and the Swedish 
beauty contest and discuss the particular aspects of the German and Swedish procedures 
that make them particularly useful for assess the winner’s curse. In particular, how the 
German and Swedish markets developed post-administration. Section 7.3 discusses the 
form and period that the market data is taken from. Section 7.4 reports the results o f the 
German and Swedish event studies with references to the Cable et al. UK study. Finally, 
Section 7.5 concludes this section with a discussion of whether the winner’s curse has 
been identified and what effect this may have on the post-administration market.
7.2: The Swedish and German Procedures and Post-administration difficulties
Germany and Sweden are two countries that personify the way in which European 
countries favoured different methods o f licence administration. Despite their similarities 
in terms of GDP per capita and mobile penetrations, their chosen methods of 
administration could not have brought about more divergent outcomes. Sweden 
administered four licences through a strict and tightly controlled beauty contest whilst 
only charging s nominal fee. In contrast, Germany used an auction procedure that went 
as far as giving the bidders the ability to control the number o f licence holders and the 
quantity o f spectrum in each licence, whilst raising billions o f Euros in the process.
The technical aspects o f the Swedish and German procedures have been outlined in 
Chapter 2. Sweden was well placed to take advantage o f the new 3G technology with a 
relatively high GDP and one of the highest mobile penetration rates in Europe, standing 
at 58% in 2000.3 Bjuggren (2003) identifies the Swedish decision to use a beauty contest 
and charge a nominal fee as motivated by a desire to avoid overly indebting the firms 
that won licences and encouraging development in the industry. The Swedish had laid 
out a goal of becoming international leader in IT development; the development o f 3G 
services was considered a key goal in achieving this aim. The use o f a beauty contest
3 International Telecommunications Union (2003)
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came about despite opposition from some sections o f the Swedish parliament (the 
Bourgeoisie parties) that favoured an auction due to its revenue raising potential.
The desire for speedy network development extended not only to the relatively strict 
roll-out conditions that were laid out in the licences, but also the way the applications 
were judged. In addition to the first stage, where applicants were judged on whether they 
were suitable candidates from such criteria as their technical, commercial and financial 
feasibility, there was a second more detailed stage. If  an applicant succeeded in 
achieving the minimum standard from the first stage they would then go through to 
phase 2 o f the procedure where there proposals were ranked according to the 
commitments each applicant laid down for itself. The criteria in the first stage were so 
strict that only five out o f the ten applicants were considered in the second stage. O f the 
five that dropped out in the first stage, one was the incumbent and former state 
monopolist, Telia.4 Telia failed to move beyond the first stage due to it committing to 
build fewer antenna than the PTS considered necessary to achieve the required signal 
strength. Although four licences were finally administered the original number that the 
PTS had planned to administer was five. The number o f licences was reduced to four as 
the Swedish market was considered not able to sustain five network operators.
The focus for the Swedish beauty contest was speed o f roll-out and fast development o f 
services. Despite these goals there were initial delays with the roll-out o f services as a 
number o f the firms that failed to win licences challenged the decision in the Swedish 
courts. These appeals were rejected and the licences were administered according to the 
PTS’s original judgement. The focus o f fast market development meant winners of 
licences in the Swedish procedure should be advantaged in two ways when compared to 
winners o f the German auction. Firstly, they received their licences for a much lower 
fee. Secondly, the number o f licences administered in Sweden was two fewer than in 
Germany, making the opportunity for profit potentially greater. This had to be weighed 
against the relatively smaller market that Sweden offered. This o f course assumes a
4 Although the assessment was performed in two stages the results were announced on one date even if  the 
applicant had not progressed to the second stage.
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direct relationship between market structure and performance. These two benefits would 
support the idea that winners o f licences should gain a winner’s bounty rather than a 
winner’s curse. One important set of factors to account for when considering a winner’s 
bounty in the Swedish procedure are the roll-out conditions. Due to their severity and the 
conditions that some licence winners placed upon themselves, the value o f the licence 
may have been diminished if  investors believed that these conditions were unattainable. 
However, this still should not have brought about a negative market reaction. Even if 
licence conditions were tight, the licence can be considered an option to roll-out 3G 
services. If  in the post-administration market the roll-out conditions were found to be 
unattainable, the licence could be handed back with the loss o f only a nominal fee or the 
licence conditions renegotiated.
Given the desire in Sweden for a speedy development o f 3G services it may seem 
somewhat surprising the difficulties that they faced post-administration. Chapter 2 
recounts the struggle faced by some o f the operators and the eventual withdrawal of 
Orange from the Swedish market leaving them with one less operator than was desired. 
However, this type o f behaviour supports the supposition that the licences, to an extent, 
were treated as options to roll-out 3G services; an option that, as became apparent, 
Orange did not wish to exercise.
Germany, as opposed to Sweden, raised a considerable amount o f revenue from their 
licences through an auction mechanism (again technical details o f this auction can be 
found in Chapter 3). The German authorities sought to administer the licences to those 
that valued them the most in the hope that the licences would then be used most 
efficiently. This led to a considerable amount o f revenue being raised. Chapter 2 
provides certain evidence that this behaviour negatively affected the development o f 3G 
services in Germany. Referring back to Table 2.1, o f the six licences that were 
administered two were eventually returned. The most critical events in the German post­
administration market were the withdrawal o f MobilCom and Group 3G. In July 2002, 
Group 3G shut its network o f retail outlets but claimed that it would continue to develop 
its 3G network. By October o f the same year Group 3G declared itself bankrupt and
138
recommended that its customers switch to T-Mobil (T-Mobil paid €50,000 for this 
recommendation). At the time, Group 3G stated they may still seek to exercise their 
rights over the licence. However, given that they would not achieve any o f the stated 
roll-out conditions it seemed unlikely that the regulator would allow them to do this. In 
November o f 2002, MobilCom took a €9.9bn write-off on its 3G licence, €7.1bn of 
which was taken by consortium member France Telecom. In June o f 2003, MobilCom 
sold its existing 3G infrastructure to E-Plus for €20 million. At this point it became clear 
that MobilCom was withdrawing from the German market and with the first rollout 
commitment approaching MobilCom returned its licence to RegTP. Although 
MobilCom requested compensation for the return o f the licence, perhaps unsurprisingly 
RegTP found no grounds for this to be granted. This left the German market with four 
instead of the original six operators and no new entrants when compared to the 2G 
market. This was until Telefonica, one o f the former owners o f Group 3G, bought back 
into the Germany market by acquiring 0 2  for €24bn. This gave Telefonica a licence in 
both Germany and the UK.
These events occurred despite Germany only requiring licence winners to attain around 
a quarter o f the coverage that was required in the Swedish licence. A superficial reading 
o f  the failure of these two licence winners would suggest that, as they were forced to 
hand back their licences without any recompense, then they must have suffered a 
w inner’s curse. It is clear that they must have paid too much for the licence. However, 
taking the definition o f a winner’s curse as it was laid out in Chapter 5; it would appear 
that this is not necessarily the case. As was discussed, the behaviour in the post­
administration market cannot tell us if  a winner’s curse was present. The licence winners 
may have just suffered some unanticipated adverse payoff shock or simply that a 
particular negative state o f the world occurred. It is entirely possible that at the time the 
winning firms bought the licence they valued them correctly. The results o f the event 
study should indicate whether the markets believed that the winners o f these German 
licences did value them correctly. It will be particularly interesting to see if  there was 
any specific negative reaction to those licence winners that eventually returned their 
licences. This would mean that some licence winners suffered a winner’s curse whilst
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others did not. Despite the sums that Germany raised and its lower emphasis on market 
development, Germany still managed to get four 3G networks established -  one more 
than did Sweden.
7.3: D ata Description
The estimation period is taken as one calendar year before the start of the event period. 
This gives an event period o f 276 trading days. For consistency the estimation period for 
both event studies will be the same. The event period is taken as 30 days before the date 
o f the event. The German event is assumed to start when the auction begins, on the 31st 
July 2000 and ends on the 17th August 2000. This entire 18 day period is considered to 
be the event date. As the Swedish beauty contest was announced and not run over a 
number o f days, its event date is a single day on the 16th December 2000. However, as
iL
this was a Saturday the next possible day for the markets to react was 18 December 
2000, so this will be taken as the event date. As with the German study, the Swedish 
event period will be assumed to start 30 days before the event date. The event period 
will end 30 days after the event date. For the German study this is 30 days after the end 
o f the first auction.5
In the previous chapter, the need to consider carefully the results o f some firms was 
identified. A particular example was the results for NTT DoCoMo due to its changing 
status during the event. All the firms that took part in the German auction were included 
in the event study apart from Vivendi. It was not possible to get a consistent estimation 
period for Vivendi because the firm announced its intention not to bid during the 
estimation period.
Although data could be obtained for the majority o f firms in the German administration 
this was not the case for the Swedish event study. There were particular issues with firm 
data being available during the estimation period in the Swedish beauty contest. As the 
administrations across Europe went on it became more common for consortia to form
5 Where the firm is listed on a non-European market the event date may be different due to the markets 
being closed at the time of the announcement.
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and bid for licences. By the time o f the Swedish beauty contest occurred, over 30 firms 
made up the 10 bidding consortia. Some o f these firms were new start-ups and so did not 
exist during the estimation period and were certainly not listed on any stock market; 
even some firms that were established prior to the 3G administration were not listed 
companies. So consistent estimators were not available and these firms could not be 
included. O f those firms that took part in the Swedish beauty contest 12 were included in 
the analysis, split equally between winners and losers. Unfortunately Telia, which would 
have been o f particular interest due to its position in the Swedish market and the fact it 
did not win a licence, was one o f the firms for which it was not possible to get a 
consistent estimation period. Many o f these firms that were involved in bidding were 
only small contributors to their consortium. However, the size o f a firm would not 
necessarily preclude them from the event study. It would be desirable to weight the firms 
involved in each consortium by the size o f their share in the bidding unit but this was so 
often ill defined and changeable that it is not possible.
7.4: Empirical Results.
7.4.1: G erm an Results
The results for the German event study can be found in Table 7.1, Table 7.2 and Table 
7.3 which contain the results for the winners of the auction using OLS, Median and 
Robust estimation techniques respectively. Column 1 has the one day AR on the day of 
the auction result. Column 2 the CAR for 30 days after the end o f auction date. Column 
3 is the CAR t-ratio and column 4 is the one day AR for the result o f the second stage 
auction. Table 7.4, Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 contain the results for the losers; columns 1, 
2 and 3 are the same as in the previous 3 tables. Columns 4, 5 and 6 contain the one day 
ARs for the date the firm withdrew, the 30 day CAR from the withdrawal date and the t- 
ratio for this CAR. Table 7.7, Table 7.8 and Table 7.9 show the calculation o f the wealth 
effects for the one day AR at the end o f the auction or the withdrawal date depending on 
the firm. Table 7.10, Table 7.11 and Table 7.12 contain the weighted portfolio o f the 
winning firms. Column 4 is the calculation o f the weighted portfolio for the end of 
auction plus 30 day CAR and column 6 is the calculation o f the weighted portfolio for
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the 30 days before the start to 30 days after the end o f the auction CAR. This table also 
includes the results o f the sign test on the CARs. Table 7.13, Table 7.14 and Table 7.15 
are the same as the previous three tables but for the losing firms.
Appendix B contains the plots o f the CARs. Figure 7.3 to Figure 7.18 show the plots o f 
the CARs for each winning and losing firm for the 30 day before the auction to 30 days 
after its end. On each chart, the CARs using each estimation technique are shown. 
Figure 7.1 shows the CAR for the winning and losing portfolio from 30 days before the 
start of the auction to 30 days after its end. Each estimation technique is plotted on the 
chart. Figure 7.2 shows the CARs for the winning and losing portfolios form the start of 
the auction to 30 days after its end. For comparison, the plotted CAR from the Cable et 
al. study is shown in Figure 7.33.
7.4.1.1 : German Winners
O f the 11 winning firms, 8 had negative one day abnormal returns (ARs) and 3 had 
positive one day ARs. The 3 firms with positive one day ARs are Deutsche Telecom, 
MobilCom and NTT DoCoMo. The CARs for the end o f the auction to 30 days after its 
end are all negative apart from NTT DoCoMo for all the estimation methods and BT for 
the OLS estimation results. The T-ratios in all cases were highly significant. This was 
consistent across all the estimation techniques with only a small variation across 
techniques. After the results o f the second stage auction were announced all but two 
firms had negative one day ARs. O f the two firms with positive ARs, BT did not win 
extra spectrum, the other firm was NTT DoCoMo. Table 7.7 to Table 7.9 give the 
average one day wealth effect across all the winners which varies between -€1647.51 m 
and -€ 1490.94m across the different estimation techniques. This figure has been slightly 
distorted by the large negative wealth effect for Vodafone. The largest positive wealth 
effect was achieved by Deutsche Telecom with between € 4 134.61m and € 4 179.98m the 
largest negative wealth effect was Vodafone with between -€ 11396.1m and -€11519m 
depending on the estimation technique. O f the firms that were involved in bidding units 
that eventually returned their licences (Telefonica and Sonera for Group 3G and France
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Telecom and MobilCom for MobilCom) there are mixed results. Apart from MobilCom, 
all experienced a negative one day AR. However, when the progression o f the ARs is 
observed in the CAR plots, all the firms that eventually hand back their licences perform 
badly. Despite their poor performance they do not appear to have been cursed to a 
greater extent than any other winner. As was stated previously, Deutsche Telecom was 
the firm with the lowest CAR at the end o f the event period.
From the graphs, in Figure 7.3 to Figure 7.11 we can see the development o f each firms 
CAR over the entire event period. O f these plots one o f the most interesting is Deutsche 
Telekom (Figure 7.4). From this plot we can see that although Deutsche Telekom has a 
positive one day AR on the date o f the auction this is followed by a sharp decline in the 
following days. After this immediate period Deutsche Telecom’s CAR increases and 
levels off for the remainder of the period. There is also an interesting period around 10 
days before the start of the auction, here Deutsche Telekom suffers a sharp decline in its 
CAR. It is primarily this pre-administration period that causes Deutsche Telekom to 
have the lowest CAR at the end o f the period. The fact that Deutsch Telekom had such 
deterioration pre-auction could have been due to the assumption that, as the largest 
incumbent, it would have had to win a licence. Therefore the competition that emerged 
as present in the auction was immediately received as a negative signal by the markets. 
Vodafone in Figure 7.11 follows a similar pattern but without such a large pre­
administration fall in CAR. Vodafone experiences a decline during the auction 
procedure and, once it is over, a sharp decline followed by a slight increase. Post 
auction, Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom follow a similar path. O f the other winners 
France Telecom, KPN, MobilCom and Sonera all experience sharp declines of their 
CARs in the days immediately after the end o f the auction. Only British Telecom and 
NTT DoCoMo did not experience a large fall at any time in the post-auction period.
7.4.1.2 : German Losers
O f the 7 losing companies included, 4 have positive ARs on the day o f the result. 
However, there would be no reason to expect any useful information to come from this
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one day AR as the majority o f bidders would have already dropped out o f the auction by 
this point. O f more interest for the losing firms are the abnormal returns for the day of 
withdrawal from the competition. All but 2 firms have negative 1 day ARs for their 
withdrawal date. The two firms that have positive ARs are American based which may 
reflect the relative unimportance o f the German market to them. Taking the losing firms’ 
CARs from the end o f the auction until 30 days after its end, the results show that the 
losing firms perform considerably better than the winning companies with 4 out o f 7 
registering a positive CAR. However, taking the 30 day CARs from the date of 
withdrawal all but 2 have negative CARs. Taking the average wealth effect for the losers 
also seems to suggest that they fared considerable better than the winners. The losers’ 
average wealth effect is over €2500m higher than the winners. However the size o f this 
wealth effect is slightly distorted by large positive wealth effects for the two American 
firms, SBC and MCI WorldCom. Even if these companies are not included, the losing 
firms’ wealth effect still outperforms the wealth effect seen for the winning firms. This 
result immediately suggests the possibility o f a winner’s curse.
The CAR plots for the losers can be found between Figure 7.12 to Figure 7.18 and give a 
clearer indication o f the evolution in each firms’ performance. The withdrawal, where it 
is within the event period, is also shown on the diagrams. O f these losing firms, only 
SwissCom (Figure 7.17) experience a decline in CAR after the end o f the auction and a 
sharp decline after the withdrawal announcement. Debitel (Figure 7.12), although 
experiencing a small decline after withdrawal, saw a large positive increase in CAR as 
the auction approached its end. This increase was maintained after the end o f the 
auction. One of the most interesting plots is that o f E-On (Figure 7.13), which was the 
final bidder to drop out from the auction. The end o f the auction saw very little reaction 
in E-ON’s CAR. This strongly suggests that the markets attached no penalty for not 
winning a licence. The remaining losers’ CARs do not produce a consistent pattern. O f 
the two American firms, SBC experienced a gradual increase in CAR post-action and 
MCI WorldCom saw a short-run gradual increase followed by a sharp decline. Also the 
plot does not show an instant decline followed by a slow upwards adjustment but rather 
a series of negative ARs over a number o f days. It is likely that this was the reaction to
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the winning firms and the latter increase in the CAR was brought about by other 
confounding factors.
7.4.1.3 : German Portfolios
Table 7.13, Table 7.14 and Table 7.15 contain the constructed portfolios o f aggregated 
CARs for the winners and losers. As would be expected with the results from the 
individual CARs, all the portfolios have negative CARs at the end o f the 30 days pre­
auction to 30 day post auction and the end o f auction plus 30 day period. The portfolio 
o f losers, has a positive 30 day pre-auction to 30 day post auction CAR in all cases, and 
positive CARs in the end o f auction plus 30 day period in all but the OLS case. The OLS 
reports a small negative value for the CAR. The sign tests for the plus 30 day CARs 
support the idea that winners performed badly. For both event periods and across each 
estimation method the null that the CAR is equal or greater than zero is rejected. For the 
losers, in no case can we reject the null that the CARs are equal or greater than zero. The 
evolution of CARs over these periods can be more clearly seen in Figure 7.1 and Figure 
7.2. The 30 day pre to 30 day post auction plot in Figure 7.1 show an instant divergence 
between the portfolios of winners and losers. This difference is consistent across all 
estimation methods, with OLS giving the lowest CARs for both winners and losers. The 
difference between portfolios remains relatively constant until the start o f the auction 
period. At this point both sets o f portfolios begin to decline and continue to do so 
throughout the auction procedure. At the end o f the auction procedure there is another 
divergence as the winning portfolios sharply decline whilst the losing portfolios level 
off. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 7.2. Figure 7.2 shows the portfolios’ 
behaviour from the start o f the auction procedure. During the auction procedure, both 
sets of portfolios decline but neither is particularly worse than the other by the end o f the 
auction. However, once the auction had ended and the winners are announced, there is a 
sharp decline in the winner’s portfolio. This divergence is greatest 5 to 8 days after the 
auction has ended. The portfolios reconverge slowly and meet around 20 days after the 
end o f the auction. This result presents a clear and stark negative market reaction for the 
winning firms.
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An interesting comparison will be made here with results from the Cable et al. study. 
The portfolios remain quite close until the end o f the 30 day period when there is again a 
slight divergence. This pattern closely resembles the behaviour o f the portfolios in the 
Cable et al. study. The 30 days pre-auction to 30 day after its end for the UK study (OLS 
results) can be seen in Figure 7.33. After the start o f the auction the UK results follow a 
very similar pattern to the German results. Both have declining CARs during the 
auctions and, like the German results, after the end o f the auction there is a divergence 
between the portfolio of winners and the portfolio o f losers. The winners’ portfolio 
performs relatively worse than the losers’ portfolio for a period o f around 20 days after 
the end o f the auction. This similarity with the German results does seem stark. 
Although, unlike the German results, in the UK event study the winners’ portfolio does 
not perform consistently worse than the losers’ portfolio pre-auction. However, once the 
results are taken from the end of the auction procedure, there is clear evidence o f a short­
term negative response to the winners. A cautionary note does need to be struck 
concerning the behaviour after this 20 day period. In both the UK and German event 
studies the winners’ CAR plot rejoins the losers CAR plot. It could be argued that this 
demonstrates an overreaction by the market followed by a slow correction. Referring 
back to the previous chapter, this was discussed as one o f the potential consequences of 
market inefficiencies. Although this is a possibility it would seem that the negative 
returns lasted for too long a period. Given the evidence o f the speed o f  market reaction 
discussed in the last chapter, if this type o f market correction was to take place it would 
be expected to occur over a much smaller number o f days.
7.4.2: Sweden
The Swedish results are arranged in much the same way as the German Results. The 
results for Sweden can be found between Table 7.16 and Table 7.30 which contain the 
abnormal returns for the winning and losing firms and the portfolios o f both. There was 
no second stage in the Swedish procedure and so there is only one event date reported 
for the winners. Unlike the German auction the event date is only one day so there is no
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period between the start o f the procedure. The event period still begins 30 days before 
the event date and end 30 days after it, but as the event date is shorter, the event period 
will also be shorter. Due to the result o f the procedure coming from an announcement on 
one day, there are no additional withdrawal events for the losers. The charts for the 
Swedish event study can be found from Figure 7.19 onwards. Starting with the two 
portfolio CARs for 30 days post administration and 30 days pre to 30 days post event 
date in Figure 7.19 and Figure 7.20 respectively. The CARs for each individual firm are 
shown between Figure 7.21 and Figure 7.32.
7.4.2.1 : Swedish Winners
The winners’ results are shown in Table 7.16 and Table 7.18, o f the 6 companies 
included, 4 had negative one day ARs and 2 positive. This was consistent across all 
estimation methods used. The two firms with positive ARs were Vodafone and France 
Telecom. The 30 day CARs for the winners shows only one firm with a positive CAR 
(Tele 2). The positive 30 day CAR of Tele 2 was in fact very large when compared to 
the negative CARs o f the other firms. However, perhaps more importantly, all the 30 
day CARs for the Swedish winners seem small when compared to the CARs 
experienced in the German auction. The average wealth effect is heavily influenced by 
the size o f the positive effects for Vodafone and France Telecom. This means, despite 
only two firms having positive one day ARs, the average wealth effect is around €1500 
m across the estimation techniques. The plots o f the 30 day CARs support the 
supposition that the effect o f winning a licence in this case in only very small. Most of 
the firms experienced very little action in their CAR over this period. An exception to 
this is Tele 2 (Figure 7.25), who experience quite a sharp decline in CAR in the period 
30 days pre-administration to just over 10 days before the administration. After this 
point the CAR increases until the date o f the administration. Post administration the 
CAR is relatively flat for around 14 days but then increases quite considerably. 
Europolitan (Figure 7.21) experience a period o f positive CARs post-administration but 
by the end o f the 30 day post-administration this CAR was relatively neutral. One firm 
o f particular interest is France Telecom (Figure 7.22), as the only licence winner to hand
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back their licence through its Orange subsidiary. It has already been noted that France 
Telecom was one o f only two firms that experienced a positive AR. There is also very 
little movement o f the firm’s CAR, although it does end in slightly negative territory. 
There would appear to be very little impact to France Telecom winning a licence and 
certainly no response that would suggest negative market feeling. This is not to say that 
the firms were wrong to hand back their licence but rather at the time the licences were 
administered the markets did not believe that these bidders had overvalued the licences 
more than any other bidder.
7.4.2.2 : Swedish Losers
The losing applicants’ results can be found between Table 7.19 and Table 7.21. The 
losing applicants follow a relatively similar pattern to the winners. Across the losers, 4 
out o f the 6 firms had negative one day ARs. This was consistent across firms in all 
estimation techniques apart from OLS where Nomura also had a positive one day AR. 
Four out o f the six firms have negative CARs at the end o f the plus 30 day period; this 
result is consistent across all estimation techniques. Although the losers experienced the 
same number o f firms with negative and positive one day ARs as the winners, there is a 
considerable difference in average wealth effect. As can be seen in Tables 6.22 to 6.24, 
across the different estimation techniques the average wealth effect varied between 
-€2062 million and -€2770 million. The size o f this negative result is brought about by 
the large negative wealth effects for Deutsche Telecom and BT. Unlike the winners, the 
losers with positive one day ARs had only small positive ARs and had relatively small 
market capitalisation. Both o f these factors gave relatively minor weighting to their 
positive wealth effect. The losers’ 30 day to 30 day CAR plots can be seen between 
Figure 7.28 and Figure 7.32. The majority o f these plots are relatively static. However 
two present results o f particular interest. Both British Telecom (Figure 7.29) and Sonera 
(Figure 7.31) experience a decline in their CARs in the 10 to 15 day period after the 
event date. This would seem to suggest at least some negative reaction to these two 
firms not winning licences.
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7.4.2.3 : Swedish Portfolio
The constructed portfolio CARs for the event date plus 30 days and 30 days pre-event 
to 30 days post-event can be found between Table 7.25 and Table 7.27 for the winners 
and Table 7.28 to Table 7.30 for the losers. The results are negative across each period 
and for all estimation techniques for both the winners and the losers apart from the 30 
day pre to 30 day post period for the winners using the robust estimation technique. 
However, in all cases these are relatively small negative numbers. Unlike the German 
results the sign tests produce mixed outcomes. The null o f the CAR being equal or 
greater than zero is rejected for the winners’ event +30 portfolio but is accepted for the 
30 day pre event to 30 day post-event period. This is primarily brought about by a 
stronger performance by Vodafone with its larger portfolio weighting. Likewise the 
losers outperform the winners in all cases apart from the one robust regression result. 
Although these results are informative a more accurate reflection o f market reaction can 
be seen in evolution o f CARs over this period.
The results o f the winner and loser portfolio CAR plots can be seen in Appendix B, 
Figure 7.19 and Figure 7.20. Both these plots show the CARs over the 30 days pre­
event to 30 days post-event. In the 30 days pre-event the winner and loser plots follow a 
relatively similar pattern until about 15 days before the event. At this point there is a 
slight divergence as the relative position o f the losers disintegrates. There is a slight 
reconvergence before the event but by the time o f the event announcement the losers 
portfolio was performing slightly worse than the winners. After the event announcement 
both sets o f firms’ CARs deteriorated although the losers performed considerable worse 
than the winners. This continued until 10 to 15 days after the auction when the two 
portfolios reconverge. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 7.20 where only the post­
event period is shown. When taken from the event onwards there is very little movement 
in the winners’ portfolio ending slightly negative. The losers’ portfolio has a clear 
negative reaction over a 10 to 15 day period after the event. However, just as with the 
winners in the German and UK studies this reaction only occurs for a short period of 
time. These results remain relatively consistent across the three estimation techniques. 
When comparing the Swedish portfolio results with the individual CARs it would appear
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jthat the majority o f action in the loser portfolio is being driven by the abnormal returns 
from British Telecom and Sonera.
7.5: Conclusion
The last three chapters have been primarily concerned with examining whether there 
was evidence that, in some o f the European administrations, licence winners paid too 
much for their licences. The use o f auctions in the administration process was put 
forward as a reason why this excess debt was incurred, through a so-called winner’s 
curse. In Chapter 5 the case was made for the existence o f the winner’s curse in some 
auctions and why the 3G auctions had particular characteristics that made them 
susceptible. An important point was made in this chapter over the nature and 
identification o f a winner’s curse. Crucially, the argument was made that in these 
particular auctions a winner’s curse could not be identified by examining post­
administration returns or post-administration behaviour. This led to the conclusion that 
the only possible way to search for a winner’s curse in the 3G auctions would be to 
examine the market response to each firm’s security price through an event study. The 
methodology for this event study was laid out in Chapter 6.
This chapter has sought to identify a winner’s curse in the German auction through a 
comparative event study o f the German and Swedish procedures. In addition, a further 
confirmation o f a winner’s curse was sought by a comparison with the Cable et al. event 
study in the UK. Taking the German result by itself, we may share the early Cable et al. 
conclusion that there does appear to be a short-run winner’s curse. The winner’s 
portfolio performed worse than the losers’ portfolio for around a 15 day period after the 
end of the auction. The results o f the sign test also support this conclusion. Although 
only a short-run winner’s curse can be identified this does not mean that it can be 
ignored. Indeed identifying anything more than a short-term effect is extremely difficult 
due to the increasing number o f confounding effects that will impact on the firms’ 
returns as time goes on.
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The Swedish beauty contest results provide mixed support for the existence o f a 
winner’s curse. The performance o f the winners’ ARs and the winners’ portfolio show 
no sign o f the expected winner’s bounty. However, there was not the sharp decline in the 
winning portfolios that was seen in the UK and German auctions. So it would appear 
that initially, the winners in Sweden were not penalised in the same way as those in the 
UK and German auctions. It is also the case that the losers in the Swedish auction did no 
better, and at some points worse, than the winners. The losers’ portfolio initially 
followed a more negative path than the winners’ portfolio. This would lead to the 
conclusion that the losers were worse off for not winning but the winner’s did not 
experience a particular gain from being a licence holder. The results from the Swedish 
event study may suggest that there was a general negative feeling emerging towards the 
3G technology. This negative feeling may have been brought about by the high expected 
roll out costs of the 3G technology, the high levels o f debt already incurred in previous 
administration processes or simply that there would not be the anticipated market for 3G 
services. However, this negative sentiment was not large enough to make winning a 
licence for a small fee a negative event.
One alternative explanation for the market reacting is this way is through endogeneity in 
the process. Instead of the market determining the value o f a licence independently, the 
post-administration claims by the licence winners that they overpaid impacted on the 
value that the market placed on these licences. The proposition is then that the ‘talk’ of 
the licence winners acted as news to the market. Although this is a possibility, whether 
this actually happened is questionable. Firstly, even if  the winners were complaining 
over licence fees a rational market would still come to its own valuation. This will be 
particularly the case if they saw this complaints process as an attempt to bring about 
regulatory easing or a refund. Secondly, although these complaints did occur, they were 
not that prevelant during the event period under investigation.
The combined results suggest that the use o f an auction in the German administration 
procedure brought about a short-term negative cumulative abnormal effect for the 
winners. In other words the markets believed that the winners overpaid and suffered a
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wim er’s curse. The presence o f a winner’s curse may call into question the use of 
auctons as a method o f administering licences. The primary concern o f this section has 
beer the identification o f a winner’s curse and not the effect that overpayment has had 
on tie post-administration industry environment, whether this be through a change in 
regulatory approach or alteration in investment approach. The perceived efficiency of 
using auctions may be called into doubt if a winner’s curse facilitates the need for 
licerce renegotiation, regulatory easing, or industry instability. The following chapters 
will make a closer examination o f the post-administration industry framework and 
consider how overpayment has impacted on the industry, particularly in attaining the 
goals of a competitive and stable industry. In particular, whether in contradiction of 
standard economic theory, a one o ff lump sum, like an auction fee, could be responsible 
for a change in the post-administration environment.
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Table 7.1: German OLS Abnormal Returns (winners)
(1)
AR
(17/08/00)
(2)
CAR
(17/08/00
+30days)
(3)
Car T-ratio
(4) 
AR on 
day of 
2nd 
Phase
Winners
BT -0.010 -0.043 -962.6 0.025
MobileCom 0.018 -0.261 -2442.4 -0.070
D-Telecom 0.020 -0.067 -918.8 -0.014
France
Tele -0.019 -0.034 -662.6 -0.041
KPN -0.016 -0.340 -2607.1 -0.066
Sonera -0.032 -0.365 -2368.1 -0.057
Telefonica -0.027 -0.096 -3221.9 -0.041
Vodafone -0.038 -0.077 -1148.2 -0.015
NTT
DoCoMo 0.002 0.108 2159.6 0.002
Table 7.2: German Median Abnormal Returns (winners)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AR on
CAR day of
AR (17/08/00 CarT- 2nd
(17/08/00) +30days) ratio Phase
Winners
BT -0.008 0.002 44.0 0.026
MobileCom 0.018 -0.246 -2302.9 -0.070
D-Telecom 0.020 -0.059 -802.3 -0.014
France
Tele -0.018 -0.017 -302.7 -0.040
KPN -0.014 -0.281 -2233.1 -0.063
Sonera -0.031 -0.349 -2287.7 -0.056
Telefonica -0.028 -0.091 -2853.5 -0.042
Vodafone -0.037 -0.050 -740.2 -0.014
NTT
DoCoMo 0.005 0.179 3493.7 0.005
Table 7.3: German Robust Abnormal Returns (winners)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AR on
CAR day of
AR (17/08/00 CarT- 2nd
(17/08/00) +30days) ratio Phase
Winners
BT -0.009 -0.014 -329.0 0.025
MobileCom 0.020 -0.178 -1725.5 -0.068
D-Telecom 0.021 -0.054 -742.5 -0.013
France
Tele -0.018 -0.009 -167.8 -0.040
KPN -0.013 -0.290 -2277.6 -0.063
Sonera -0.031 -0.348 -2282.4 -0.056
Telefonica -0.027 -0.078 -2563.3 -0.041
Vodafone -0.038 -0.067 -1022.8 -0.016
NTT
DoCoMo 0.004 0.172 3364.7 0.004
i
I
I
Table 7.4: German OLS Abnormal Returns (losers)
(1)
AR
(17/08/00)
(2)
CAR
(17/08/00
+30days)
(3)
CarT-
ratio
(4)
AR
Withdrawal
(5) 
CAR 
(withdraw 
+30 days)
(6)
CarT-
ratio)
Losers
DBL 0.131 0.142 749.0 -0.015 0.109 563.1
SwissCom 0.020 -0.168 -4863.3 -0.007 -0.211 -5539.0
Hutchison -0.028 -0.021 -931.5 -0.028 -0.021 -931.5
SBC -0.058 0.226 3573.4 0.044 -0.011 -131.7
TDC 0.010 -0.049 -598.5 -0.001 -0.252 -7530.9
MCI
WorldCom -0.005 -0.097 -1102.0 0.030 -0.190 -1131.9
E-ON -0.028 0.010 285.3 -0.028 0.010 285.3
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Table 7.5: German Median Abnormal Returns (losers)
(1)
AR
(17/08/00)
(2)
CAR
(17/08/00
+30days)
(3)
CarT-
ratio
(4)
AR
Withdrawal
(5) 
CAR 
(withdraw 
+30 days)
(6)
CarT-
ratio)
Losers
DBL 0.131 0.150 812.1 -0.014 0.114 606.7
SwissCom 0.021 -0.128 -3886.2 -0.005 -0.168 -4711.6
Hutchison -0.027 0.006 266.2 -0.027 0.006 266.2
SBC -0.057 0.252 3915.1 0.045 -0.010 -122.6
TDC 0.006 -0.056 -688.6 -0.001 -0.248 -7401.3
MCI
WorldCom -0.004 -0.083 -943.3 0.030 -0.175 -1049.3
E-ON -0.028 0.011 316.8 -0.028 0.011 316.8
Table 7.6: German Robust Abnormal Returns (losers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR CAR
AR (17/08/00 CarT- AR (withdraw Car T-
(17/08/00) +30days) ratio Withdrawal +30 days) ratio)
Losers
DBL 0.132 0.182 967.4 -0.013 0.147 769.1
SwissCom 0.022 -0.119 -3642.9 -0.005 -0.160 -4516.2
Hutchison -0.028 -0.015 -681.2 -0.028 -0.015 -681.2
SBC -0.057 0.279 4189.9 0.046 -0.009 -114.1
TDC 0.008 -0.041 -511.4 -0.001 -0.240 -7333.4
MCI
WorldCom -0.004 -0.077 -873.5 0.030 -0.169 -1014.2
E-ON -0.027 0.035 979.8 -0.027 0.035 979.8
155
Table 7.7: German OLS Wealth Effect in Millions (€)
(1)
AR
(2) (3)
Market
(4)
(17/08/00
or Market Value
Value
31/05/00 Wealth
Withdrawal) 31/05/00 (€) Effect
Winners
BT -0.010 63050.040 101617.7 -1002.11
MobileCom 0.018 7508.000 7508 134.8654
D-Telecom 0.020 202983.400 202983.3 4134.616
France
Tele -0.019 160352.200 160352.2 -3061.49
KPN -0.016 46303.840 46303.83 -763.74
Sonera -0.032 40113.130 40113.13 -1264.43
Telefonica -0.027 72155.880 72155.87 -1948.21
Vodafone -0.038 187690.600 302500.9 -11519
Ntt
DoCoMo 0.002 26621264.000 269405.3 461.9648
Average
Winners -1647.51
Losers
DBL -0.015 2870.250 2870.251 -43.6062
SwissCom -0.007 43615.110 27746 -204.141
Hutchison -0.028 383703.100 53105.56 -1489.72
SBC 0.044 148612.500 159594.2 7065.446
TDC -0.001 122299.900 16380.71 -17.5659
MCI
WorldCom 0.030 107859.600 115829.8 3468.585
E-ON -0.028 27653.880 27653.89 -772.143
Average
Losers 1143.837
Table 7.8: German Median Wealth Effect in Millions (€)
(1)
AR
(17/08/00
or
Withdrawal)
(2)
Market Value 
31/05/00
(3)
Market
Value
31/05/00 (€)
(4)
Wealth
Effect
Winners
BT -0.008 63050.040 101617.7 -851.508
MobileCom 0.018 7508.000 7508 134.8106
D-Telecom 0.020 202983.400 202983.3 4147.152
France
Tele -0.018 160352.200 160352.2 -2928.49
KPN -0.014 46303.840 46303.83 -644.851
Sonera -0.031 40113.130 40113.13 -1245.99
Telefonica -0.028 72155.880 72155.87 -2050.12
Vodafone -0.037 187690.600 302500.9 -11280.3
Ntt
DoCoMo 0.005 26621264.000 269405.3 1300.897
Average
Winners -1490.94
Losers
DBL -0.014 2870.250 2870.251 -39.4528
SwissCom -0.005 43615.110 27746 -147.862
Hutchison -0.027 383703.100 53105.56 -1450.82
SBC 0.045 148612.500 159594.2 7210.512
TDC -0.001 122299.900 16380.71 -16.4039
MCI
WorldCom 0.030 107859.600 115829.8 3463.36
E-ON -0.028 27653.880 27653.89 -774.08
Average
Losers 1177.893
Table 7.9: German Robust Wealth Effect in Millions (€)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AR Market
(17/08/00 Value
or Market Value 31/05/00 Wealth
Withdrawal) 31/05/00 (€) Effect
Winners
BT -0.009 63050.040 101617.7 -901.877
MobileCom 0.020 7508.000 7508 151.5772
D-Telecom 0.021 202983.400 202983.3 4179.984
France
Tele -0.018 160352.200 160352.2 -2887.09
KPN -0.013 46303.840 46303.83 -615.739
Sonera -0.031 40113.130 40113.13 -1245.83
Telefonica -0.027 72155.880 72155.87 -1964.23
Vodafone -0.038 187690.600 302500.9 -11396.1
Ntt
DoCoMo 0.004 26621264.000 269405.3 954.7695
Average
Winners -1524.95
Losers
DBL -0.013 2870.250 2870.251 -37.9023
SwissCom -0.005 43615.110 27746 -149.353
Hutchison -0.028 383703.100 53105.56 -1488.46
SBC 0.046 148612.500 159594.2 7337.503
TDC -0.001 122299.900 16380.71 -11.4463
MCI
WorldCom 0.030 107859.600 115829.8 3514.035
E-ON -0.027 27653.880 27653.89 -750.379
A verage
Losers 1201.999
Table 7.10: German OLS Portfolio o f Winners
(1)
Market
Value
(2)
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
(3)
CAR Start 
+30days
(4)
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
(5)
CAR-
30days
to
+30days
(6)
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Winners
BT 101617.7 0.084 -0.043 -0.004 -0.180 -0.015
MobileCom 7508 0.006 -0.261 -0.002 -0.321 -0.002
D-Telecom 202983.3 0.169 -0.067 -0.011 -0.462 -0.078
France Tele 160352.2 0.133 -0.034 -0.005 -0.189 -0.025
KPN 46303.83 0.038 -0.340 -0.013 -0.837 -0.032
Sonera 40113.13 0.033 -0.365 -0.012 -0.260 -0.009
Telefonica 72155.87 0.060 -0.096 -0.006 -0.078 -0.005
Vodafone 302500.9 0.251 -0.077 -0.019 -0.266 -0.067
Ntt DoCoMo 269405.3 0.224 0.108 0.024 0.015 0.003
Total 1202940 1.000 -0.047 -0.229
Sign Test 2.193** 2.193**
Table 7.11 : German Median Portfolio of Winners
(1)
Market
Value
(2)
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
(3)
CAR Start 
+30days
(4)
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
(5)
CAR-
30days
to
+30days
(6)
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Winners
BT 101617.7 0.084 0.0019 0.0002 -0.078 -0.007
MobileCom 7508 0.006 -0.2461 -0.0015 -0.263 -0.002
D-Telecom 202983.3 0.169 -0.0588 -0.0099 -0.435 -0.073
France Tele 160352.2 0.133 -0.0167 -0.0022 -0.145 -0.019
KPN 46303.83 0.038 -0.2814 -0.0108 -0.686 -0.026
Sonera 40113.13 0.033 -0.3494 -0.0116 -0.224 -0.007
Telefonica 72155.87 0.060 -0.0908 -0.0054 -0.056 -0.003
Vodafone 302500.9 0.251 -0.0498 -0.0125 -0.196 -0.049
Ntt DoCoMo 269405.3 0.224 0.1790 0.0401 0.160 0.036
Total 1202940 1.000 -0.014 -0.152
Sign Test 1.729* 2.396**
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Table 7.12: German Robust Portfolio of Winners
(1)
Market
Value
(2)
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
(3)
CAR End 
+30days
(4)
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
(5)
CAR-
30days
to
+30days
(6)
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Winners
BT 101617.7 0.084 -0.014 -0.001 -0.119 -0.010
MobileCom 7508 0.006 -0.178 -0.001 -0.103 -0.001
D-Telecom 202983.3 0.169 -0.054 -0.009 -0.425 -0.072
France Tele 160352.2 0.133 -0.009 -0.001 -0.128 -0.017
KPN 46303.83 0.038 -0.290 -0.011 -0.692 -0.027
Sonera 40113.13 0.033 -0.348 -0.012 -0.222 -0.007
Telefonica 72155.87 0.060 -0.078 -0.005 -0.030 -0.002
Vodafone 302500.9 0.251 -0.067 -0.017 -0.250 -0.063
Ntt DoCoMo 269405.3 0.224 0.172 0.039 0.139 0.031
Total 1202940 1.000 -0.019 -0.167
Sign Test 2.357*** 2.357***
Table 7.13: German OLS Portfolio of Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR-
(6)
Market CAR Portfolio 30days Portfolio
Market Capitalisation Start effect to Effect
Value Weight +30days (2)*(3) +30days (2)*(5)
Losers
DBL 2870.251 0.007 0.142 0.001 0.073 0.001
SwissCom 27746 0.069 -0.168 -0.012 -0.341 -0.023
Hutchison 53105.56 0.132 -0.021 -0.003 0.003 0.000
SBC 159594.2 0.396 0.226 0.089 0.122 0.048
TDC 16380.71 0.041 -0.049 -0.002 -0.429 -0.017
MCI
WorldCom 115829.8 0.287 -0.097 -0.028 -0.163 -0.047
E-ON 27653.89 0.069 0.010 0.001 0.054 0.004
Total 403180.4 1.000 0.047 -0.035
Sign Test 0.225 -0.533
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Table 7.14: German Median Portfolio o f Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR-
(6)
Market CAR Portfolio 30days Portfolio
Market Capitalisation Start effect to Effect
Value Weight +30days (2)*(3) +30days (2)*(5)
Losers
DBL 2870.251 0.007 0.1501 0.0011 0.219 0.002
SwissCom 27746 0.069 -0.1276 -0.0088 -0.232 -0.016
Hutchison 53105.56 0.132 0.0059 0.0008 0.073 0.010
SBC 159594.2 0.396 0.2521 0.0998 0.186 0.074
TDC 16380.71 0.041 -0.0555 -0.0023 -0.410 -0.017
MCI
WorldCom 115829.8 0.287 -0.0834 -0.0240 -0.130 -0.037
E-ON 27653.89 0.069 0.0112 0.0008 0.062 0.004
Total 403180.4 1.000 0.067 0.019
Sign Test 0.356 -0.39953
Table 7.15:: German Robust Portfolio of Losers
(1)
Market
Value
(2)
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
(3)
CAR End 
+30days
(4)
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
(5)
CAR-
30days
to
+30days
(6)
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Losers
DBL 2870.251 0.007 0.182 0.001 0.193 0.001
SwissCom 27746 0.069 -0.119 -0.008 -0.217 -0.015
Hutchison 53105.56 0.132 -0.015 -0.002 0.025 0.003
SBC 159594.2 0.396 0.279 0.111 0.249 0.099
TDC 16380.71 0.041 -0.041 -0.002 -0.395 -0.016
MCI
WorldCom 115829.8 0.287 -0.077 -0.022 -0.115 -0.033
E-ON 27653.89 0.069 0.035 0.002 0.113 0.008
Total 403180.4 1.000 0.080 0.047
Sign Test 0.400 -0.35642
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Swedish Tables
Table 7.16: Swedish OLS Abnormal Returns (winners)
(1) (2) (3)
CAR CAR
AR (18/12/00 t-ratios
(18/12/00) +30days)
Winners
Hutchison -0.003 -0.054 -5533.9
Europolitan
France
-0.016 -0.056 -461.3
Telecom 0.022 -0.048 -776.7
Tele2 -0.039 0.179 1854.4
Skanska -0.093 -0.041 -361.2
Vodafone 0.021 -0.114 -2143.9
Table 7.17: Swedish Median Abnormal Returns (winners)
(1)
AR
(18/12/00)
(2)
CAR
(18/12/00
+30days)
(3)
CAR
t-ratios
Winners
Hutchison -0.002 -0.022 -2377.2
Europolitan -0.012 -0.037 -307.1
France
Telecom 0.024 -0.032 -521.2
Tele2 -0.029 0.159 1771.7
Skanska -0.028 -0.016 -529.6
Vodafone 0.024 -0.081 -1501.5
Table 7.18: Swedish Robust Abnormal Returns (winners)
(1)
AR
(18/12/00)
(2)
CAR
(18/12/00
+30days)
(3)
CAR
t-ratios
Winners
Hutchison -0.002 -0.042 -4360.1
Europolitan -0.010 -0.029 -240.2
France
Telecom 0.024 -0.025 -405.3
Tele2 -0.036 0.172 1833.9
Skanska -0.031 -0.003 -100.8
Vodafone 0.020 -0.062 -1249.7
Table 7.19: Swedish OLS Abnormal Returns (losers)
(1) (2) (3)
CAR CAR
AR (18/12/00 t-ratios
(18/12/00) +30days)
Losers
Deutche
Telecom -0.049 -0.128 -1338.2
Sonera -0.034 0.132 496.4
Telefonica 0.001 -0.034 -2182.8
ABB 0.029 -0.053 -1461.6
Nomura 0.025 -0.122 -472.7
BT -0.025 0.078 1219.0
Table 7.20: Swedish Median Abnormal Returns (losers)
(1)
AR
(18/12/00)
(2)
CAR
(18/12/00
+30days)
(3)
CAR
t-ratios
Losers
Deutche
Telecom -0.048 -0.111 -1176.7
Sonera -0.033 0.146 551.7
Telefonica 0.000 -0.017 -1066.4
ABB 0.031 -0.010 -292.0
Nomura -0.003 -0.066 -6367.9
BT -0.024 0.119 1832.9
Table 7.21: Swedish Robust Abnormal Returns (losers)
(1) (2) (3)
CAR CAR
AR (18/12/00 t-ratios
____________(18/12/00) +30days)__________
Losers
Deutche
Telecom -0.048 -0.108 -1138.2
Sonera -0.033 0.147 554.0
Telefonica 0.001 -0.010 -650.7
ABB 0.030 -0.033 -921.6
Nomura -0.063 -0.085 -410.3
BT -0.027 0.043 681.6
Table 7.22: Swedish OLS Wealth Effect in Millions (€)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AR Market
(17/08/00 Value
or Market Value 31/05/00 Wealth
Withdrawal) 31/05/00 (€) Effect
Winners
Hutchison -0.003 383703.060 53105.56 -159.317
Europolitan -0.016 58847.020 7040.168 -112.643
France
Telecom 0.022 160352.190 160352.2 3527.748
Tele2 -0.039 54453.780 6514.583 -254.069
Skanska -0.093 34991.510 4186.212 -389.318
Vodafone 0.021 187690.630 302501 6352.521
Average
Winners 1494.154
Losers
Deutsche
Telecom -0.049 202983.380 202983.4 -9980.34
Sonera -0.034 40113.130 40113.13 -1346.46
Telefonica 0.001 72155.880 72155.88 67.52217
ABB 0.029 62850.380 7519.111 219.5006
Nomura 0.002 4848552.000 49067.01 1217.741
BT -0.025 63050.040 101617.7 -2553.55
A verage
Losers -2062 .6
Table 7.23: Swedish Median Wealth Effect in Millions (€)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AR Market
(17/08/00 Value
or Market Value 31/05/00 Wealth
Withdrawal) 31/05/00 (€) Effect
Winners
Hutchison -0.002 383703.060 53105.56 -80.7107
Europolitan -0.012 58847.020 7040.168 -84.5869
France
Telecom 0.024 160352.190 160352.2 3848.754
Tele2 -0.029 54453.780 6514.583 -191.446
Skanska -0.028 34991.510 4186.212 -116.076
Vodafone 0.024 187690.630 302501 7148.155
Average
Winners 1754.015
Losers
Deutsche
Telecom -0.048 202983.380 202983.4 -9774.79
Sonera -0.033 40113.130 40113.13 -1327
Telefonica 0.000 72155.880 72155.88 4.865722
ABB 0.031 62850.380 7519.111 230.7052
Nomura -0.003 4848552.000 49067.01 -169.256
BT -0.024 63050.040 101617.7 -2468.7
A verage
Losers -2250 .7
Table 7.24: Swedish Robust Wealth Effect in Millions (€)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AR Market
(17/08/00 Value
or Market Value 31/05/00 Wealth
Withdrawal) 31/05/00 (€) Effect
Winners
Hutchison -0.002 383703.060 53105.56 -114.361
Europolitan -0.010 58847.020 7040.168 -68.4505
France
Telecom 0.024 160352.190 160352.2 3872.177
Tele2 -0.036 54453.780 6514.583 -231.413
Skanska -0.031 34991.510 4186.212 -127.729
Vodafone 0.020 187690.630 302501 6077.173
Average
Winners 1567.899
Losers
Deutsche
Telecom -0.048 202983.380 202983.4 -9759.11
Sonera -0.033 40113.130 40113.13 -1326.15
Telefonica 0.001 72155.880 72155.88 71.39831
ABB 0.030 62850.380 7519.111 225.912
Nomura -0.063 4848552.000 49067.01 -3083.2
BT -0.027 63050.040 101617.7 -2749.65
A verage
Losers -2770 .13
Table 7.25: Swedish OLS Portfolio of Winners
-1
Market
Value
-2
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
-3
CAR End 
+30days
-4
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
-5 
CAR- 
30days to 
+30days
-6
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Winners
Hutchison 53105.56 0.100 -0.054 -0.005 -0.088 -0.0088
Europolitan 7040.168 0.013 -0.056 -0.001 -0.060 -0.0008
France
Telecom 160352.2 0.300 -0.048 -0.015 -0.068 -0.0203
Tele2 6514.583 0.012 0.179 0.002 0.080 0.0010
Skanska 4186.212 0.008 -0.041 0.000 0.041 0.0003
Vodafone 302501 0.567 -0.114 -0.064 -0.063 -0.0355
Total 533699.7 1.000 -0.083 -0.064
Sign Test 1.547* 0.730
Table 7.26: Swedish Median Portfolio of Winners
-1
Market
Value
-2
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
-3
CAR End 
+30days
-4
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
-5 
CAR- 
30days to 
+30days
-6
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Winners
Hutchison 53105.56 0.100 -0.022 -0.002 -0.030 -0.003
Europolitan 7040.168 0.013 -0.037 0.000 -0.026 0.000
France
Telecom 160352.2 0.300 -0.032 -0.010 -0.043 -0.013
Tele2 6514.583 0.012 0.159 0.002 0.028 0.000
Skanska 4186.212 0.008 -0.016 0.000 0.020 0.000
Vodafone 302501 0.567 -0.081 -0.046 -0.004 -0.002
Total 533699.7 1.000 -0.057 -0.018
Sign Test 1.605* -0.028
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Table 7.27: Swedish Robust Portfolio of Winners
-1
Market
Value
-2
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
-3
CAR End 
+30days
-4
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
-5 
CAR- 
30days to 
+30days
-6
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Winners
Hutchison 53105.56 0.100 -0.042 -0.0042 -0.0687 -0.0068
Europolitan 7040.168 0.013 -0.029 -0.0004 -0.0129 -0.0002
France
Telecom 160352.2 0.300 -0.025 -0.0075 -0.0284 -0.0085
Tele2 6514.583 0.012 0.172 0.0021 0.0627 0.0008
Skanska 4186.212 0.008 -0.003 0.0000 0.0497 0.0004
Vodafone 302501 0.567 -0.062 -0.0353 0.0448 0.0254
Total 533699.7 1.000 -0.045 0.011
Sign Test 1.664** 0.031
Table 7.28: Swedish OLS Portfolio of Losers
(1)
Market
Value
(2)
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
(3)
CAR End 
+30days
(4)
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
-5
CAR-
30days
to
+30days
-6
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Losers
Deutsche
Telecom 202983.4 0.422 -0.128 -0.054 -0.062 -0.026
Sonera 40113.13 0.083 0.132 0.011 0.095 0.008
Telefonica 72155.88 0.150 -0.034 -0.005 -0.025 -0.004
ABB 7519.111 0.016 -0.053 -0.001 -0.080 -0.001
Nomura 49067.01 0.102 -0.122 -0.012 -0.187 -0.019
BT 101617.7 0.211 0.078 0.016 -0.026 -0.006
Total 
Sign Test
473456.3 1.000
1.547*
-0.040
0.730
-0.042
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Table 7.29: Swedish Median Portfolio o f Losers
(1)
Market
Value
(2)
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
(3)
CAR End 
+30days
(4)
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
-5
CAR-
30days
to
+30days
-6
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Losers
Deutsche
Telecom 202983.4 0.429 -0.111 -0.048 -0.041 -0.0177
Sonera 40113.13 0.085 0.146 0.012 0.126 0.0106
Telefonica 72155.88 0.152 -0.017 -0.003 -0.014 -0.0022
ABB 7519.111 0.016 -0.010 0.000 0.005 0.0001
Nomura 49067.01 0.104 -0.066 -0.007 -0.138 -0.0143
BT 101617.7 0.215 0.119 0.026 0.058 0.0124
Total 
Sign Test
473456.3 1.000
0.813
-0.019
-0.003
-0.011
Table 7.30: Swedish Robust Portfolio of Winners
(1)
Market
Value
(2)
Market
Capitalisation
Weight
(3)
CAR End 
+30days
(4)
Portfolio
effect
(2)*(3)
-5
CAR-
30days
to
+30days
-6
Portfolio
Effect
(2)*(5)
Losers
Deutsche
Telecom 202983.4 0.422 -0.108 -0.054 -0.062 -0.026
Sonera 40113.13 0.083 0.147 0.011 0.095 0.008
Telefonica 72155.88 0.150 -0.010 -0.005 -0.025 -0.004
ABB 7519.111 0.016 -0.033 -0.001 -0.080 -0.001
Nomura 49067.01 0.102 -0.046 -0.012 -0.187 -0.019
BT 101617.7 0.211 0.043 0.016 -0.026 -0.006
Total 
Sign Test
473456.3 1.000
0.816
-0.031
1.633*
-0.031
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Chapter 8: A Review of Regulation in the European Mobile 
Telecommunication M arket
“Advanced wireless access platforms such as 3G are an essential building block to 
achieve the goals of the Information Society, in terms o f satisfying consumer demand, 
increasing productivity, ensuring competitiveness and creating jobs.’’(European 
Commission, 2002a, p4)
The previous two sections of this thesis have focussed on why different prices were paid 
for 3G licences and whether some auctions caused too much to be paid. The first broad 
conclusion that can be taken from these two sections is that much o f the difference in 
licence fees was brought about by factors outside o f the control o f the National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA). The second is that there is evidence that overpayment 
occurred for these licences in some administration procedures. Thus far the consequence 
of overpayment has only been superficially explored. The primary argument has been 
with regards to the effect that overpayment has had through a change in regulatory 
stance. This argument will be expanded in the next two chapters. To facilitate a 
discussion of regulatory easing, mobile telecommunication regulation must first be 
placed in the context o f general telecommunication regulation. This chapter will lay out 
in more detail the way regulation has been carried out in the telecommunication section, 
with a particular focus on regulation in Europe and the UK. This will lead on to a 
consideration o f the evidence o f regulatory easing in response to the distress faced by 
some licence holding firms. Chapter 9 will then go on to attempt to explain the 
behaviour o f the regulator and the firm in terms of a bargaining framework.
8.1: The Focus of this Chapter
One o f the themes alluded to a number o f times in this thesis is that a winner’s curse, or 
a perceived winner’s curse, can change the regulatory position o f the NRA. Regulation 
is not just being used to achieve economic efficiency but also to achieve certain political 
goals. The quote that opens this chapter is an example o f how this type o f technological 
development should be seen in a wider political context. How exactly this manifests
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itself will depend on those factors that the NRA considers important when they are 
deciding on regulatory intervention. When buying a licence the regulatory stance is part 
o f the worth o f a market and hence affects the value o f the licence. A change in 
regulatory stance will, in effect, change the value o f the licence to the winning bidder if 
the regulator is willing to change their stance. In the case o f 3G licences the price that is 
paid for a licence can change the value of the licence. In this case the NRA is providing 
a form o f winner’s curse insurance. If a winner’s curse is thought to have occurred the 
NRA will seek to bail the firms out and provide them with a more favourable regulatory 
environment. This may be through giving a refund on the licence fee or by making the 
market worth more. Those firms that have paid out large sums for licence fees are able 
to affect the state of the world that they face. They can do this through influencing the 
regulatory framework that they face. Once a bidder has acquired a licence the licence 
holder and the regulator engage in a bargaining process over the regulatory framework 
that the firm will face. The regulator will then seek to balance regulation that they 
perceive will improve efficiency in the market with other political goals.
In order to examine whether this is a realistic proposition, this chapter will explore the 
way mobile telecommunication regulation has been carried out in Europe and the UK. 
This chapter will be split into three broad sections. The first section outlines why and 
how regulation is carried out in the mobile telecommunications sector. The second 
section considers the evidence o f regulatory easing in terms o f explicit statements made 
by regulating authorities and inferences drawn from some regulatory decisions that have 
been made post licence administration. These regulatory actions are considered at a 
European level and the national level for the UK. The final section considers why this 
type of regulatory easing could come about and sets this in terms o f a bargain between 
the regulated firm and the regulator. The concept o f a bargaining mechanism will be 
formalised in Chapter 9.
The first part of this chapter consists o f Sections 8.2 to 8.5 and will set the context of 
regulatory decisions. Section 8.2 contains a discussion around the broad motivations for 
telecommunication regulation and areas o f the telecommunication industry that have had
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regulation imposed on them. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 will examine some specific regulatory 
issues and how they have been dealt with in the EU. Section 8.4 deals with issues 
directly linked to licensing and Section 8.5 with those outside o f licensing. The second 
part o f this chapter includes Sections 8.6 and 8.7. Section 8.6 will consider the evidence 
o f regulatory easing at the European level. Section 8.7, considers evidence o f regulatory 
easing in the UK. The chapter will end with a discussion in Section 8.8 o f the problems 
associated with ex ante regulation o f mobile telecommunication through the laying down 
o f conditions in licensing agreements.
8.2: Why Regulate the Telecommunication Industry? 
8.2.1: General Principles
Within the utility industry, Rossi (2005) identifies three potentially overlapping schools 
o f thought that motivate regulation. The neoclassical motivation is to correct for market 
failures in order to improve market efficiency and potentially social welfare (Posner, 
1974). The public interest approach is concerned with forcing private markets to 
enhance social welfare and in turn to benefit consumers (Mitnick, 1998). The public 
choice theory states that to varying degrees the regulatory authority, or the type of 
regulation, is dictated by the firms that are supposed to be regulated. This has broadly 
been termed the “capture” theory, whereby a regulator starts out with public interest 
goals but is captured by the firms it is seeking to regulate (Stigler, 1971 and Mashaw,
1997). How these concepts o f regulation can be seen in the mobile telecommunication 
sector shall be discussed as we continue through this chapter.
The broad principles that surround regulation o f the mobile sector are similar to any 
market. The regulator would seek to promote competition leading to an efficiently priced 
product and correct for any potential market failures. There may also be some particular 
politically desirable goals; for instance in network industries there is often a desire for 
universal access to the particular network. In addition to this, the regulator may seek to 
protect consumers from ‘excessive’ pricing and ensure the provision o f a quality service. 
However, there is the potential for a strong political impact on how these issues are
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prioritised. All of these goals would be conditional on the formation o f a sustainable 
industry that promotes investment and development. If there is no industry then there is 
no way that the other goals can be fulfilled.
These regulatory goals can be seen to emerge from the public interest and efficiency 
theories of regulation, discussed above. The majority of regulatory decisions that follow 
can be seen in the context of these goals. However, it is possible that these goals may 
interfere with each other. For instance, pricing controls that aid consumers may 
adversely affect the sustainability o f the industry. These interactions between potentially 
conflicting goals that affect different stakeholders in the market can lead to complexities 
in the decision making process. The final regulatory measure will only come about after 
these interactions between the regulator, firm and stakeholder have taken place and will 
be determined by the relative political weights placed on different outcomes.
The way that the regulator balances these different goals becomes important for the post­
administration mobile market. It is in the context o f the interactions between regulator, 
firm and consumer that post-administration regulatory easing may take place. A 
regulator, in its attempt to carry out action that they believe would be in the public 
interest, may make decisions which would appear more in line with regulatory capture. 
Regulatory easing is not necessarily brought about by the regulator being beholden to 
the firms, as in public choice theory. If  the stability of the market is at risk then it will be 
in the public interest to adjust the regulatory stance to support the firms in the industry. 
As Priest (1992) suggests, the focus o f this chapter and the next is not to attempt to 
derive explicit motivation for a particular regulatory decision in isolation but rather 
consider the mechanism by which a decision, or series o f decisions, comes about in the 
broader regulatory framework.
If  a  regulator does behave in a way that supports struggling firms, there may be a 
concern that the industry will be affected by a regulatory moral hazard. There is no need 
for the firms to maintain a stable industry if  the regulator will bail them out. The firm 
then may engage in high risk behaviour in the belief that any down side risk will be
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covered by the regulator. This is dependent on the firm believing that a high political 
weight is placed on the failure of a particular firm or industry. A regulatory moral hazard 
can be linked back to the winner’s curse. If the firm has a belief that the regulator places 
a high value on the development o f 3G services, which regulatory authorities at a 
number of levels did,1 then the firm may suppose that a regulator will adjust its stance to 
allow protection from a winner’s curse.
8.2.2: Market Failures in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry
The last section gave a broad description of the main motivations for regulations. This 
section will look at more specific motivations for regulation in the telecommunications 
industry and the remedies that have been identified to deal with them. Before going on 
to consider how regulatory interactions are taking place we need to examine the 
structure and justification for regulation in the mobile sector. Taking the neoclassical 
approach, there are three clear areas o f market failure that can be identified in the mobile 
telecommunication market. The first of these is the existence and abuse of monopoly 
power or significant market power (SMP). How this monopoly power may come about, 
how’ it is abused by the firm with power, and how market definitions affect the 
understanding of significant market power will be discussed at a later stage.
The second perceived market failure comes through network externalities. The 
telecommunications industry provides a perfect example o f network externalities. The 
more people that are connected to a telecommunication network the more people the 
existing users can communicate with. Each additional user that joins the 
communications network will increase the value o f the network to existing users. Albon 
and York (2006) identifies network externalities within the mobile telecommunication 
market. Mobile user externalities exist when additional subscribers to the network add 
value to the current subscribers. Fixed-line mobile network externalities exist when 
fixed line users gain from more mobile subscribers as this gives them additional users to 
call. Finally, fixed to mobile call-receipt externalities occur as a mobile subscriber
1 The quote at the start of this chapter is one o f many examples.
2 See Shy (2001) for a discussion of network industries.
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places a value on the call they are receiving. Although they place a value on the call, the 
mobile user is unable to affect the volume of calls that they receive.
The third market failure comes from the transactional incapacities that exist within the 
mobile market. Transactional incapacities are caused when one party to a transaction has 
made the contract so complex that a person o f reasonable intelligence would not be able 
to make a well-informed decision about the transaction they were undertaking. These 
transactional incapacities can occur in the mobile telecommunication due to customer 
ignorance o f some mobile charges. This is the case for both the user o f the mobile phone 
as well as a third party caller. This customer ignorance over their contractual fees is 
particularly a problem when considering roaming and terminations charges. When a user 
makes a call to a mobile phone they have no way o f knowing which network provides 
the termination on that network and therefore no way o f knowing how much they will 
pay for the service. This is a clear case of a transactional incapacity. Gans and King 
(2000) find that this type of customer ignorance can cause monopoly level prices for call 
termination. This topic will be discussed further in Section 8.3.
8.2.3: M ethods for Regulating the Mobile Telecommunication Sector
The way regulatory control is applied to the mobile telecommunication can be split into 
the following three broad categories. The first o f these is the number o f network 
operators and the structure of the industry. The regulatory primarily controls this through 
pre-entry regulation where the quantity of radio frequency, the number o f licences on 
offer and technology to be used is decided. Linked to these issues are the ownership and 
control rules and the licensing procedures and conditions. The majority o f these 
considerations are determined at the initial licensing level, although they can often be 
changed at a later stage. An example o f a regulatory issue that evolved was the approach 
taken towards Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), as discussed in Section 
8.4.3. The decisions taken in this broad industry structure area can impact on the level of 
competition in the industry and potentially the degree o f SMP. A particular danger with 
this type of regulation is the possibility of delay if there is political disagreement over 
the structure of industry, where the radio frequency is sourced from, and how it is
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administered. There is also the possibility that the regulator can choose an inferior 
technological standard.
The second regulatory lever is based around controls against “abusive” pricing, at both 
the retail and wholesale level. Market failures associated with pricing have been focused 
in two areas. As mentioned previously, these have been termination charges at the 
national level and roaming charges at the international level. Both o f these issues have 
been seen where MNOs are able to exert significant market power at the wholesale level, 
which links back to the previous point on industry structure. In some cases SMP has 
been found not because of industry structure but rather because o f the nature o f mobile 
telecommunication. The abuse o f SMP is exacerbated by the inability o f consumers to 
obtain accurate information on pricing.
The final regulatory issue revolves around quantity and quality o f service. Primarily 
these focus on the obligation to interconnect between other networks, mobile networks 
and fixed line networks and the obligation to provide a universal service. The obligation 
to provide universal service links back to the second issue regarding the licensing 
conditions and pricing. Usually there would not be an absolute universal service 
obligation rather a set minimum roll-out commitment and there may be the option to 
roam on other national networks. Chapter 3 contained a detailed discussion o f these 
licensing roll-out conditions and the problems that licence holders experienced when 
trying to meet them.
8.3: Telecommunications regulation in practice. 
8.3.1: Mobile Telecommunication Development and Institutions
Historically a hands-off approach has been taken within the mobile telecommunication 
sector. In the early stages o f mobile development few people owned mobile devices and 
they were seen as luxury goods, as such regulation of the industry was not considered to 
be necessary. It was also thought that there was adequate competition in the sector from
3 For an overview of the way pricing regulation is applied to Telecommunication Regulation see 
Sappington (2002).
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fixed line networks. The Mobile telecommunication sector was originally seen as an 
extension of the state-owned fixed network operator. Often this meant that the firm was 
under a degree of direct political control. As mobile technology improved and switched 
from analogue to digital systems it became clear that there would be room for additional 
operators. With new technology giving greater usability and the sector increasing in 
value, additional spectrum was allocated for use with mobile telecommunications. The 
growth in the mobile telecommunication market has been so rapid that in some 
developed countries the number o f fixed line telephones has been dwarfed by their 
mobile counterparts.4 Across Europe additional operators were being licensed, however 
access to the market was and is still restricted by the licensing procedure. The licensing 
of new spectrum for mobile telecommunications, which has often been slow to respond 
to changes in technology and market structure, has led to most mobile 
telecommunication markets operating with only a small number o f firms as network 
operators. Where liberalisation was occurring, one o f the first priorities o f any regulation 
was to prevent the incumbent firms using market power to restrict competition. A 
particular example o f this is the duopoly policy adopted in the UK market. An additional 
complication occurred because the body that administered spectrum was not always the 
same as the authority that dealt with the post-administration regulatory environment. 
This means that motivations of those administering spectrum may be different from 
those regulating the post-administration market.
8.3.2: Recent Developments in European Regulation
Much o f the early regulation emanating at the European level was concerned with the 
liberalisation o f telecommunication networks and how to apply competition policy 
alongside sector specific regulation. The development o f a European regulatory 
framework must be seen in the broader political context o f  European economic and 
political integration. Indeed the Maastricht treaty changed the status o f the 
telecommunication sector by listing it as a Trans-European Network.
4 See Hausman (2002) for a discussion of the development of mobile telecommunication.
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In the year 2000, a review was undertaken to amend the 1998 framework (European 
Commission, 1999, 2000a). The new framework was due to come into effect by 2003, 
however it was felt that greater progress was required on local loop unbundling which 
led to European Commission (2000b). The final framework had three key focuses. These 
three areas are the authorisation of new operators both in terms o f licence administration 
and interconnection, the definitions o f universal usage rights and consumer rights, and 
how to identify and deal with significant market power.
April 2002 saw the introduction of the EU’s “New Regulatory Framework”. This was 
based on antitrust law and moved EU regulation away from ex ante regulation to ex post 
anti-trust regulation. The Framework was based on three key principles. The principles 
were the promotion of competition, the development of the internal market and the 
promotion of the interests of the citizens of the European Union The Framework 
consisted of Directive 2002/21/EC the Framework Directive, Directive 2002/19/EC the 
Access and Interconnection Directive, Directive 2002/20/EC the Authorisation 
Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/58/EC 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive and the Radio Spectrum Decision. 
Broadly, these directives deal with interconnection between communications networks, 
the availability o f communication access, the protection o f data and a common internal 
and external radio spectrum policy. Crucially the Framework outlines how NRAs should 
treat market power. The NRA is obliged to make an assessment o f competition in a 
particular market. If  the market is considered to be sufficiently uncompetitive and 
significant market power is present, then the NRA must take rectifying action. The new 
regulatory framework also moved the assessment o f market power away from the old 
definition o f significant market power, which was considered to be present when a firm 
had greater than 25 percent market share to more ‘market dominance’ based criteria. 
This new definition meant that market power would require a market share o f around 
40-50 percent (Gruber, 2005, p56). In addition to this, firms could have positions o f joint 
market dominance, meaning that an investigation could be launched if there was 
evidence o f collusion between firms. So a firm was considered to have market power if 
“either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance,
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that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently o f competitors, customers and ultimately 
consumers.”(Gruber 2005, p57). NRAs were thus obliged to look for joint as well as 
individual market power. Markets that have been identified as potentially requiring 
regulation are voice call termination, the wholesale market for international roaming and 
call origination from mobile networks.
8.4: Specific Mobile Telecommunication Regulation
The previous three sections have focused on the broad motivations for regulation in the 
telecommunication sector, the international institutions that interact to bring about 
regulatory control, and the approach that has been taken to communication regulation 
across the EU. The following section will examine some specific issues that have arisen 
in mobile telecommunication regulation. It will begin with a discussion o f those issues 
that were in some way, although not exclusively, linked to licensing. The section will 
then consider those regulatory issues that were dealt with primarily outside o f the 
licensing process. The section ends with a discussion o f EU regulatory support for 
mobile telecommunication companies.
8.4.1: Market Entry and Licensing Conditions
Considerable barriers to entry exist for firms in the mobile telecommunications industry. 
Each firm will require one o f a limited number o f licences to operate. These licences 
determine how much spectrum each operator receives and on what terms they must 
operate. This barrier to entry, as will be discussed later, may infer market power on 
incumbent network operators. The NRA or government has complete control over the 
number of firms that operate as MNOs within the industry. The NRA has the ability to 
ensure market entry, as in the UK 3G case, when a licence was set aside for an entrant. 
This type o f policy will only ensure entry if  the market is able to sustain an additional 
licence holder. However the decision over the number o f licences to offer does not 
necessarily correspond with the number that can be sustained by the market.
In Chapters 3 and 4 the way the 3G licence fees differed across countries was discussed. 
However, just as the size of licence fees differed across countries so did the payment
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schedules. In a number of countries the payment schedules were relaxed. Most o f the 
licences allowed for a certain degree o f payment by instalment, spreading the payments 
over a period of time. Because these payments were spread out it presented the 
possibility that the fees could be delayed or reduced. Where the whole licence fee was 
made as an upfront payment there is the possibility for a refund or some form o f tax 
break. Although this is a possibility, there may be issues of legality surrounding both 
these suggestions. Those firms that did not win auctions for these licences could easily 
argue that they would have bid differently given the different licensing conditions.
Problems arising from excessive licence fees were not exclusive to the European UMTS 
auctions. The US 1995 PCS C block and F block spectrum auctions experienced 
significant post-administration difficulties. Many o f the owners o f C block licences were 
not able to pay the interest payments on their financing deal. This was such a concern 
that the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau suspended the licence holders’ obligation 
for repayment. The FCC decided not to forgive the debt o f  licence winners as this would 
undermine the FCC in future auctions. The result of this decision was a number of 
bankruptcies of licence owning firms. Once these bankruptcies took place the licences 
became embroiled within the bankruptcy proceedings effectively freezing the 
development of infrastructure on the spectrum that they were issued on. By January 
2000, of the almost 1000 licences that had been awarded in the F and C block auctions 
only 25 licence holders were offering services. Due to the government financing 
agreements that had been put in place, the government directly lost revenue. Those 
companies that filed for bankruptcy still owed the government over $8bn (Cramton,
1998).
The success and failures of the European licence administration procedures have been 
discussed in the previous six chapters. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects o f the 
whole procedure was the attempt by a large number o f national governments to increase 
competition at the network level. The results from Tables 1.1 and 1.2 have already 
shown the attempts to administer more licences than there were incumbents and, in
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many cases, the failure o f this policy as licence holders either left the national market or, 
as will be discussed, began establishing joint networks.
8.4.2: Spectrum  T rading
How to manage the radio frequencies that mobile telecommunications, as well as many 
other services, require has come under increasing scrutiny. Most developed economies 
have historically opted for a ‘command and control’ approach to spectrum management. 
The regulating authority decides how much spectrum a particular industry will receive 
and determines which companies will be able to use it.5 Once usage guidelines for a 
particular piece of spectrum have been identified they are fixed for a period o f time. 
Both the spectrum that was used for GSM and UMTS in Europe was decided and 
administered on a command and control basis. The advantage o f having this harmonised 
spectrum is the certainty it provides for infrastructure and network investment, and the 
economies of scale provided by a common EU standard. Cave (2002) compares the 
success of the European GSM standard against the relative poor performance in the USA 
which had a fragmented communications base. Having said this, there was a certain 
amount of flexibility for the NRA with spectrum management. As Cave discusses, both 
the UMTS and GSM spectrum could be used for areas other than mobile 
telecommunication as long as sufficient spectrum is available for the service that is 
required.
Administering and controlling radio frequency, by command and control, has been 
criticised for a number of reasons. The amount of time it takes to make the decision over 
what to use the spectrum for, and then to administer it, can take a number of years. A 
current example of problematic spectrum management is the imposition o f a standard for 
mobile television. In July 2007, the EU made a decision to back the DVB-H standard for 
mobile television. For some countries this decision is o f no concern. Italy has already 
begun offering mobile television using that particular standard. However, in the UK it is 
possible that delays will occur in offering mobile television using this standard. The 
allocated frequency band falls within the UHF band. These frequencies are currently
5 It should be noted that in some cases international guidelines are laid down for where on the radio 
spectrum an industry should operate.
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being used for analogue terrestrial Television. Some o f this spectrum will not be 
available until 2012 when the full digital switch over (DSO) has occurred. It will also 
impact upon companies such as Virgin UK, which are already offering mobile television 
through the Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB-IP) technology. Companies such as these 
may be forced to switch the standard they are using.
If  there is a strict command and control approach in place then those who ‘own’ 
spectrum may not be able to put it to its most profitable use because o f the restrictions 
placed by the NRA. Spectrum must be used in the blocks that it was assigned in. There 
may be no option to sell or lease off small parts o f spectrum that are not being utilised. 
To actually carry out spectrum trading in this command and control environment would 
be extremely difficult. Farquhar and Fitzgerald (2003) look at the system for 
administering and controlling spectrum in the US. They identify those areas that would 
need to be reformed in order to create an efficiently operating market for spectrum. 
These include the elimination of usage restrictions on all newly administered spectrum, 
and spectrum that has already been administered. It also requires the removal of 
preapproval to use spectrum for a particular service. Instead o f usage restrictions, 
emissions criteria and power limitations would be put in place to prevent interference. 
Also, where the NRA sets a usage/power limit that a company considers to be overly 
restrictive, they should be allowed to contact potentially affected parties and buy out 
their protection rights. This is, of course, if  an agreement can be reached. This idea could 
be taken further to allow, not only the trading o f spectrum, but also the trading of 
emission rights between those companies that may interfere with each other. This focus 
on power limits as well as blocks o f spectrum could also be considered at the 
administration phase. Instead o f the current system o f offering particular blocks o f 
spectrum, the administering authority could offer several licences for the same block o f 
spectrum but with different power outputs. This then gives the bidders the opportunity to 
either bid for all power usage and get the complete licence or, if  technologically able to, 
bid for only part o f the power usage. Although some o f these recommendations are 
particular to the US market they could equally be applied to the European market. 
Although technically possible it may not necessarily be politically desirable to have this
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level of freedom in spectrum usage. In general and given the current technological 
constraints, a system of spectrum property rights is preferred to a commons approach 
where spectrum use is open to all. Indeed Crocioni (2008), when examining those 
factors that can bring about an efficiently operating secondary market for spectrum, 
identifies that spectrum rights that do not enforce usage restrictions but rather have 
interference restriction, incentivises the development o f more spectrally efficient 
technology. This applies to the type of technology that is used on the transmission and 
reception side.
The ability to buy and sell radio spectrum was in some cases laid out in the licence 
conditions. Unfortunately, in the majority o f cases it was not clearly defined whether the 
licence holders had the right to sell on the spectrum in these licences or indeed to buy 
additional segments o f spectrum. This is despite the fact that as early as 1998 the UK 
government were looking into a secondary market for spectrum trading.6 The lack of 
explicit decision-making around spectrum management made it an area in which a lax 
regulatory stance could be taken. If all radio frequencies were traded it is likely that 
there would be an increase in the amount of spectrum available for telecommunication 
networks. This is due to the relative value of spectrum in the mobile telecommunication 
sector when compared to other uses. In addition to this being able to trade spectrum in a 
secondary market would correct for any inefficiencies in the original administration 
procedure.
We may expect spectrum to shift from other uses to mobile telecommunications. Taking 
the total market for spectrum, the formation of a secondary market is not a simple task. 
The exact nature o f this market is not clear. This is partly to do with the multi­
dimensional nature of radio spectrum; it has a particular bandwidth over a particular 
geographic location and usually over a set amount o f time. Radio spectrum is usually put 
aside for a particular task and this is often in accordance with some international 
agreement. In some cases radio spectrum may be used in units smaller than the size o f a
6 Managing spectrum through market forces. Radiocommunication Agency of the Department o f Trade 
and Industry (1998)
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country. In different parts of the country it may have different uses. If  we think in terms 
o f mobile telecommunication there may be technological restrictions on the radio 
spectrum that can be used and the size o f units it can be sold in. However, the spectrum 
market reforms and technological changes may make these problems obsolete.
The situation can be simplified by only considering the option o f 3G licence holders 
being able to sell spectrum, either between themselves or to others, rather than an entire 
market for trading spectrum. If spectrum trading is allowed then the number o f mobile 
operators is potentially no longer fixed.7 It has been argued that incumbent operators 
will be averse to spectrum trading (Valletti, 2001).8 However, what is to stop operators 
gaining significant market power by buying up all additional spectrum? In the early 
stages o f network development spectrum trading may be considered beneficially as some 
spectrum owners would not be able to utilise all of their spectrum.
At a European level there is an interest in changing the way radio spectrum is treated. 
This is laid out in the Review o f the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services. This document moves the EU away from 
exclusive usage rights. They no-longer merely wish to prevent interference and maintain 
standards. Mobile telecommunication standardisation and harmonisation occurs at an 
international rather than European level, meaning spectrum trading within this industry 
may pose additional difficulties. These may only be short-term problems as new 
technologies improve efficient use o f spectrum. The technological improvements will 
not only improve the efficient use o f existing spectrum but also open up additional 
spectrum that can be used for the mobile telecommunications sector. Cave and Crowther 
(2006) give an overview of the development of European spectrum liberalisation since 
the introduction of the competition directive in 2002. They find that although the EU has 
moved towards a market based approach there still needs to be further work to 
harmonise the level o f liberalisation across member states.
7 This to a certain extent is dependent on technological constraints and the amount of spectrum each
needed.
8 Valletti (2001).
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8.4.3: Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs)
There is a certain amount o f confusion over the exact definition o f MVNOs and there is 
no clear consensus o f opinion surrounding them (Landgrebe, 2002). Mobile Network 
Operators are those companies that own a network and have acquired a licence over a 
certain amount of spectrum. Any company that does not have ownership over spectrum 
cannot be considered to be an MNO. If we take the most stringent definition o f an 
MVNO it would be a company that has ownership and control over its own network 
infrastructure and only buys access to the MNOs spectrum. This type o f MVNO may be 
considered to be spectrum trading light. Although the MVNO does not own the rights to 
the spectrum they are free to operate on it. There is a question over the amount of 
network infrastructure that an MVNO must own to qualify as an MVNO. Some 
classifications state that an MVNO must have at least a network o f switching stations, 
others that they do not necessarily require any infrastructure at all to be classed as an 
MVNO. It is generally agreed that at an absolute minimum the MVNOs must have 
control over SIM cards. With this level o f control, the MVNO would be responsible for 
the information held on subscribers and the subscribers’ ability to connect to a network.
If  the company does not control the SIM card then it must be some form o f Service 
Provider (SP). These companies can vary in the amount o f control they have over the 
services they sell, in general they are heavily reliant on the MNOs. The SP would buy 
wholesale subscriptions and then control billing and have some limited control over 
other services and special offers. These SPs do provide competition for the MNOs’ retail 
outlets but as they are in effect franchises o f the MNO there is no addition to 
competition at the network level. There is very little scope for the SP to adjust call 
packages or pricing as these are largely controlled by the MNO. In contrast to this, an 
MVNO should have a large amount o f control over pricing and package content and thus 
provide greater competition at the network level. Dippon and Banerjee (2006) argued 
that an MVNO does not necessarily need any network infrastructure as long as they have 
a strong brand identity, usually built up in the non-telecommunication sector. The 
MVNOs must then provide a well branded product that differentiates itself from the
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MNO brand. If the MVNO operates in other industries it will offer bundles o f products 
alongside mobile services. An example of this would be Virgin Mobile UK which offers 
TV, Broadband and Mobile telecommunications in a single bundle. It is these types of 
services that allow MVNOs to reach markets that MNOs have been unable to penetrate. 
In the short and medium term MNOs find a use for their spectrum through the wholesale 
market that they cannot use in the retail market. This has to be weighed against the 
potential cost to an MNO brought about by erosion o f their market share, downward 
pressure on the average revenue per user (ARPU) and, as more spectrum becomes 
utilised, network congestion. The number o f MVNOs would appear to be increasing 
across Europe. In 2007 the European Commission classed 290 firms as MVNO/service 
providers, an increase of 76 firms on the previous year; this compares to a constant 79 
MNOs (European Commission, 2007, p41).
A further area of contention for MVNOs is network roaming. It is often the case that 
MNOs have roaming agreements among themselves. This is in order to achieve greater 
network coverage or may be part o f the licensing agreement. This will also often be the 
case cross-nationally. If an MVNO obtains the rights to use a certain amount of 
spectrum from an MNO this does not mean they have the right to roam on the other 
networks that the MNO may roam on. Indeed, Gabathuler and Sauter (2004) report on 
restrictions of MVNOs being able to roam on other networks in Germany This may 
mean other MNOs have the ability to limit the coverage o f MVNOs (this would be the 
case where roaming agreements have been extensively used). At this point the only 
companies that could be considered close to a pure MVNO would be Tele 2 in Denmark 
and Germany and Sense in Sweden and Denmark.
A question remains as to whether there is a need for regulation to enable MVNOs to 
operate. For this to be justified the MNOs would need to have market power and be 
abusing it. Dippon and Banerjee (2006) argue that in developed economies there is 
sufficient competition between mobile networks to allow the market to form naturally. 
Indeed they identify the ability o f MVNOs to access markets that the MNO would 
struggle to access, thus not be cannibalising subscribers from the MNO’s network, as a
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as a reason why the MNO would be happy to sell to the MVNO at the wholesale level. 
This has been the view of the majority o f countries in the EU leaving this part o f their 
wholesale access networks unregulated.9
The access of MVNOs to MNO networks falls within the realm o f the New Regulatory 
Framework, specifically the “access and call origination on public mobile telephone 
access”. If MNOs were considered to have SMP in this area then an MNO could be 
forced to open their networks up to all MVNOs. In general, NRAs found little evidence 
o f SMP in this section of the market. A discussion o f the UK analysis can be found at a 
later point. Only Slovenia and Spain identified SMP and suggested action which was 
eventually approved by the EC. The fact that the number o f MVNOs, in some form or 
another, have been growing so substantially would seem to support this analysis.
8.4.4: Network Sharing
A similar issue to that o f MVNO is the volume and depth o f MNO network sharing. The 
volume o f network sharing is in terms of the number o f  MNOs that can share a base 
station and the percentage of population that can be shared. The depth o f sharing is in 
terms o f the level of infrastructure that the MNOs can share at. Again, the way that 
network sharing could take place was often not clearly laid out in the licensing 
conditions and so was left to the post-administration discussion. The sharing of 
infrastructure involved those companies that owned licences, and so owned radio 
spectrum, coordinating their activities in order to save costs in the provision o f mobile 
networks. Infrastructure sharing can be broadly split into three categories. The MNOs 
can either share actual network infrastructure, each operate a segment o f a network on 
geographic grounds or have one operator building a network and the other MNOs 
piggyback on it.
The main form of infrastructure sharing would include the sharing o f sites, masts and 
other network infrastructure, but still with two identifiable networks. This type of 
network sharing is usually split into two types. Either the Radio Access Network (RAN)
9 See Dippon & Banerjee (2006).
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level which includes the masts, power supplies, base stations (Node Bs) and Radio 
Network controllers, which control the Node Bs which link to the core network. The 
core network would be the next level of network sharing.10
The alternative form o f network sharing would be for the geographical segmentation o f a 
country. Each network operator would build their own network at the infrastructure level 
but in different geographic segment. Each operator then agrees that all the other 
operators that are part of the agreement can use their geographic segment. The option is 
particularly attractive when the MNOs are committed to strict roll-out conditions within 
a limited time-frame. A slight variation on this model would be for all operators to set up 
networks in core areas while splitting up less profitable areas such as rural zones. This 
type of network sharing is essentially a national roaming agreement. If  left unchecked 
there is a danger that this type of behaviour could cause a country to have a fragmented 
series o f small linked networks rather then any national networks.
The final most complicated version is where a considerable amount o f infrastructure is 
shared. This extreme would involve a single company operating a network infrastructure 
on behalf of several licence holders. We then have a single network company “Necto” 
and the licence owners becoming service companies “Servcos”. The Servcos then rent 
space on the Necto’s infrastructure whilst using their own spectrum.11
Infrastructure sharing makes it considerably easier and cheaper for licence owners to 
meet their roll-out obligations. They are able to share parts o f their infrastructure and in 
some cases they will not have to develop network in certain areas. As a side issue, 
network sharing is considered desirable as it reduces the environmental impact o f each 
licence owner building separate physical infrastructure. The network sharing agreement 
between 0 2  and T-mobile, which was the first to go before the EC for approval, was an 
important precedent. They planned to share network up to but not including the Node B
10 See Oftel (2001a)
11 See Oftel (2001a) for a discussion of the competition issues associated with Servcos and Nectos.
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level. This would mean that they were not sharing at the core network level. More detail 
o f these agreements will be discussed in Section 8.6
8.5: Non-licence regulatory issues
8.5.1: Competition and Concerns over Significant M arket power
The previous section has dealt with those regulatory issues that were in some way linked 
to the 3G licensing. This section will focus on those regulatory issues that have arisen 
outside of the licensing process. Although not directly linked to 3G licensing, these 
regulatory decisions still allowed for regulatory easing within the 3G sector. The two 
most widely used forms of non-licence regulatory controls are pricing controls and 
interconnection controls. These would include controls against abusive retail pricing and 
international pricing. This may come in the form of mobile to mobile (M2M) or fixed 
line to mobile (F2M) tariff regulation. A key concept behind phone networks is that they 
are able to interconnect. There is an obligation for EU telecoms networks to 
interconnect.12 The interconnection between two networks is a commercial agreement of 
which termination charges are a part. Further to the obligation to connect NRAs should 
also assess if any operators have significant market power (SMP) within this market.
The determination o f market power that is in line with the New Regulatory Framework 
was discussed in detail in Section 8.3.2. If  there is evidence o f SMP then the NRA are 
obliged to take corrective action. When assessing SMP NRAs have been given a 
relatively free hand; this can be seen in the analysis o f SMP within the UK market as 
discussed later in Section 8.7. The European Commission laid out guidance for what 
would constitute significant market power.13 These included the size of the operator, 
control of infrastructure, vertical integration, existing retail network among other. These 
guidelines were built upon by the European Regulators’ Group which suggested taking 
into account pricing behaviour including perceived excessive pricing behaviour, the 
potential for market entry and barriers to switching within an industry.
12 see Gual (2003) p38, p47 (access directive) (European Commission (2003a)
13 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services.
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One particular area where MNOs are considered to have market power is the pricing of 
interconnection charges. When a user makes a call their network provides originating 
access and the receiving network is said to provide terminating access. The Calling Party 
Pays (CPP) principle means that the fixed subscriber that calls a mobile subscriber will 
pay the cost of the call termination. This is as opposed to Mobile Party Pays (MPP) 
where the mobile subscriber pays the call termination charge. Most o f the world operates 
a CPP system. A notable exception is that o f the USA which operates a MPP system. 
The individual making the call may not know the network that the mobile owner is a 
subscriber on. If they do not know the price they are paying for the call then they have 
no ability to respond to pricing incentives and change their calling behaviour. The caller 
also has no choice over which operator terminates the call. As the users do not respond 
to changes in price the operators do not then have any incentive to lower their prices. As 
such it is suggested that mobile termination rates will not be constrained by competitive 
forces. The issues that surround call termination and market power were discussed in 
Section 8.2.2. Although there may be intense competition at the wholesale level and 
between mobile operators in other areas, as the cost of a call from a fixed line is hidden 
there is no incentive to compete in this area. So a high termination charge will not 
influence the number of subscribers to a particular network. An exception to this would 
be so called closed user groups as will be discussed in the next section. It was thought to 
be a particular problem with the F2M mobile charges. Fixed network operators have 
their termination charges regulated. As such they do not have bargaining power. As we 
shall see in the next section there have been a number o f approaches put forward to deal 
with this problem. The conventional wisdom amongst regulators is to impose price caps 
on these termination charges.
8.5.2: Termination Charges
Mobile termination charges are the charges placed by a mobile operator to terminate a 
call with one of their subscribers. When a call is made to a mobile the caller will pay a 
retail fee for their call to be accepted and then the call, to be successful, must be 
terminated. These termination charges are purchased by the caller’s network at the
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wholesale level. The market for these calls is often seen as a two-sided market. There is 
the caller and the receiver, the price structure between the two will determine call 
volumes. We should remember at this stage that the networks operate on a CPP principle 
so the termination fee will be completely paid for by the caller.
It has generally been accepted that these termination charges are considerably higher 
than costs and that mobile licence holders are able to exert monopoly power over calls to 
their networks (Gans and King, 2000). It is ironic that in developing countries mobile 
operators are receiving unreasonable interconnection payments from the fixed line 
operators, whereas in most developed countries, where fixed line operators are forced to 
provide access and restricted their interconnection charges, mobile operators are 
charging above cost termination charges to the fixed line operators. Armstrong (1997,
2002) discusses the incentives that mobile operators have to push their termination 
prices towards the monopoly level then cross subsidise to other areas. Armstrong took 
the example of F2M termination charges with two mobile operators and a regulated M2F 
charge. Each mobile operator has an incentive to increase their termination charges to 
the fixed line operator and provide a subsidy to attract a greater number o f subscribers. 
The mobile operators would not be making abnormal profits as all o f this extra money 
from termination charges would go into the subsidisation o f subscriptions. However, 
they would still be making monopoly profits from the termination charging and there 
would be the deadweight welfare loss associated with this. When Armstrong accounts 
for internalising network externalities he finds that the level charged by network 
operators will still be above the level which would be welfare maximising.
With the current technological constraints, the only operator that can terminate a call to a 
mobile handset is the operator the user subscribes to. This operator has absolute 
monopoly power over termination on their network. This is the case no matter what the 
size of the MNO. Indeed Laffont and Tirole (2000) argue that smaller MNOs will have 
greater market power due to smaller firms facing inelastic demand for their termination 
services. The wholesale prices that a larger firm charges will have a greater impact on 
the final price than that of a smaller rival, this is assuming that retail prices are not
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dependent on where the call terminates. Even if the retail price does depend on the 
network that is being called it may not matter. If  users are ignorant o f the termination 
cost or of which network they are connecting to, then they will still not receive any 
pricing information. When determining their call demand it is assumed they will use 
average call prices. So if a network increases their termination rates all networks suffer a 
decrease in calls. A smaller network will have less impact on this average price and so 
less impact on demand. As such, termination charges on a smaller network are less price 
elastic than those on a large network. For this reason it has been suggested that a mobile 
market with a large number of network operators would actually lead to higher 
termination charges.
The mobile operators accept, to an extent, that their termination charges were above 
costs but give a number of reasons for this.14 The MNOs argue that they charge high 
termination charges in order to subsidise subscription charges and handsets. They justify 
this from the positive externalities gained by other mobile users of having additional 
users to call and by fixed line users who have the option o f connecting with mobile 
users. The argument is that the network externalities that were discussed in Section 8.2.2 
are internalised by transferring the excess pricing o f termination charges into a subsidy 
for subscriptions and handsets. Those who will gain through having more users to call, 
pay some o f the costs o f these users joining the network. It is then argued that through 
competitive forces within the industry, operators will select the optimum level o f cross 
subsidy. Albon and York (2006) find that MNOs have “neither the incentive nor the 
ability”15 to subsidise at the socially optimal level. Even if we accept that termination 
charges are used in this way, once an industry becomes mature there should no-longer be 
a need for this type of subsidy. Everyone who wishes to will have already joined the 
network. Operators have also claimed that termination charges should not be looked at 
individually but rather as one within a bundle of mobile phone services that the user 
buys. As such, each operator should not be considered to have monopoly power as there 
is plenty o f competition for these bundles. Even though it is true that there is
14 See UK case study for some of the particular excuses that were used to explain termination charging.
15 page 380.
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competition at this level, it does not detract from the SMP that is held by each individual 
operator.
Crandall and Sidak (2004) identify substitutes to FTM calls as MTM, MTF, FTF and 
data messages although these vary in how closely they can be considered substitutes. If 
we consider a fixed line user who wishes to contact a mobile user in a particular instant 
there are in fact no direct substitutes.16 No other substitute offers the ability to 
communicate with a person at that instant wherever they are without connecting to their 
mobile. If it is accepted that mobile calls have no direct substitutes then it increases the 
inelasticity of demand for call termination. A mobile user is in a slightly different 
position as they have the ability to send data messages. Also a distinction needs to be 
made between MTM calls from a different network and those calls on the same network. 
An MNO would not wish to increase termination charges on calls made between mobile 
users on its own network. If they did, it would impact directly on their own customers. 
This is one of the reasons that it is not unusual to see greatly reduced prices for calls 
between mobiles on a particular network compared to off-network.
It is possible that termination charges do have an effect on the mobile subscribers’ 
behaviour if they care about the price that the caller is paying. Valletti (2006) identifies 
some o f these “closed user groups” as “families that behave under a single budget 
constraint, or some business users who provide different sorts o f telephony services to 
their employees.”17 It is also possible however for the mobile operators to 
circumnavigate these concerns by price discriminating between groups. Families can be 
placed on so called “friend and family networks” so that calls from certain numbers will 
incur a smaller charge and business networks can be offered similar discounts. As such 
these groups do not need to affect the overall price level that is being charged.
The SMP held by each network provides a justification for intervention. In general this 
intervention has taken the form o f caps on the amount that can be charged for
16 Although it is now possible to send and receive text from fixed line phone if  the user has an enabled 
phone.
17 Page 72.
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termination pricing. As with all regulatory pricing decisions the exact level at which to 
place the cap is difficult to determine. Valleti and Houpis (2005) report on the use of 
Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) calculations as a bench mark for the price cap with a 
potential mark-up to account for those externalities already discussed. Determining the 
mark-up for these externalities may also be problematic. Oftel took the approach of 
examining Rohlfs-Griffin factor (Rohlfs, 1979 and Griffin, 1982). The Rohlfs-Griffin 
factor is the ratio o f social value to private value when a new subscriber joins a network, 
or in the case o f termination charges, the social and private value o f a call being made. 
The larger the Rohlfs-Griffin factor the greater the charge allowed for network 
externalities. If the ratio is 2 then none o f the network externalities from an additional 
subscriber is internalised. In this case, the value of the call to the two users is the same 
and so the social benefit is twice that o f the private benefit. This assumes that the benefit 
to other subscribers does not exceed the private benefit o f the new subscriber. At the 
other extreme the ratio has a value o f 1 where the private benefit is equal to the social 
benefit so there are no externalities.18 Oftel estimated that these RG factors lie between 
1.3 and 1.7 (Oftel, 2001b).
The methods o f regulating termination charges across Europe do differ. Depending on 
the definition o f SMP that is used, how important externalities are considered to be and 
how to adequately determine the correct cost structure for termination.19 The type of 
mobile services may also affect the level o f regulation with some countries not initially 
placing any restriction on 3G termination charges. These differences are likely to 
decrease as the EU’s Mobile Service review comes into effect. There have been 
suggestions that the level of cap may also be affected by other regulatory considerations 
for instance the level o f spectrum fees. For a more detailed discussion on the way SMP 
was judged and how the appropriate level o f termination pricing was determined see the 
discussion of UK regulation that follows.
18 It is possible for the Rohlfs-Griffen Factor to be less than 1 if the externality is negative.
19 For a review of different measures of termination regulation see Valletti and Houpis (2005) p236.
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8.5.3: European Roaming Fees
An area that caused particular concern in the EU was the cost o f using mobile 
telecommunication services in an EU country that was not the subscriber’s home 
country, so called international roaming. The EU approaches regulation from two 
perspectives; an efficiently operating market and further EU integration. On both counts 
a persistent pricing concern surrounds international roaming fees. Despite the decreasing 
cost o f using mobile phones, and the widespread use o f them across Europe, roaming 
charges have remained high. Fees on cross European calls take two forms. These are an 
extension of termination pricing. In this case we have both CPP and MPP. Both the 
calling and the receiving party pay a fee. Sutherland (2001) gives a review o f the issues 
that surround international roaming. International roaming came about with the advent 
o f GSM and was credited as one o f the reasons that GSM became so popular in Europe. 
When a mobile user enters a foreign country their mobile will provide them with a list of 
possible networks they can connect to. They are able to connect to a particular network 
if  the user’s home operator has a roaming agreement with that particular network. Where 
an operator has networks across Europe these will usually be connected as preferred 
networks. The preferred network will be held on the SIM card. A user can select an 
alternative network manually and then their phone will always connect to this network if 
it is available. Two operators may agree to place each other on their preferred list. If 
there is no preferred network in range, and the user does not select a network manually, 
the handset may select a network at random. This selection will be based on the strength 
o f signal at that time. Although not a problem in Europe an issue can arise as SIM cards 
do not have sufficient memory to hold preferred lists for all possible countries. MNOs 
have avoided having exclusive roaming agreements as it would limit the potential 
roaming coverage and it would mean they would get less roaming traffic on their own 
network. Depending on the type o f call they are making the preferred network is not 
necessarily the cheapest. Also, given both the receiving and the calling party pays, it 
may be cheaper, rather than answering an incoming call, to wait and return the call from 
the mobile.
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The European Commission became concerned at the level o f roaming charges and 
launched an investigation in 1999.20 Concerns were raised after an International 
Telecommunications Users Group (INTUG) survey finding that the difference between 
international mobile calls on roamed and non-roamed networks was up to 500%.21 They 
identified two markets that existed within the broad international roaming market. These 
are the wholesale and retail markets. The Commission believed there was evidence o f at 
least tacit collusion as operators across countries charged similar prices at both the 
wholesale and the retail level. Linking back to licensing, the European Commission was 
concerned with the barriers to entry, particularly in the wholesale market, brought about 
by a limited number of licences. Even on the retail side they found average prices have 
been increasing.
Salsas and Koboldt (2002) argued that the problem comes about through the inability of 
MNOs to direct their subscribers onto a particular network. They conclude that an 
operator would have little or no increase in demand if they decrease their wholesale 
price. As such, operators would do better to compete by increasing their network 
coverage. For the subscriber it is not as simple as knowing how much a particular 
network will charge. There is a particular problem separating the retail and the 
wholesale prices. These prices can vary over the course o f day and at weekends. This 
may also vary depending on how many calls an individual makes. For example, a mobile 
user may find that the billing structure changes when they are roaming. Instead o f being 
billed by the second, they may find they are being billed by the minute. The time o f day 
when they receive discounted calls may be different when they are roaming. In some 
case this may vary from country to country. For instance in France Saturday morning is 
still considered to be peak time.22 Indeed in a number o f cases the MNO made it explicit
20 European Commission, EC Working Document on the initial findings of the sector inquiry 
into mobile roaming charges of 13 December 2000 (the EC Working Document), available 
online at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/roaming/working_
document_on_initial_results.pdf.
21 Sutherland (2001) p9.
22 Sutherland (2001) p8
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that they could not guarantee the price their subscribers would pay when roaming 
internationally.
With the importance o f international roaming growing, the pricing structure has begun to 
change. Depending on contractual arrangements it is possible to get a flat rate for calls 
made to the user’s home country no matter which network they are roaming on. Or a flat 
rate from a particular country no matter which network they are roaming on. An 
alternative option used by Vodafone was to encourage manually selecting a certain 
network to roam on. This plan known as Eurocall used reciprocal IOT discounts. 
Networks on the plan would charge each other a special lower tariff and other networks 
a higher tariff. Even if a MNO is charging a fixed roaming fee this does not mean that a 
subscriber will necessarily be using the cheapest option for their particular call. This 
may depend on how charges change throughout the day. However, it may encourage 
increased competition in roaming fees as these become a greater part o f user contracts. 
Technological changes are making it easier for MNOs to direct traffic onto particular 
networks. These include SIM cards that allow over the air programming that would 
allow an MNO to select the network that the user will roam on. This has the potential to 
allow them to switch to the cheapest networks at any particular time. There is an 
additional concern with 3G international roaming over whether full data services will 
actually be available.
8.5.4: Other Regulatory Considerations
Other areas of regulation that 3G licensing has had less impact on surround customer 
access regulation and universal service performance. Customer access regulation which 
involves number portability and rules that affect the use o f SIM-cards have been 
relatively set for several years and are unlikely to change. Mobile users in the EU gained 
the right to hold onto their mobile number due to the EU’s Universal Service Directive 
2002. This gives the mobile user the right to keep their number even if  they switch 
service providers. Service providers could charge for this service but this charge had to 
be proportional to any cost incurred. Buehler et al. (2006) outline the benefits of
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mandatory number portability. They benefit the customer by greatly reducing the cost of 
switching; this is assuming that having to change a mobile number imposes some cost 
upon the user. Also, by reallocating the property rights of the number to the mobile user 
they provide an incentive for customers to invest in ‘vanity numbers’. In addition to this, 
those individuals who wish to contact the mobile user do not have to incur any cost 
through number search.
Allowing number portability should increase the amount o f competition in the market. 
Ofcom saw the inability to retain a number when switching provider as a significant 
switching cost (Ofcom, 2006, p4). By allowing number portability, switching costs are 
reduced and entrant firms are able to compete. Allowing number portability does 
exacerbate one o f the regulatory problems already identified. There is a potential for a 
problem to occur with number portability and termination charges. In the early 
development of mobile telecommunication, each network had particular numbers that 
were assigned to it. This meant that it was possible for a user to identify the network that 
they are calling from the starting digits of the phone number. Buehler and Haucap
(2004) discuss how, once this relationship had broken down, it exacerbated the 
consumer ignorance problem with regards to pricing. Unless the caller was informed by 
the mobile user, it was no longer possible to identify which network the caller is calling. 
Although this is a problem, it is not the sole cause o f the market failure around 
termination charging and the gains from number portability outweigh the loss. The 
universal service issue has been largely covered with the renegotiation in spectrum 
licences. The level and coverage of service is usually included as one o f the 
preconditions for holding a licence.
8.6: European Regulatory Easing
So far this chapter has focused on those particular regulatory issues that have been dealt 
with in the mobile telecommunication sector. The aim is to inform the next section’s 
discussion and to add context to the documentary evidence that both at a European and 
national level regulators engaged in an easing o f regulation. After the administration of 
3G licences there was concern over the level of indebtedness and in turn that licence
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winning firms would not be able to achieve their roll-out commitments. This led the EC 
to outline its position on regulatory relaxation and licence re-negotiation (European 
Commission, 2002b). This communication did give a slightly mixed message and was 
interpreted by some as the Commission taking a hard line with the licence winners. This 
came from the statement that “in principle the licensing conditions should not be 
changed”. However they go on to place a caveat on this statement saying that licensing 
conditions can be changed when the market has “changed unpredictably”. In essence 
this sanctioned a wide raft o f changes, as it could be easily argued that the market had 
changed unpredictably. The EC appear to be sanctioning regulatory easing in response to 
unpredicted negative payoff shocks but not for simple mis-pricing of assets. The 
communication then went on to suggest some possible changes including extending roll­
out periods, treating issues that were not explicitly mentioned in the licensing conditions 
in a favourable way, and only gave vague concerns around refunds o f licences. The only 
measure they explicitly advised against was the extension o f licence periods as it was 
thought that this would not help the short-term situation. As was discussed in Chapter 4, 
it was entirely possible that once an operator was in possession o f a spectrum licence, 
once the licence term had ended it would be extended anyway.
The EC’s advice would then appear to have placed most of the onus for regulatory 
easing onto the NRAs. Indeed, the EC’s behaviour with regards to roaming charges 
would suggest that they still prioritised competition in the EU market over helping the 
3G licence holders. However, two areas that would appear to give a clear indication o f a 
relaxed approach by the EC can be seen in decisions on the sharing o f network 
infrastructure and the approach o f the EC to mobile content owners.
Network infrastructure sharing has already been discussed and the potential savings that 
it can bring. The first case that the Commission considered was a proposal by 0 2  and T- 
mobile that involved sharing network infrastructure in the UK. The Commission had 
concerns over network sharing under Article 81(1) Treaty o f Amsterdam (85(1) Treaty 
o f Rome). The concern was that if the MNOs all incurred a common cost it would feed 
through to less competition at the retail level (88). There was also a concern that both
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parties had a similar plan for rolling out their network and this would lead to less overall 
geographic coverage (89). An issue that attracted particular attention was that network 
sharing in this agreement would block other operators from the sharing o f infrastructure. 
This was because each operator in the agreement gave the other first refusal on site 
sharing of new sites. Further to this, if  access was allowed by a third party not in the 
agreement then this would be at a price equal to or greater than the price for those in the 
agreement. Once this was added to the concerns around national roaming, the EC came 
to the conclusion that the agreement was in violation of Article 81(1).
However, the EC decided to grant 0 2  and T-mobile an exemption under Article 81(3). 
This exemption was granted as network sharing was considered to aid the production 
process as it increases roll-out speed with higher geographic coverage and better 
transmission rates. The EC also believed that network sharing would actually increase 
competition due to the competition with the non-agreement operators. Firms would not 
seek to minimise costs rather than maximise their network coverage. This ruling also 
laid down the position for future requests for network sharing agreements. If an NRA 
wishes to approve a network sharing agreement it must do so within the confines of 
Article 81(1) and 81(3).
The second instance o f support o f 3G MNOs came with the EC’s approach towards 
potential 3G content. Clearly with faster transmission speeds a key area o f expansion is 
to provide content that takes advantage o f these transmission speeds. An example o f the 
EC forcing content owners to give up some o f their content rights came with the 
decision on the commercial rights o f the UEFA Champions League. Petit (2004) reviews 
how  the EC attempted to support 3G MNO through opening up transmission rights. 
UEFA members allow UEFA to negotiate joint-selling agreements with TV buyers. This 
was considered a violation o f Article 81(1) as it prevents individual clubs taking 
individual action over their viewing rights. It also prevented TV content being shown on 
other media. In response to this conclusion, UEFA put forward proposals to unbundle 
the transmission rights which would crucially include the UMTS market as a single 
market. The EC explicitly stated that part o f their objection to UEFA’s behaviour was
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motivated by a desire to improve MNOs position. The new proposals will provide “ ...aw 
impulse for the emerging new media such as UMTS services” (European Commission, 
2003b) This approach to mobile content was continued with the agreement over 
marketing systems for Bundesliga broadcasting rights (European Commission, 2003c) 
and the agreement with the FA Premier League and BSkyB over football content rights 
(European Commission, 2003d). These agreements sought to reduce dramatically the 
time between a match being shown live, and footage being shown on Mobile phones. 
The agreements also sought to increase the amount of footage that could be shown on 
mobile networks. This became a more formalised policy when the EC launched an 
inquiry into the sale of sports rights to Internet and 3G mobile operators (European 
Commission, 2004).
8.7: The UK Market
8.7.1: 3G Post-Administration in the UK23
The UK mobile telecommunication market post-3G licence administration poses a 
slightly unusual case study. The regulatory position taken in the licensing differed from 
that taken in many other countries. One of the most notable differences is the starting 
position of having relatively light roll-out condition. This meant there was no need to 
extend the roll-out period as was done in countries such as Spain, Portugal and Belgium. 
With the first roll-out condition not needing to be met until 2007, and the politically and 
legally sensitive issue o f giving some form o f refund not being considered as an option, 
there was only a limited scope for licence condition easing. Given that there is no 
requirement for a fast roll-out it could be questioned why any regulatory easing was 
required. If there was an easing o f regulatory stance this would have been due to some 
implicit desire for a speedier roll-out of 3G infrastructure or a concern over the 
sustainability of mobile telecommunication market. The only options open to the 
regulator were changing regulations around spectrum management (in the form of 
spectrum trading, network sharing and the position of MVNOs) and any controls on 
pricing.
23 For a review of the administration of licences in the UK see Chapter 2.
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The UK was generally open to allowing operators to share networks, however there 
were concerns over how it could affect competition at the network level. As with most 
3G licences there was no a priori exclusion of network sharing. There were concerns that 
any infrastructure sharing did not violate the Wireless Telegraphy Act.24 There was an 
obligation on NRAs to encourage physical infrastructure sharing from Article 11 o f the 
Interconnection Directive 25 In addition to this, there were concerns that the balance 
between encouraging infrastructure sharing but not allowing companies to engage in 
anti-competitive behaviour was maintained. It was thought that less competition would 
mean that network coverage and quality would be lower. If  infrastructure sharing was to 
take place it would need to conform with UK Competition Act 1998 Chapter 1 
competition prohibitions which “prohibits agreements which have the object or effect of 
preventing, restricting, or distorting competition and that may affect trade within the 
UK”26
The UK uses a relatively loose definition of MVNOs. An MVNO is considered to be a 
service provider that has control over SIM cards, billing and their subscriber database. In 
the early stages o f mobile development, retail mobile services had to be offered by 
service providers. This was the case when there were only two MNOs and it was thought 
that there needed to be an additional layer o f competition. Ofcom’s weak form MVNO 
means that companies like Virgin mobile and Tesco Mobile counts as MVNOs even 
though they have no physical infrastructure.27
Regulation of pricing comes about because o f the two issues discussed in Section 8.5 
Regulators have a desire to cut termination charges and cross-Europe roaming charges. 
The current charging was thought to be greater than the “true cost” The problem then 
becomes identifying whether regulatory changes that are adverse to the MNOs would 
have been more severe if  it had not been for MNO lobbying.
24 See Ofcom(2001) 3G Mobile Infrastructure Sharing in the UK.
25 European Parliament (1997a).
26 Oftel (2001) section 14.
27 Oftel (1999).
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8.7.2: Mobile Network Operators and Market Power.
Before considering possible regulatory interventions, Oftel and then Ofcom attempted to 
identify significant market power within the mobile market. The European Commission
98 • •laid out guidance for what would constitute significant market power. This guidance 
has already been discussed and included the size o f the operator, control of 
infrastructure, vertical integration, the existing retail network, pricing behaviour 
including perceived excessive pricing behaviour, the potential for market entry and 
barriers to switching within an industry. As was outlined in Section 8.3.2, this was all 
brought about by the EU ’s new regulatory framework. Most o f the EU directives were 
implemented in the UK through the 2003 Communications Act.
Ofcom came to the conclusion that each MNO had SMP. It may seem counter intuitive 
to say that every operator in the market has SMP, particularly when given the number of 
operators in the mobile market. Ofcom did this by narrowing the definition o f the market 
they were considering to the termination of voice calls on each particular network. As 
each MNO has 100% control over the termination charges on their network by definition 
a licence holding MNO would have SMP. By defining each market in such a way they 
also inferred greater barriers to entry. At this point in time it is not possible for a MNO 
to terminate the calls o f another network making entry virtually impossible. These 
findings, added to the fact that Ofcom considered the pricing to be above the cost o f call 
termination, led them to seek corrective action. By contrast when considering the retail 
side o f the mobile telecommunications market Ofcom find MNOs do not have SMP.29
The MNOs in the UK lobbied against controls on termination rates. Originally they put 
forward the argument that MNOs would not raise termination rates as doing so would 
reduce calls to mobile phones and therefore reduce their profits.30 This was particularly 
the case as the number of MNOs had increased. Oftel believed the termination charge
28 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services.
29 Oftel (2003)
30 Newbery et al. (2000)
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could get as high as £0.25 per minute31. The MNOs also put forward Ramsey or near 
Ramsey pricing as an excuse for higher termination charges in order to cover the fixed 
costs they incurred from building networks.32 Vodafone was one MNO that argued along 
these lines, suggesting that calls to a mobile are relatively more price inelastic than other 
telecommunication services meaning that MNOs are justified in charging higher 
termination charges. In their response Vodafone stated that “pricing structures are 
consistent with Ramsey outcomes”33 When these arguments were rejected by Oftel the 
MNOs began lobbying on the grounds that termination rates should be greater than the 
marginal cost to help recover the fixed costs of licences and network roll.34 Indeed 
mm02 directly linked the speed o f 3G roll-out with price controls. They threatened that 
if  the UK introduced tight control over termination charges they “ ...would have to cut 
back on 3G investments [meaning] other markets would be materially ahead o f this 
country.”35 Again these arguments were rejected on the grounds that it was not made 
clear at what level termination charges were set to recover fixed costs. Without 
regulation there was nothing to stop mobile firms setting charges too high.
The MNOs appealed the decision to the Competition Commission who agreed with 
OFTEL. Vodafone and mm02 were ordered to decrease their rates by 15 per cent 
immediately and then by 15 per cent per year until 2006, bringing them to a target of 
£0.0563 per minute. T-Mobile and Orange were ordered to decrease their termination 
rates by 14 per cent and then by 14 per cent every year until 2006 bringing them to a 
target o f £0.0631 per minute. However, it should be noted that these restrictions were 
not applied to the 3G technology. It was considered that this may damage a developing 
industry.
31 Ofcom (2006) 4.16.
32 Ramsey pricing or Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is used when it is believed that marginal cost pricing will 
not cover the regulated firm’s costs. The aim of the regulator is then to allow price that maximises social 
welfare under the condition that the firm does not make a loss. Those services with greater inelasticities of 
demand should have a larger mark-up over marginal costs than those with lower elasticities. Firms that are 
engaging in Ramsey pricing will charge prices that are inversely proportional to the elasticities of demand. 
As such the structure of prices will be the same as it would be for an unregulated monopoly, just not as 
high (see Armstrong et al. 1999 for a full discussion of Ramsey Pricing under different assumptions).
33 Oftel (2001b).
34 See Newbery et al (2001).
35 Budden (2002).
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As time went by Ofcom seemed to take a more relaxed approach to termination pricing. 
Ofcom carried out a review o f termination pricing that took over from the previous 
arrangement. The new arrangement cuts the termination charge to 5.3 pence per minute 
(Hutchinson 3G had a cap of 6 pence per minute due to exogenous cost differences 
between H3G and the other MNOs) by 2010-11. Ofcom were criticised by both the 
European Commission and national fixed line operators for taking an overly lenient 
approach to termination charges.
A further area of relaxation came with the reassessment o f Vodafone’s and BT Cellnet’s 
(now 0 2 ) market power in the wholesale mobile access market. An Oftel assessment in 
2003 found that under the new regulatory framework the two companies no longer had 
SMP in this market. This was due to SMP being redefined in the New Regulatory 
Framework to include the concept of ‘dominance’. This led to the removal o f the 
regulatory requirements placed on Vodafone and 0 2  previously. This actually had only a 
limited impact on these operators. Both Vodafone and 0 2  were still required along with 
the other MNOs to negotiate interconnection contracts between each other under Article 
4 o f the Access Directive. There were also no mobile IA providers operating at the time.
Although the UK set one o f the longest time periods for a roll-out obligation to be met, 
as the deadline approached there was still the possibility o f non-compliance with 
coverage commitments. Although Ofcom seemed to take a tough line over adherence to 
roll-out conditions “ ...Ofcom expected all licensees to meet the rollout obligation 
included in their licences by the end o f 2007.”,37 the actual sanctions that would be taken 
against a licence holder were not made clear. Ofcom went as far as to virtually rule out 
revoking a licence “ ....where a licensee had rolled-out a network to a significant extent 
and could clearly demonstrate to Ofcom that they have evidence o f a clear commitment 
to remedy the infringement o f their rollout licence condition in a timely way, Ofcom is
36 Parker (2006).
37 Ofcom(2006) section 3.10.
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likely to consider that revocation would be a disproportionate sanction to impose.”38 
When the deadline arrived four out o f the five licence holders had met the roll-out 
condition. 02  the subsidiary of Telefonica was the only operator that missed the target. 
The response of Ofcom was to extend the roll-out condition by another 4 months.
8.8: How the Regulatory Decision is Reached
The question still remains -  why would the regulator change its regulatory stance? If it is 
accepted that the licence fees did impact on the post-administration regulatory position, 
then the licence winning firms must have the ability to affect the regulatory regime that 
they are under. It is fair to assume that the regulators have certain goals discussed at the 
start o f this piece. Some of these goals will be motivated by perceived improvements in 
efficiency and some from political motivations. The operating firms will have an 
influence over some o f these factors. These include the speed o f roll-out, quality of 
service, maintenance of a stable industry. The regulatory decision-making process can 
then be seen as a bargaining process. The structure of this bargaining mechanism will be 
explored to a greater extent in the next chapter. The regulator must balance out this 
desire for a stable market with the perceived improvement in welfare they can obtain 
from other regulatory levers. The operating firms wish to lobby the regulating authority 
to provide them with a more favourable regulatory regime. The bargain will then occur 
as the regulator trades off the speed o f network development against other regulatory 
levers. The MNO offers a faster network roll-out in exchange for an easing o f future 
regulatory stance. This bargain will occur even if the firm does not have any difficulty in 
achieving their licensing commitments. However, for the regulator to take account of 
this lobbying activity the operating firms must be able to provide some credible signal to 
the regulating authority. How exactly this signal manifests itself is a matter for each 
individual regulatory authority. It may come about through falling stock market prices, 
revisions in the firm’s credit ratings, or identified problems in technological 
developments, all which were present after the 3G administration procedure.
The proposition that the regulatory regime that a firm faces is not exogenous to it would 
seem to be well supported. Indeed the very fact that NRAs produce consultation
38 Ofcom(2006) section 3.13.
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documents in order to consult with the industry shows a desire to engage in a bargaining 
process. O f course it is not only firms in the industry that are being consulted at this 
stage, consumer groups and other related businesses also lobby. Protecting those firms in 
the telecommunication industry has occurred since the beginnings o f the liberalisation of 
the industry. As already discussed the level o f competition was limited in the early 
stages o f liberalisation in order to protect the incumbent BT. Indeed Armstrong et al. 
(1999) refers to the early relationship between Oftel and BT as “almost regulation by 
bargaining”39.
8.8.1: Industry Lobbying
Duso (2000) examines the lobbying activity within the mobile market in the U.S. In 
particular how lobbying activity affected regulation and in turn how this impacted on 
prices. Duso’s study only focused on price regulation, however he does find that firms’ 
lobbying activity caused the ‘wrong’ markets to be regulated, in as much as those 
markets that would have had a significant decrease in price if  regulated were not. 
Despite this finding Duso does not give a full account of how the regulated firm exerts 
power over the regulator.
I f  it is accepted that the regulatory regime can be influenced by the lobbying o f firms, 
assuming they can provide a credible signal of not being able to achieve regulatory aims, 
then it can be inferred that this will feed back to the auction procedure. The value placed 
by bidders on a licence will be some function of the possible future states o f the world. 
I f  a bidder knows that if  they suffer a winner’s curse, or at least are able to signal that 
they have overspent, then the state o f the world will change as the regulatory regime 
changes. This will mean that if  a licence winner is able to signal that they have 
overspent, the licence will be worth more. The price paid for the licence will affect the 
value o f the licence. A problem may arise if the bidders do not know if  the regulator 
takes a strong or weak approach to their post administration regulatory regime. In reality 
it may not be as simple as dividing regulators into strong and weak, instead they may 
occupy a spectrum of regulatory severity. An added complication in this framework is 
that we have a regulator with changing motivations. This may be particularly relevant if
39 p271.
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the regulator has little political independence. A regulator’s primary motivations may 
change with the election of a new government. Also there may be different regulatory 
goals at differing levels of regulatory institution. This can be seen from the EC’s 
criticism o f Ofcom’s termination charges and the negotiations concerning roaming fees.
8.8.2: Incom plete Contracts
It may be useful to consider the regulatory setup in terms o f incomplete contracts. Rossi
(2005) gives themes that can be transferred from incomplete contracts to regulatory 
bargaining. The parties involved are unable to commit to not renegotiating the contract 
in the future. The political process may lead to ambiguities in law leading some 
bargaining agents to prefer incomplete contracts to a bad law. Both these points are 
particularly relevant for a market that is evolving with new technologies that were not 
originally catered for in the original regulatory contracts. A regulatory decision is only 
one point in an ongoing discussion. From this view, those conditions laid out in 
licensing agreements should not be seen as legalistic contracts that need to be enforced, 
but rather are a starting point, an incomplete contract open to renegotiation. Making a 
slight alteration to the Hart and Moore (1999) description o f an incomplete contract we 
have a very close approximation to what occurs in a licensing process. Imagine a 
regulator that requires a licence winning firm to operate a network under certain 
conditions. The exact nature of how the network will run depends on a state o f the world 
that is yet to be realised. In an ideal world, the parties would write a contingent contract 
-  or possibly with regulation a law -  specifying how the network is to be run depending 
on each state of the world. However, with such a large number o f states o f the world, to 
write such a contract would probably be impossible and certainly would be prohibitively 
expensive. Instead an incomplete contract is written and then renegotiated when the state 
o f the world is realised.
8.9: Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the motivations and methods that have been used to regulate 
the telecommunications industry. In particular, it has focused on the regulatory 
interventions that have occurred and that were perceived to be needed to correct certain 
market failures. The chapter gave background information for a discussion o f the ways
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that regulators have engaged in regulatory easing. A key part o f this chapter was the 
discussion o f documentary evidence that regulators engaged in regulatory easing in 
response to the high 3G licence fees.
The evidence for regulatory easing was considered at a European level and at the 
national level for the UK. At the European level this evidence consisted o f the European 
Commission’s immediate reaction to the licence fees and some key decisions taken post­
administration. As discussed in Section 8.6, the Commission left all options open to 
NRAs if  they believed the post-administration market had changed unpredictably. The 
EC reinforced this support for licence winners firstly by allowing network infrastructure 
sharing even though they found it in breach o f competition rules. The EC then went on 
to enforce new rules for rights to show European football highlights with the explicit 
aim o f helping 3G licence holders.
Further evidence o f regulatory easing is provided in Section 8.7 by examining decisions 
made post-administration in the UK. This regulatory easing took a number o f forms. At 
the national level network sharing was also allowed. Ofcom did not impose charge 
controls on the 3G termination rates. Finally, despite having relatively lax roll-out 
conditions, no action was taken against those operators that did not meet their roll-out 
commitments.
The next chapter will pick up this discussion o f regulatory easing and attempt to identify 
in more depth why a high licence fee could bring about the behaviour seen in the post­
administration market, most notably the delay in the roll-out o f 3G services and the 
relaxation o f 3G licensing conditions and post-administration regulatory environment.
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Chapter 9: Real Options in Mobile Telecommunications Investment 
and Post-administration Regulatory Bargaining.
9.1: Introduction
Chapter 8 discussed the development o f mobile telecommunication regulation and, in 
particular, regulatory decisions that took place in the aftermath o f the administration of 
licences to run 3G services. This chapter will seek to explain the rationale behind some 
o f the behaviour by both firm and regulatory in the post-administration market. 
Exploring this relationship is by its nature difficult to do. There are a number o f complex 
interactions between the regulator, the firm in question and other firms in the industry.
This chapter will focus on a number o f areas. It begins in Section 9.2 with a discussion 
o f the motivation for the firm to delay the roll-out o f their 3G infrastructure and how the 
size o f licence fees could impact upon this decision. In particular, this section 
exemplifies how a change in the firm’s cost of capital can bring about a change in the 
value o f the firm’s option to delay. This relationship will be demonstrated through a 
number o f simulations in Section 9.3. These simulations show that under a number of 
different assumptions an increasing cost o f capital causes an increase in the value o f the 
option to delay. The chapter will then go on to explore how, in the light o f the firm’s 
increasing desire to delay investment when their cost o f capital increases, the size o f the 
licence fee will impact on a basic Nash bargaining game between the regulator and the 
firm. This is shown via a Rubinstein bargaining mechanism in Section 9.5. This 
Rubinstein bargain shows that an increase in the value o f the option to delay can 
increase a firm’s bargaining power. The final section applies this principle to a simple 
two stage Nash bargaining game.
9.2: Infrastructure Investment, the Cost of Capital and Timing Options 
9.2.1: UMTS Infrastructure and the Cost of Capital
In order to provide 3G services, a licence owner must undertake a large amount of 
investment in new base stations and network infrastructure. The existing 2G network 
infrastructure is on the whole not suitable to run 3G services although there can be some 
conversion from 2G basestation. With over €100bn spent on licences and another
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estimated €127.4bn! needed to be spent on the provision o f 3G services, operating firms 
face mounting debt. As these costs are fixed and sunk they should have no effect on 
firm’s pricing or investment decision. The size of the licence fees should not, in theory 
at least, have an effect on the firm’s marginal cost or pricing behaviour in the post­
administration market. However, this logic will only hold if  capital markets are behaving 
efficiently and firms follow rational investment strategies. If  the size o f the debt has 
negatively affected the firm’s ability to borrow then this may have a significant impact 
on the firm’s investment decision. Table 9.1 shows the deterioration o f some o f the 
licence winning firms’ credit ratings over the period that the licences were being 
administered.
There were other factors apart from 3G licence fees that were negatively impacting on 
the high-tech sector around this period, however, there is evidence that the size of the 3G 
licence fees were directly responsible for the downgrading in credit ratings. Almost 
immediately after the end of the German auction, all the firms that won licences in 
Germany apart from Vodafone were placed on the S&P’s credit watch list. In early 
September MM02 offered a loan package in order to try and raise funds in the aftermath 
o f their split from BT. The loan package was given a BBB- rating by S&P, which is only 
one grade above junk status, indicating the decline in these firms’ credit ratings. Even 
Hutchison Whampoa had its S&P rating downgraded from A to A- as a direct 
consequence o f uncertainty surrounding the company’s 3G business plan (3GNewsroom
2003). The association between credit ratings and licence fees was explored by Del 
Monte (2004). The Del Monte study calculated a ratio of each operators’ total cost of 
licences against the 1999 value of their assets. Licence owners with the highest ratio 
were those that had their credit ratings downgraded by the largest amount. This is put 
forward as direct evidence that the licence fees increased the licence winners’ cost of 
borrowing.
1 Estimate from European Commission (2002a) Exhibit 44.
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It is not surprising that the size o f licence fees had this effect on the winners’ credit 
ratings. High borrowing costs will lead to higher financial gearing ratios. The gearing is 
a financial ratio that compares the level of owner’s funds that are invested in the firm 
compared to borrowed funds. When firms have to pay large lump sums they may borrow 
more or sell off some of their assets to pay for it. Either way this will lead to an increase 
in gearing. The gearing ratio is one factor that is used to determine credit ratings and in 
turn the cost of borrowing for the firm. This problem will be exacerbated by many 
telecoms firms attempting to acquire finance at the same time. Investors will wish to 
diversify across sectors in order to spread risk. This raises the possibility that borrowing 
will become more expensive for all operators not just those that have deteriorating 
leverage. Cave and Valletti (2000) discuss the possibility o f this occurring. They 
consider this to be a “genuine but small” risk. However this analysis was made before 
the process of roll-out had begun. As the process went on there was widespread 
downgrading of credit ratings. The companies that were particularly badly hit were start­
ups which were no-longer able to borrow money.
9.2.2: Cost of Capital and the Firm’s Investment Decision
Even if the firm’s cost of capital was negatively affected this should still not impact on 
the firm’s investment decision. Basic finance theory would tell us that each project that 
the firm engages in should be assigned its own discount rate. This discount rate should 
be determined by the risk associated with that project. The company cost o f capital is 
then the weighted sum of all the costs o f capital for the investments that the firm is 
engaged in. A particular project may have the same discount rate as the company as a 
whole but that is only due to the risk associated with the project being the same as the 
company as a whole. If  the firm used a single cost of capital for all investment appraisals 
then some projects will be taken on even though they have returns too low for their 
actual level o f risk and some projects will not be taken on even though their returns are 
high enough for their level o f risk. This would lead to the firm only accepting high risk 
projects and rejecting low risk. In practice however, there are a number o f problems with 
the assumption that firms will assign different costs of capital to each project. Firstly, it 
assumes that the firm will be willing and able to compute individual costs o f capital for
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each investment project. When dealing with regulatory interactions it also assumes the 
regulator will have some method of ascertaining the cost o f capital used by the firm.
Although using the appropriate cost o f capital is assumed in theory it is by no means 
certain. The first issue, of whether the firm will attempt to identify individual project 
cost o f capital, places the onus on the firm to determine the correct cost of capital. 
Clearly this would be a particularly arduous task of which there is no consensus over the 
best means for determining either the expected return for a project or the risk associated 
with the project. One way for the firm to determine the correct cost o f capital is to 
identify a listed company or a number of listed companies that shares the same 
characteristics as the investment project that they are facing. Adjust each company’s 
beta for capital structure giving an asset beta and take an average o f these betas. From 
this, and using CAPM, the cost o f equity can be calculated. Alternatively if a single 
listed firm can be found that shares the characteristics of the investment there is no need 
for aggregation, this is the so called ‘pure player’ approach (Grinblat and Titman, 2002). 
Finding such an undiversified firm for each project would be extremely difficult. In 
addition to this adequately adjusting for firm leverage can be problematic. It may also be 
difficult to make an adequate adjustment for the possible growth option. A listed 
company’s beta will also include its prospects for future growth.
Just because it is difficult to calculate costs of capital for each project does not mean that 
a company would not do it. After all, the serious consequences o f using the company’s 
cost o f capital for all investments have already been discussed. Despite this, companies 
do seem to shy away from using investment specific cost o f capitals. Surveys o f 
company finance managers over the last 30 years have consistently found that a majority 
o f companies not only fail to use an investment specific cost o f capital, but do not even 
go as far as to use different cost o f capitals for different divisions o f the firm. A survey 
by Brigham (1975) found that only 23 percent of firms questioned attempted to evaluate 
the risk associated with each project while 48 percent used a single cost o f capital across 
the entire firm. Of those firms that did adjust their cost o f capital the majority (45 
percent) only did so at the divisional level. A more recent study by Bruner et al. (1998)
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found similar results when addressing the same question. O f those firms surveyed, 26 
percent adjusted their cost o f capital for each investment decision while 41 percent did 
not adjust at all. Further evidence of this type o f behaviour was found by Graham and 
Harvey (2001) in a study o f US firms 60 percent used a single company-wide discount 
rate. Those that do use different discount rates for different divisions often use heuristic 
approaches such as adjusting the company cost o f capital by a set amount depending on 
which division it is. Both Cooper et al. (1990) and Block (2003) both find that over half 
o f those firms surveyed use subjective approaches to adjust the cost o f capital for 
different projects. Despite financial theory suggesting that only the risk associated with a 
particular project should be considered when assessing the appropriate cost o f capital in 
reality, due to inefficient investment practices, the company cost o f capital is more often 
used.
Even if the firm is able to calculate a correct cost o f capital for a specific investment 
they will have no interest in sharing this with the regulator. When assessing the 
investment decision that the firm faces, the regulator will have even less information 
than the firm over an appropriate level o f cost o f capital. The regulator will be more 
inclined than the firm to use a measure that is related to the company cost o f capital even 
if they aspire to a more financially sound measure. Despite the fact that the risk 
associated with a particular project has not changed the firm will attempt to use its 
change in cost o f capital to bring about a higher cost o f capital calculation from the 
regulator. A recent example o f this can be found with Ofcom’s treatment o f the 
Openreach2 section of BT’s business.
Given the potential demand for UMTS services and the price operators paid for licences 
to run them, a question remains as to why any operator would delay rolling out a 
network and, in some cases, after delaying, decide to abandon 3G development. Even if 
the licence winning firms had their credit rating lowered, they would still be able to 
borrow. If  the cost of capital is higher it may mean that investment will no happen but
2 Openreach is a new organisation established out of BT to run Wholesale Line Rental, Local Loop 
Unbundling and Ethernet services.
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why delay? If borrowing became so expensive that a network was no-longer viable then 
the project should be abandoned immediately. If a network is viable then why not invest 
now and begin to recover costs. By treating the roll-out o f 3G services as a timing 
option, we can explain why a licence winning firm may delay roll-out and potentially 
abandon the project. The timing option can be seen as a type o f a financial call option. 
The call option allows the holder, for a specified period o f time, to pay the exercise price 
and receive a certain asset. The proposition is then that the option to delay investment is 
affected by the size of the licence fee via the cost of capital. Given this framework we 
can also consider the impact of different regulatory decisions and the effect that high 
sunk costs, such as licence fees, can have on the decision to delay or abandon. In turn, it 
will be shown how the introduction o f an option to delay will impact on the interaction 
between the firm and regulator.
9.2.3: Option to Delay in Telecommunications
There has been wide-ranging work carried out on the problem of a firm’s investment 
decision when faced with an irreversible investment and have an option to delay. Given 
these conditions the net present value rule - that the firm should invest in a project if the 
NPV o f the expected cash flow is equal to or greater than the cost - is no longer valid. 
For an overview o f timing options and the firm’s investment decisions, see Pindyck 
(1991) and later Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Investment decisions and timing have also 
been used to model investment decisions in multi-firm industries under different 
conditions.3 This piece seeks to consider in more detail the relationship between the 
regulator and the firm within this framework. If the regulator attaches some welfare to 
the speed of network roll-out, then the regulator may make decisions that will change the 
firm’s investment behaviour. Harmantizis and Tanguturi (2007) take the US case and 
attempt to calculate the value o f an option to defer expansion from 2.5G to 3G under a 
number o f quite stringent assumptions. They calculate that the value o f the option to 
delay is small but considerably greater than the NPV of the project if  investment
3 See Vives (1989), Spence (1979), Sadanand and Sadanand (1996), Ghemawat and Sol (1983).
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occurred immediately. Although they consider other factors that can influence the size of 
the option they do not consider the impact o f regulatory behaviour.
This piece takes a similar approach to Alleman and Rappoport (2002). The authors use 
the concept o f timing options to demonstrate potential costs o f regulation. In particular 
they examine the costs placed on broadband and payphone providers o f removing the 
option to delay in the USA. They do acknowledge that companies could engage in 
lobbying to change the market they face, but they do not engage in a detailed discussion 
o f this. Allenman and Rappoport identify four possible regulatory conditions that can 
affect the delay option: (1) no constraints on cash flow or the ability to delay, (2) a 
constraint on cash flow but not on the ability to delay, (3) no constraint on cash flow but 
no ability to delay, (4) a constraint on both cash flow and the ability to delay. These 
translate well to the 3G case but we may also include enforcing the cost o f investment 
(the exercise price). In the 3G case the regulator can allow operators to share network 
infrastructure etc.
We start with the assumption that the 3G licence owner can begin roll-out now or in the 
next period (Period 1 and Period 2 respectively). This model will be similar to that of 
Lozano and Rodriguez (2006) and use a finite horizon model with discrete instead of 
continuous time. The regulator must decide in period 1 which regulatory stance it wishes 
to take, either strict or lax.
The cost o f roll-out is ( /)  and is assumed to be the same in each period so that /, = I2, in 
options terms this is the exercise price. The discounted cash flow o f the project if  the 
firm invest now is (Pj).The net present value o f the project assuming immediate 
investment is:
NPV] = PJ - / j  (9.1)
251
If there was no uncertainty over the level of future demand then as long as V] > /, 
investment will take place. This is still the approach taken with neoclassical investment 
theory. However, once we introduce uncertainty over future demand this is no-longer the 
case.
In this simple delay option example period 2 demand can either be high or low. If 
demand is low then the cost o f roll-out is greater than the value o f the project and it will 
be abandoned./? is the probability o f high demand and 1 - p is the probability o f low 
demand in period in the second period. Vu2 is the value (in terms o f cash flow) o f the 
project if demand is high. Vd2 is the value of the project if demand is low. It will be 
assumed that Vd2 < I2 so investment will not take place. In this case Vu2 and Vd2 have
been put in terms of demand, it may be better to think in terms o f technological ability 
and perceived potential demand. The uncertainty comes not just from whether people 
will want to use 3G services but also what services 3G will be able to offer. The present 
value of the project if investment occurs in the next period can be calculated as:
( / ? x ( ^ 2- / 2)) + ( ( l- /? )x 0 )  ' (9.2)
1 + r
This leads to three possible outcomes. If c, > NPVX and in period 2 Vu2 occurs, then the 
firm waits until period 2 and then will invest. If  ct > NPVX and in period 2 Vd2 occurs 
then the firm will wait until period 2 and then abandon the project. If  c, < NPVX then the 
firm will invest in period 1.
The regulator has the ability to influence I , Vx, Vu2 and Vd2. If  the regulator wants the
firm to begin roll-out in period 1, they can decrease /  or increase V} . However it is
unlikely that Tj could be increased without also increasing Vu2 and Vd2. The regulator
could decrease the value of ct without decreasing V} by having a fine for delay. This
may increase the chance of abandonment if Vui becomes less than / .  In this case the 
timing option is worthless so investment will take place in period 1 or not at all. Let us
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say that a regulator with a lax stance will decrease I and increase Vu2 and Vd2. If the 
regulator is able to increase Vd2 to such an extent that it is greater than /  then it is 
probable that the firm willl invest in period 1. This would be to ensure that they do not to 
miss out on the forgone revenue. Strictly speaking the value o f c, is still greater than the 
NPV due to I remaining the same across periods. So it is still possible that delay would 
occur even if  both Vu2 and Vd2 were greater th a n / .  Taking the more realistic
assumption that the value of I changes then if both Vu2 and Vd2 investment will take 
place in period 1 as any uncertainty over profitability o f the project is removed.
It may be more appropriate to consider the roll-out process as a staged multi-period 
option procedure, particularly as staged roll-out conditions were used. As roll-out was 
required in set periods, a discrete rather than continuous model is appropriate. A licence 
holding firm will continually assess from period to period whether they will roll-out, 
delay, or abandon. By treating the development as a rolling timing option, the firm will 
have no reason to abandon. Instead of abandonment they will just delay until the next 
period. Now we assume that high demand in the next period means demand high enough 
to bring about immediate investment and low demand means a further delay or 
abandonment will take pllace. The regulator must now also decide whether to enforce the 
roll-out condition or allow an extension. This enforcement may not lead to simply 
removing the licence but may be a fine. In each period the regulator will come under 
lobbying pressure to relax their regulatory stance in the next period. If the regulator is 
known to enforce a roll-out condition then, due to the loss o f future options, Ct will be 
worth less, encouraging investment in period 1.
9.3: Two Examples of Changing the Cost of Capital
Section 9.2 established the position of options to delay in mobile telecommunication 
infrastructure development and the impact of licence fees on the cost o f capital. This 
section will give an indication through simulations of how these two factors can impact
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on infrastructure investment. These simulations are used to illustrate the effect o f a 
change in the cost o f capital on two simple option formations. In both these examples it 
is assumed that the regulator has the ability to influence the size of the initial investment. 
The regulator will then seek to set the investment to a level that would cause immediate 
investment given different costs of capital. The level o f demand in the future is assumed 
to be uncertain. The first example uses Black-Scholes framework and the second a 
binomial framework. Each simulation is run over a seven year period with a risk-free 
rate of 3%. The cost o f capital is assumed to change form 7% to 7.5%. Each simulation 
shows the change in investment required to bring about immediate investment given a 
change in the cost of capital.
9.3.1: A Black-Scholes Simulation
Using a modified Black-Scholes framework whereby
c = Ve~,TN(d, ) -  Ie~r,TN(d2) (9.3)
and
, InO/ / ) +(r,-y + <r2 /2)T (9.4)
rf' =  W F ---------------
d2=d]-ay[r (9-5)
Where c is the value of the option, V is the present value o f cash flows o f the project,
T is the time to expiration I is the investment cost and rf is the risk free rate. In this
simulation the level o f /  is set so that the firm is indifferent between investing now and
delaying investment so that
NPV -C (9.6)
V — I-C  (9.7)
The correct level of investment can then be calculated iteratively using
j _ V~ Ve~yTN{d\) (9.8)
~ \-e~r/TN(d2)
The initial starting point equates the NPV of the project and the value o f the option to
delay. The results o f this simulation can be seen in Table 9.2. Both this simulation and
the next were calculated using Excel.
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By changing the cost of capital we can calculate the level o f I that is required for the 
firm to be indifferent between immediate investment and delay. Note that this is not the 
level of adjustment that will cause the firm to undertake investment. The simulation says 
nothing about whether the investment is in the money (if it is not then the investment 
will not take place). Rather, it shows how much the cost o f investment will have to 
change in order to bring about immediate investment even if  the project is not in the 
money. This then brings about the condition set out in Equation (9.7). This comes about 
as the NPV of the project decreases by a greater amount than the value o f the option to 
delay. If the value o f the project moves out of the money then an even greater 
adjustment would be needed to cause immediate investment.
9.3.2: A Binomial Simulation
A more complex version of the same concept can be seen by using a binomial model.
In section 9.2.3 a simple model was used that only has two periods. Just as with the 
Black-Scholes example this simulation will use 7 periods. The model that will be used 
will follow that suggested by Lozano and Rodriguez (2006). Using a finite time horizon 
model with discrete periods, Lozano and Rodriguez run simulations to demonstrate how 
by using option pricing a more accurate level of access pricing can be imposed by a 
regulator.4 They demonstrate the difference between an NPV calculation o f an access 
price that would bring about immediate network investment and the option pricing 
valuation. This simulation will keep the level of access pricing fixed and instead adjust 
the level of initial investment so that network investment will occur instantly. Unlike the 
previous Black-Scholes example results will also be shown for three levels o f demand 
volatility (0.15, 0.25 and 0.5).
As with Lozano and Rodriquez D is demand at t = 0, p is the probability o f an ‘up’ 
state u and 1 -  p is the probability of a ‘down’ state d . Next period D may increase to 
uD with a probability p or to dD with a probability o f 1 -  p . a is the access price set 
by the regulator, k is the cost o f capital and /  is the cost o f the initial investment.
4 See Chapter 8 for a discussion of access pricing.
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In t  periods time D will take the value
D, = Du‘d'-‘ (9.9)
The present value o f the future cash flows will then be
V=D,  V — y   ---- pJ(\-p)'-‘-JuJd'-'-J (9.10)
' '£ ( 1  + k)'-f£jKi-j)r
In their model the regulator would traditionally (not taking account o f the option cost) 
set (a) so that the NPV of the future cash flows just covers the investment.
i =dY - ^ — y_JL_pj(\-py-JuJd‘-J (9U)
t * ( i + k y u m - j ) f
When the value of waiting is included the regulator must set an access price according to
= _ / _  _ qu + (1 -  q)d A  g  -JL-p>  (1 -  p r +J W
u'D \ + r &t\(\ + k) y !(f — y )! P)
where q is the risk neutral probability so that
_ (pu + (1 -  p)d)(\ + r) -  (1 + k)d (13)
q (u-d)(l + k)
and now taking account of optimal timing the firm will seek to maximise the following
<14>
1 + r
If  we wish for I to be set at a level just high enough to cause immediate investment then
y  j  ( 15>
1 + r
Lozano and Rodriquez sought to calculate the difference between the access price that 
would cause immediate investment with or without a value placed on waiting. They 
come from the position of setting the price of access to a level that will compensate a
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firm for the lost of the option to delay when they are forced to build a network 
immediately. Using the same framework I will run a simulation that calculates the level 
o f access price that is needed to just cause instant infrastructure investment and then 
holding those constant calculate the change in the size o f initial investment if there is a 
change in the cost of capital. Equation (14) can be rearranged so that
I = au'D + u‘Dqu + (1 q)d V  — T ------- ---p'{ 1 - PT"'~!u‘ (16)
Again an increase in the cost o f capital will require a decrease in /  for investment to 
begin immediately. Results for this simulation can be seen in Table 9.3 At any set level 
o f prices, increased demand volatility will cause changes in the cost o f capital to have a 
greater effect o f the require change in level of investment..
9.4: UM TS Regulation and Timing Options
The timing option §et§ up how the firm and regulator interact with regards to roll-out. To 
understand how a regulator will respond we must consider how they will bring about a 
change in c, V or I . The revenue that a firm receives given particular market 
conditions will partly be a function o f the regulatory stance. It is clear that allowing 
higher termination charges and giving operators access to premium content will increase 
the revenue given any particular market conditions. The regulator can decrease the 
exercise price through decreasing the cost of roll-out. This may be through allowing site 
sharing, reducing legal and environmental red tape, or even giving a refund on licence 
fees if  this decreases the cost o f borrowing. From the discussion that occurred in Chapter 
8 it is clear that a combination of these actions were used.
The action that the regulator takes depends on which policy it wishes to pursue. It may 
wish to ensure speedy roll-out, minimise the chance o f abandonment out o f a desire to 
maintain the number o f operators, or both of these options. The regulator will then be 
balancing the desire for a speedy roll-out of services and preventing abandonment and
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withdrawal from the market against achieving other regulatory goals. The decision to 
change the regulatory position will depend on the weighting that the regulator places on 
speedy roll-out, having a larger number of operators and controlling for perceived 
market failures. Section 9.5 will outline a more formal approach to the interaction 
between the firm and regulator.
9.4.1: Regulatory Difficulties with Options
A cautionary note comes from Dixit and Pindyck when they discuss policy intervention 
in a market such as this. They find that any delay or abandonment is not caused by a 
market failure and so is socially optimal. Indeed they claim that “a social planner would 
not want to invest any faster”. This will mean that the regulator should make no 
alteration in its stance to account for uncertainty. These claims do rest on a number o f 
assumptions. The most problematic in this case is that the firms operate in well 
functioning capital markets. Even if  we are happy to accept the assumptions surrounding 
the firm’s behaviour we must then accept that the regulator’s primary goals are the 
correction of market failures. It is difficult to marry this concept with the stated goal of 
speedy roll-out of 3G services. Dixit and Pindyck’s argument focuses on how regulators 
should behave, what they actually do may be quite different. The regulator may not be 
attempting to correct for a market failure but rather to undertake a particular political 
goal. When the regulator decides on its particular regulatory stance it is fair to assume 
that they will only have partial knowledge of the position they will need to take to 
prevent delay in period 1 or abandonment in period 2. The licence holding firms will 
need to be able to send some credible signal to the regulator that the value o f the option 
is greater than the NPV of the project. The exact nature o f this signal will depend on the 
regulator, but may take the form o f deteriorating stock prices, credit ratings; all o f which 
occurred in the post-administration market. However, if the regulator believes that this is 
not the case then they will not change their stance as investment will occur immediately. 
Even if the believe that the option to delay is worth more than the projects NPV they 
will not intervene if they attach greater importance to the conditions they would have to 
relax than the speed o f roll-out.
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Thus far it has been assumed that the regulator makes a decision in period 1 which is 
then adhered to in period 2. More realistic is the assumption that the regulator will react 
to the state o f the world as it occurs. Once the network operator has built its network and 
so undertaken some level of irreversible investment it is in a weaker bargaining position. 
The regulator will truncate any up side with stricter regulation. If  the operator believes 
that an upside will bring additional ex-post regulation then this decreases the future 
value o f an upside and hence decreases the probability o f period 1 investment. This 
problem was discussed with respect to telecommunication regulation by the Australian 
inquiry reports by the Production Commission into Telecommunication Competition. 
They suggested allowing a fair rate o f return in the form o f a truncation premium which 
rewards the operator for the risk they face (Lally, 2003). How exactly this premium 
would be calculated and whether a regulator would be able to commit to it is unclear.
9.4.2: Regulatory Approach to the Cost of Capital
When there is an interaction between a regulator and a firm there will be information 
asymmetries. The actual level of cost o f capital may be less important than the perceived 
cost o f capital that the regulator uses to assess the firm’s investment decision. It would 
be simple to assume that the regulator was perfectly informed over the level o f cost o f 
capital faced by the firm and hence, be able to determine the level o f regulation that 
would bring about immediate investment. However it is unlikely that the regulator 
would have as much information as the firm over the cost o f capital they face. If a 
regulator values immediate investment highly then it may estimate on the side of caution 
when they determine the cost o f capital. Indeed there is a certain amount o f evidence for 
this. In Ofcom’s discussion on its decisions around appropriate cost o f capital they state 
that when using CAPM to estimate the cost o f capital the estimation o f the Equity Risk 
Premium (ERP) can be difficult as
“ ...calculation of a forward-looking ERP entails a significant degree o f judgement and a 
wide range of estimates can be derived by commonly-used estimation techniques. As 
explained in the first and second consultation, Ofcom considers that the downside risk 
associated with taking too low a value for the ERP (discouraging discretionary
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investment) is more detrimental to the interests of consumers than taking too 
high a value (leading to higher prices to customers) and has tended to the 
higher end of the possible range.” (Ofcom, 2005, Section 1.13)
As may be expected, there would appear to be a clear preference here to allow a more 
generous cost of capital in order to ensure that investment takes place even if  this is to 
the detriment of the price that future the future consumers will pay. Indeed in the same 
document Ofcom refer to the level o f compensation provided to an investing firm for the 
loss o f the option to delay. They take the view that by using an upper estimate o f the 
weighted cost of capital they can account for the value of the option without having to 
explicitly set a value for it. In essence they use a higher cost o f capital when assessing 
the level of return that a firm should receive.
In order to demonstrate some of the regulatory implications the models o f options to 
delay have been kept necessarily simple. In reality further complications could be added 
in a number of areas. The 3G market contains a number o f competing firms. We may 
wish to introduce the concept o f a first mover advantage or model the impact of differing 
industry structures. If there is some advantage from early market entry then this may 
negate any value from waiting. It has also been assumed that the demand is exogenous 
o f  the firm’s investment decision. Although this will be true to a degree, as the success 
o f  new technologies is always uncertain, a firm building or not building a network is 
bound to impact on demand in the next period. It may be better, rather than considering 
the model in discrete time periods, to treat it as a continuous process where the firm 
must decide at which point to invest. Further complications could be added by the 
introduction of a time to build effect. Thus far it has been assumed that when investment 
occurs the investment returns begin to be realised instantaneously. It would be much 
more realistic to assume that once the decision to invest is made a time lag occurs before 
revenues begin to be received. Finally, only the option to delay has been explicitly 
considered here. Like the first mover advantage the option to expand may provide a 
strategic value to the firm o f investing at an early stage. Once investment has occurred it 
may provide access to other more profitable investments as the market develops. This
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would be particularly important where the market develops quickly. Another option that 
would add value to immediate investment is the follow on option. This option has value 
when the investment that takes place leads to other linked investments that would not be 
able to take place without the original investment. How valuable both o f these options 
are will depend to a degree on the timeframe o f the investments. The follow on option 
would only take on a significant value over a longer timeframe than either an option to 
delay or an option to expand. The option to expand takes on greater value when the 
timeframe for roll-out and the formation of services is greater. It would be difficult for 
operators to respond to a change in demand if roll-out cannot be performed quickly. It is 
possible that given their existing infrastructure the value o f an option to expand will be 
worth less to existing operators than new ones. Now that the nature and position of 
options in mobile telecommunications has . been outlined, and the interaction o f the 
regulator and the firm discussed, the following section considers how the option may 
impact on regulatory bargaining.
9.5: A Simple Model of Regulatory Bargaining
Section 9.5 will discuss how the decision of the firm to invest came be seen in the light 
o f a bargaining scenario. The first stage o f this discussion will link the effect o f an 
option to delay on a firms bargaining weight. This will be done through a two stage 
Nash bargaining solution game where the asymmetric bargaining weights are justified 
by a Rubenstein type argument (Muthoo, 1999). The supposition is then that once the 
licence administration has take place the regulator and the licence holding firm engage 
in a bargaining process over the division of surplus where both are impatient and prefer 
investment to occur earlier rather than later. This will be picked up in Section 9.5.1 
where the discussion will be used to inform the weights that are applied to the licence 
holder and government in a Nash bargaining game. Preceding that discussion, this 
section will argue that for the firm this preference for early investment will be reduced 
when the firm incurs high licence fees through the impact that this will have on the value 
o f the firm’s option to delay.
261
The Rubinstein bargaining is based on the assumption that those taking part in the 
bargain are impatient. They would prefer to complete the bargain earlier rather than 
later. In a simple game the surplus to be divided between participants decreases after 
each period. This concept fits well with the timing of network roll-out, particularly 
where the regulator desires early roll-out. One of the simplest example o f a Rubinstein 
bargaining model is the dollar game where the two players prefer more dollars to less 
and prefer the money sooner rather than later. The roll-out o f network infrastructure to 
run 3G services is clearly more complicated than the dollar game but can be seen in a 
similar way. If it is assumed that the regulator wishes to maximise consumer welfare, 
and at a broader level, to efficiently use the limited amount o f spectrum that is available, 
they will seek to do this through a number of different policy goals. The regulator has a 
desire for a speedy roll-out o f 3G infrastructure in order to be able to offer 3G services at 
the earliest point possible. This desire comes from the potential loss o f consumer surplus 
over the period of delay and other politically motivated aims. These factors cause the 
regulator’s preference for earlier rather than later investment by the licence holder. The 
dollar is then made up o f the conditions that are attached to this roll-out. These factors 
include the level and quality of coverage (in terms of their obligations to cover a certain 
level o f the population or country as part of the roll-out conditions), the prices charged 
for services and the content that are provided on the network and the punishment placed 
on the firm if they do not meet this requirement. The consumers and hence the regulator 
would want the best service at the lowest possible price. This is with the constraint on 
the regulator that a service must be offered. As such they must ensure that investment 
occurs at some point so that the network roll-out takes place.
The link between the value of the option and the ability to bargain comes through the 
bargaining weights for the licence holder. The firm will seek to gain surplus from a 
decrease in the discussed regulatory levers. Where we have no other strategic 
considerations, the cost o f delay for the firm is the forgone revenue from not investing 
immediately. The cost o f immediate investment will be the loss o f the option to delay. 
The greater the expected revenue from investment in network infrastructure, the more 
likely that investment will occur immediately. Where there is a great amount o f
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uncertainty, whether it is due to the potential future demand o f the success then the value 
o f the option to delay will increase and investment will be less likely. However, this 
reasoning does not explain why the licence fee would have an impact on the decision 
and the timing to invest. The desire of the firm to engage in bargaining over its 
regulatory position, would be used in a regulatory bargaining game whether high licence 
fees were incurred or not. Indeed the licence winning firm has an option to delay even if 
it receives the licence fee for free. If it is accepted that the size o f the licence fee 
negatively affects the firm’s cost o f borrowing then this in turn it will positively affect 
the value o f the option to delay.
In Section 9.3 it was shown that a higher discount rate will cause the value o f the option 
to delay to be greater. If  we assume that the cost of investment in each period will be the 
same and that the size o f the potential market will not be affected by late delay, then the 
only cost o f delay to the firm is the foregone revenue. In terms o f a bargaining model, 
the discount factor will be reduced when the value of foregone revenues is high and 
increased when the value o f the option is high. If the value o f the option is the same as 
the forgone revenue the discount factor will be 1. In this case we are assuming that the 
cost o f network investment remains the same in real terms between periods.
More formally, let us say that we have a total surplus o f x that the regulator can divide 
between the firm and consumers. The regulator knows that if they do not provide enough 
surplus to the firm then they will delay investment until the next period. If  delay occurs 
then there is no surplus provided to either the consumers or the firm. We can also say 
that the licence winning firm and the regulators have discount factors o f 8f and 8r 
respectively. 8r takes a value between zero and one and is determined by the loss o f total 
surplus between the two time periods. In addition to the loss o f total surplus there may 
also be other unquantifiable political factors which will mean that the regulator has a 
very strong desire for early roll-out.
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If  there is no option to delay then the cost of delay for the firm, assuming that once 
investment occurs output can take place immediately, is only the revenue lost in the 
period between bargains and Sfwill take a value between 0 and 1 .
<?,= (9.17)
X
where r is the forgone revenue between two periods. If r = 0 then there would be no 
revenue in the period, and hence no revenue lost. This would leave the firm with a 
discount factor o f 1 and the firm would be indifferent between investment now and in 
the next period. If r = x then all the revenue for the project is made during the period 
between bargains and hence all the revenue is lost. In this case the firm has an absolute 
preference to invest now and so will invest even if offered a fraction o f the surplus.
When we include an option to delay with some value then the discount factor becomes;
St = 1 + —  (9.18)
X
Remembering that c is the value of the timing option. It should be noted that the 
discount factor no longer has to be less than 1. If the value o f the option takes a value so 
that 0< c < r then the discount factor will be between 0 and 1 but will be greater than 
with no option to delay. If c>r then the discount factor will be greater than 1 and the 
value o f  the investment is increased if investment is delayed. Each side’s surplus is then 
taken as xdj* where t is the time at which the bargain takes place.
The model also rests upon the assumption that once the agreement over the regulatory 
stance has been fixed both sides will stick to it. This is realistic to a degree; once the 
firm has invested in its infrastructure it no longer has any bargaining power. Investment 
has occurred and as long as the firm can cover its marginal costs there is no motivation 
to cease the provision o f services. The regulator has less o f an incentive to keep to the 
agreement that is made. The temptation for the regulator would be to renege on the
agreed division o f surplus once investment has occurred and the infrastructure is in
place. This form of regulatory truncation has already been discussed in relation to its
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effect on the value o f the option to delay. The regulator would be particularly keen to 
engage in this truncation if their estimate of surpluses was incorrect. If they believe that 
the licence holder is experiencing a windfall from the regulatory regime that is in place 
they may wish to remove part o f this. The regulator may be prevented from behaving in 
this way through legally enforceable contracts. However, as was discussed in the last 
section, where contractual inefficiencies are present these contracts made be difficult to 
form.
9.5.1: Nash Bargaining Model
The discussion around Rubenstein discount factors will be used to inform the building of 
a model to examine the Nash bargaining model. The primary argument is that greater 
debt will cause a higher cost of capital and in turn increase the value o f the option to 
delay. As was shown in the last section this will in turn improve the licence holder’s 
bargaining position. Due to the complexity that surrounds the 3G administration and 
post-administration market it is impossible to model all the interactions that occurred 
during the period under consideration. There is also the added complication o f a number 
o f different firms interacting with each other and the regulator. Indeed one o f the themes 
o f the last two chapters has been the influence of political and psychological factors in 
determining the interactions between the regulator and the firm. As such this model will 
present a simplified version of the possible interaction between the regulator and the 
firm and the consequences for how the government would approach licence fees.
As with the simple option pricing example, the licence holder’s investment decision will 
occur over two periods. In each period either a positive or negative state o f the world 
occurs. The only negotiation that occurs between the government and the licence holder 
occurs over the price (P) that will be charged and the level o f the investment (I). As has 
been discussed if a price is negotiated in period 1 then it will also be used in period 2 so 
that ^  = T*2 • Before the first period the sale of a licence occurs. The government can
determine the level o f revenue it receives by either giving the licence away in a beauty 
contest or charging a fee through an auction. The government and licence buyer
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negotiate over the level of investment in period 1. If the licence holder invests, then 
production occurs in period 1. If the licence holder does not invest in period 1 then the 
government and licence holder engage in another bargain over investment levels and 
pricing in period 2. The licence holder then has the opportunity to invest if  they have not 
done so in period 1. If investment takes place in period 2 then so will production. It 
should be noted that in this model the government is responsible for both revenue raising 
at the licensing stage and the post-administration regulatory bargaining. As was 
discussed in the previous section, once an agreement is reached both parties will adhere 
to it.
Given that the licence holder invests in period 1, the government’s payoff in period 1 is 
^ ( / , ) . This welfare is made up of a range of different factors such as consumer surplus,
political influences, and network externalities. Potentially this could include any o f the 
social factors that were outlined in the previous chapter. In period 2, the welfare function 
for the government is PF2( /() where i = 1 or 2 depending on whether investment has 
taken place in period 1 or 2. The welfare function will take a form so that 
W\I) > 0, W”(I) < 0 . The payoff for the government if investment has only occurred in
period 2 with a positive state of the world is
G2=W{I2)-P2 (9.19)
If investment occurs in period 1 then the expected payoff for the government is
E{Gl) = p[Wi(I,) + W1(I,)-2Pt] (9-20)
where p is the probability that the positive state o f the world occurs.
For the licence holder the payoff in period 2 is
B2 = P2-I2 (9.21)
The expected payoff if investment occurs in the first period is then
E(B,) = 2pPl-Il (9.22)
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Moving on to the Nash bargaining solution threat points,in period 2, if the licence holder 
and the government do not reach an agreement then both receive a payoff o f zero. This 
is equivalent to a licence holder removing themselves from the market. It is also 
assumed that the licence can be re-sold at a later date but this is both costly and time 
consuming. In period 1 the threat point is the expected value o f the outcomes in period 
2. The bargaining power o f the licence holder will be a  and the power for the 
government the bargaining power is 1 -  a . As discussed in the previous section, the cost 
o f delay to the licence holder will decrease due to the higher value o f the option to delay. 
As such a  is a function of the licence fee L where a\L) > 0.
Taking the usual backwards induction method the bargaining solution for period 2 given 
that investment did not occur in period 1 is
This will mean that no matter what the licence fee as long as the investment is 
worthwhile in the positive state of the world then investment will be efficient. Although
(9.23)
which leads to the first order conditions
(9.24)
P2-.(\-a)(P2-I2) = a(W2(Iz)-P2). (9.25)
Solving Equations (9.24) and (9.25) gives
(9.26)
which means that investment is efficient and
Pl=aW2(l'2) + {\-a)l'2. (9.27)
One point to note from Equation (9.28) is that
(9.28)
267
the government is keen to have full mobile coverage, they are willing to compromise if 
it will cost the rest o f the country too much.
The bargaining solution for period 1 is
MaxhJ,pi =[p(Wi(Il)+W1(Ii)-2Pl)-p{W2(l[)-Pl)Y\p(2P,)-h-p{Pl-ll)Y
Leading to the first order conditions of
/, ■.(\-a){w;{i])+wM))(2Pp;-ri-p(p; -/;»=
(9.30)
a2 P(wl ( /,• )+ w2 ( / ; )  -  2 p;-(w2 (r2) -  p2 )).
(9 31)p^2p(\-a){2pp;-i;-p{p;-i\))=2ap[w,{i;)+w2{i;)-2p;-{w2(i'2)-p;)).
Solving Equations (9.30) and (9.31) gives
WXi;) + W'(l\) = 2p. (9-32)
Here, when compared to period 2, efficient investment can be higher due to the longer 
time period or lower because o f the associated future uncertainty o f investing 
immediately.
The price is then given by
t. (i- a)\r^p{p2-i'2)\+ap[w; )^+w;{.i;)-{w;{f2)-pi)] (9-33>
2pp; =
From Equation (9.33) it can be seen how the price will change with the licence price L 
HP* HP* <9 '3 4 )( i ) [ - / ;+P {p; -  r2)+P {w, (/; >+w2 (O) -  P (w2 m  > -  p2)]+P-±- > o
From this we can conclude that delay only occurs due to a high level o f uncertainty. If 
the bargaining surplus is positive in the first period then a bargain will be reached. Now 
looking at the government’s ex-ante overall payoff including the licence fee. This payoff 
will be
n ( / ; ) =wt ( / , - ) + w2 ( / ; )  -^  2 p; + 1
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The optimal choice of licence fee is then
6 m c O  = _2 < +1 (9-36)
dL dL ’
Equation (9.36) provides an interesting conclusion. Depending on the size of dP* /dL 
the government would opt for either an auction or a beauty contest. When d?{ /dL takes 
a low value, due to the period 1 surplus being low or a'(L) being small then a high 
licence fee will have a smaller impact on the government’s bargaining power. If a'(L) 
is high or the period 1 surplus is large then beauty contests are better due to the smaller 
impact they have on bargaining power. Taking the discussion from the Section 5.2 and 
applying it here; if the mechanism through which the licence fees impact o f the option to 
delay is particularly strong, whether this be through inefficient capital markets or 
through firms engaging in heuristic investment practices, it will mean that a\L) will be 
high and a beauty contest should be more attractive to the government than an auction. 
As such, governments that perceive a higher external effect are more likely to opt for a 
beauty contest. This finding links back to the discussion in Chapter 3, that those 
countries that used beauty contest explicitly citing concerns over market development.
9.6: Conclusion
The previous chapter discussed the evidence of regulatory easing in the post 3G 
administration. Evidence was presented from both the European and national level. This 
chapter had demonstrated through a bargaining mechanism why this behaviour may 
come about. The chapter has focused on three main areas. Firstly, the chapter was 
interested in how a lump sum licence fee could impact on a firm’s investment decision.
Sections 9.1 and 9.2 outlined how inefficient capital markets and heuristic investment 
approaches could have an effect on the firm’s operational cost o f capital when the firm 
pays out a large lump sum fee. The next step was to explore how these changes in the 
cost o f capital would impact on the firm’s preferred timing for network infrastructure 
investment. As was shown in Sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5, both theoretically and through 
simulation, this could be explained through an increase in the value o f the firm’s option
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to delay. When the firm’s cost of capital increased the value o f the option to delay also 
increased. This relationship is then applied to a bargain between the firm and the 
regulator. This relationship is examined in the context o f a Rubinstein bargain where the 
increasing value o f the option to delay increases the firm’s bargaining weight by making 
delay more attractive for the firm.
The final section applies this concept to a simple two stage bargaing model between the 
licence holder and the government. The final section shows that where the firm’s cost of 
capital is affected in the way described, it may be better for the government to use a 
beauty contest instead o f an auction to avoid the associated loss in bargaining power. As 
such, a one-off lump sum licence fee administered using an auction mechanism can have 
an impact on the post-administration industry.
Table 9.1: Fall in Licence winner credit ratings
Operator Long Term Rating (Moody)
1999 2000 2001 2002
British Telecom A al A2 Baal Baal
Deutsche Telekom Aa2 A2 A3 Baal
France Telecom Aa2 A1 Baal Baa3
KPN A al Baal Baa2 Baa3
Sonera A2 A2 Baa2 Baa2
Tele Danemark Aa3 Aa3 A2 A3
Telecom Italia A3 Baa2 Baal Baal
Table 9.2: Blac t-Scholes Simulation Results
Cost o f (K) 7.1% 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 7.5%
Investment 
(I) % change 0.348 0.694 1.037 1.380 1.720
Table 9.3: Binomial Simulation Results
Cost of (K) 7.1% 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 7.5%
(I) % change 0.15 -0.318 -0.634 -0.948 -1.261 -1.571
(I) %change 0.25 -0.321 -0.639 -0.956 -1.27 -1.582
(I) %change 0.5 -0.331 -0.659 -0.985 -1.31 -1.632
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
This thesis has been concerned with an analysis o f the administration to run 3G 
technology across Europe. Controversy surrounded these licences due to the range of 
fees that different countries raised, as well as due to the post-administration difficulties 
o f many of the operators. During and soon after the administrations the focus was on the 
success of auction theory and on denials that large lump sum fees would have an impact 
on the post-administration market. This thesis has challenged some o f these ideas and 
has presented reasons why such behaviour was observed. The thesis began by exploring 
those factors that were responsible for the differential in licence fees across countries, 
and examined the issues that affected which bidders won licences. The second part of 
the thesis focused on using financial market reaction to explore whether there was 
evidence o f overpayment via a winner’s curse. The final part o f the thesis explored the 
evidence that 3G licence fees directly brought about regulatory response. In essence, the 
analysis found that the regulators responded to regulatory distress by providing the 
licence holders with a more favourable regulatory framework. The previous section 
ended by seeking to explain how and why this regulatory easing could come about, 
suggesting that the key motivation for this regulatory easing was some socially desirable 
goal.
10.1: How Much? Who? Why?
The first section o f this thesis focused on what actually happened in the 3G 
administrations. Chapters 2 and 3 outlined why particular administration types were 
used and how auctions became the favoured type o f administration procedure. Auctions 
were preferred due to their relative speed, ability to raise revenue and the perceived 
efficient outcomes associated with auctions. Auctions became even more popular in the 
European administration after the success o f the British and, to a certain extent, the 
German auctions. Despite the popularity of auctions, some countries still used 
comparative selection procedures, often with the expressed aim to avoid overpayment 
and encourage network development. One key insight that chapter 3 provided concerns
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the difficulty that developed in the post-administration market. This post-administration 
difficulty manifested itself in two ways: through delays in network development and 
through the return or revocation o f licences. Indeed, as was shown, in a number o f cases 
the same licences were administered and returned several times. It should be noted that 
these delays and hand-backs occurred across countries that used different administration 
procedures and was not the reserve of countries that used auction procedures.
Chapter 4 provided the main empirical analysis of the first part o f this thesis. Firstly the 
analysis attempted to identify those factors that affected the size o f each bidding unit’s 
bid. As discussed in Chapter 4, it would have been desirable to examine each bidding 
unit’s willingness to pay, but due to the way the auctions are constructed this is not 
possible. The bidders’ observed highest bid was analysed against country-specific, 
bidder-specific and administration-specific variables. The second part o f the analysis 
examined those factors that affected the bidding units’ probability o f winning a licence. 
The analysis also introduced an instrumented observed highest bid into the probit 
equation.
Certain results of this analysis conformed to expectations over the procedures. Although, 
unsurprisingly, one of the main determinants was the type o f administration used, 
auction or beauty contest, there were also a number of other factors that determined the 
size o f licences across countries. One critical factor among these was the timing o f each 
administration. This meant that one of the most important determinants o f a bidding 
unit’s bid was out of the hands o f the administering authority. The main finding o f the 
second part o f the analysis is that despite attempts to allow entry into the industry, the 
main factor in determining the probability of a bidding winning a licence was whether or 
not they were an incumbent.
10.2: The Identification of a Winner’s Curse
After the first part o f this thesis addressed those factors that influenced the size o f the 
observed bids and who won licences, the second part focused on whether too much was 
paid for these licences due to a winner’s curse. One o f the key discussions from Chapter
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5 was the problems associated with identifying a winner’s curse, in particular the 
weakness o f using ex post returns data to identify a winner’s curse in general and in 
particular for the 3G administrations. Indeed, an examination of ex post returns could 
only inform us of which state of the world occurred, rather than whether a winner’s 
curse was present. The argument was made for the examination o f the stock market 
reaction in order to test whether overpayment occurred. This was done through 
examining the reaction to the winners and losers of the German and Swedish licences 
administrations through an event study. One key question that was addressed regarded 
the importance o f a winner’s curse in terms of regulatory response. Given the definition 
o f a winner’s curse provided in Chapter 4, the licence winner could be in financial 
distress whether they had suffered a winner’s curse or not. Indeed, the licence holders 
could have suffered a winner’s curse and still made a considerable profit. The 
importance of identifying a winner’s curse lies in two areas. As Chapter 4 made clear, 
firstly, a winner’s curse makes financial distress more likely and, secondly, the 
administering authority is partly to blame for the financial distress that occurs.
In order to identify the winner’s curse, an event study was employed. The event study 
analysed the equity returns of each o f the firms involved in the German and Swedish 
procedures. In this event study, the market model was used to estimate the normal 
returns and three estimation techniques were used to account for any non-normality. 
Although it may have been preferable to treat the European administration as one larger 
super-event, with each administration as one event within it, this is not possible due to 
the length o f the event. This is, however, something to be aware o f in the interpretation 
o f the results. The results of the event study in Chapter 7 show that the winners in the 
German auction fare considerably worse than the losers when compared on both the 
event date and the losers’ withdrawal date. Further evidence was provided to support 
this supposition by the lack o f  a negative response to the winners o f the Swedish 
administration. The results from the comparative Swedish/German event study suggest 
that the markets reacted negatively to the winners in the German auction and there was 
evidence o f at least a short-term winner’s curse.
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10.3: Post-adm inistration Regulation
The final part of this thesis dealt with the regulation o f mobile telecommunications, 
evidence of post-administration regulatory easing, and an explanation o f the post­
administration behaviour by both the firm and regulator. In order to facilitate this 
discussion, Chapter 8 has given an overview o f the way telecommunication regulation 
has been carried out at the European level and at the national level in the UK. In both 
cases, documentary evidence was provided for the proposition that regulators responded 
to the size of licence fees and the firms’ financial distress by easing the regulatory 
framework the firms faced.
Chapter 9 sought to examine how high licence fees can impact on the firm’s investment 
decision by changing the firm’s cost o f capital. In particular, it showed that where 
capital markets are inefficient or where firms engage in heuristic investment practices, a 
large lump sum fee could impact on the cost of capital that the firm uses to assess its 
investment strategy. This in turn can affect the value that is placed on the firm’s option 
to delay. It was shown that this could explain the post-administration behaviour o f the 
firm in delaying its roll-out of network infrastructure. The second part o f Chapter 9 
outlined how the regulator and the firm could interact in a simple two stage Nash 
bargaining model, informed by the first section on the value o f the option to delay and 
how this could affect Rubinstein bargaining weights. It demonstrated the ways in which 
the size o f the licence fee could bring about delay in network infrastructure investment 
due to the regulatory firm interaction. A larger licence fee increases the value o f the 
firm’s bargaining weight via a change in the firm’s cost o f capital. When this concept is 
applied to the simple Nash bargaining model a solution is reached that shows beauty 
contests may be more attractive to governments than auctions. Indeed the model shows 
that those countries that perceived a higher external effect will have a preference for 
beauty contests.
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Although this model poses valuable insights, it can only be indicative o f the actual 
relationship between the firm and the regulator. The model assumes only a single firm 
and regulator. Further, it assumes two time periods and that the same authority is 
responsible for both administration revenue raising and post-administration regulatory 
stance. All o f these assumptions could be changed and provide scope for further 
research. Another area of potential future interest is the relationship between the level of 
regulatory easing and the level of independence of the regulatory authority. This area 
was touched upon in Chapter 2 with a discussion o f the level o f interference in the 
regulator’s decisions over the number o f licences and the way the licences were 
administered.
10.4: Lessons learnt from the 3G auctions.
The administration of spectrum has undergone a considerable evolution over the past 30 
years. Much o f this experience has been a matter of trial and error. Perhaps the most 
important leap forward was the use of spectrum auctions and the lessons learnt from the 
FCC administrations. These lessons were primarily focused on ensuring participation, 
revenue maximisation and efficient allocation. As was discussed in Chapter 2, many o f 
these lessons were adapted for use in the European 3G auctions. Just as lessons were 
learnt from the FCC auctions, they can also be learnt from the 3G administrations. Some 
have already been discussed in other literature (Klemperer 2002a). However, these have 
focused on auction design matters, such as attracting entry or preventing collusion. This 
thesis has been particularly interested in the impact that overpayment has had on the 
post-administration market. At a European level, there were clear winners and losers 
from the allocation of spectrum, and this may require additional coordination when 
administering spectrum. The results of the empirical analysis show that part o f the 
success for the countries which did well was brought about by luck rather than good 
judgement. This led to an inequitable distribution o f revenue between countries, 
although in many cases the post-administration distress was not exclusive to the 
countries that raised the most. If the EU administration is considered to be a sequential 
administration rather than a series of individual administrations, then one potential 
option would be to administer licences all at once through a simultaneous European
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procedure. Although this would improve equity among countries in terms o f revenue 
raised, as it removes the element of luck (particularly in terms of timing), it runs the 
danger o f exacerbating the possibility of a winner’s curse. In a sequential process, 
information about the true value of licences emerged over time. If  licences were sold 
through a simultaneous procedure, this information could not be released. The danger 
then is that a winner’s curse is present in all, not some o f the administrations.
It follows from the examinations in this thesis that auctions may no longer be the best 
way to administer spectrum licences if the administering authority has some social goal 
to achieve, as was the case with the 3G technology. If handled differently, the licences 
would end up in the hands of those that valued them the most, and the administering 
authority would have to accept that it is up to the winning bidder to decide what to do 
with their licence. Although contracts can be written that oblige the licence-winning 
firms to meet certain roll-out or quality commitments, it has been shown that in many 
cases these contracts are not enforced and are open to be rewritten. In this case the 
regulator takes a ‘how would this make me look?’ approach. Where there is a desire to 
achieve a certain policy goal it may be better to administer through a beauty contest 
procedure and enforce the efficient use o f spectrum through some form o f administered 
incentive pricing. However, if that is to be done, it must be done at a European level to 
stop some countries using auctions and free-riding on those countries that used beauty 
contests.
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